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  In the context of scarce financial resources for government programs in both the United 
States and internationally, efforts to develop health policies that are informed by evidence may 
increase in the coming years. In the United States, policymakers repeatedly attempt to integrate 
research and evidence into the policy process by establishing federal advisory committees (FACs) 
under the purview of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972. Although FACA 
committees have existed for 40 years, are used frequently by the executive branch, and have 
accounted for $3.4 billion in government spending between 2002 and 2011, they remain “little-
known [and] little-studied” (McApline and LeDonne, 1993).  
  Two case studies were conducted for this dissertation using a multiple-case study design and 
a grounded theory approach to data analysis. The overall aim was to describe how FACs play a role 
in the policy process. The two cases were the science advisory board to the President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief and the National Climate Assessment and Development Advisory Committee, 
established by the US Department of State and the Department of Commerce, respectively. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with purposively-selected FAC members and staff from 
government agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Interview transcripts were 
coded using Atlas/ti following the grounded theory method outlined by Charmaz. Documents from 
FAC proceedings were also analyzed. Data collection was concluded when theoretical saturation was 
achieved. 
  Findings suggest that FACA committees are heterogeneous in their primary objectives, 
operating structures, decision-making processes, and methods of engaging with NGOs. In addition, 
ambiguity in the FACA language and the politically sensitive nature of selecting members 
complicates efforts to establish a FAC. However, in spite of the differences across FACA 
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committees and the difficulties encountered by government agencies when establishing them, 
findings indicate that FACs can be effective as mechanisms for agencies to obtain specific and broad 
guidance from independent experts on scientific matters of concern to the agency.  The extent to 
which recommendations from FACs are adopted by the establishing agency is influenced by the 
perspectives of the executive and legislative branches on the value of evidence-based policy, as well 
as the perspective of the agency administrator.  
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"No one who achieves success does so without the help of others. The wise and confident acknowledge this help with 
gratitude." 
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finished my PhD. In particular, I am confident that I would not have been able to complete this 
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  The importance of research1 and its findings to public policy generally, and to health policy 
more specifically, has been verified repeatedly over time. Although a formal movement calling for 
health policy to be more evidence-based did not arise until the mid-1990s, the literature suggests that 
the United States government relied on health research and its findings as early as the 1930s to draft 
legislation for a national health insurance program. More recently, and in the context of health 
reform, the emphasis placed on ensuring that health policy decisions are based on evidence has 
increased substantially. Indeed, President Obama’s intention to use evidence to inform decisions 
about the allocation of resources for social programs has been unprecedented (Haskins, 2011). 
  An examination of the literature on theories of the policy process, the role of research and 
its findings in this process and of evidence-based policy highlights disagreement over fundamental 
assumptions underlying each of these three areas. The traditional model of the policy process 
assumes that policymaking is linear, with policymakers engaged at each stage as rational actors. The 
push for policy to be more evidence-based or even evidence-informed relies heavily on these 
assumptions. Some critics suggest these assumptions are flawed and argue that any call for policy to 
be evidence-based ignores the reality of the policy process, including that it is irrational and political. 
This debate is discussed in-depth in Chapter 2.    
  While there is clearly a disconnect between the literatures on theories of the policy process 
and the literature on evidence-based policy, policymakers repeatedly attempt to integrate research 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this Introduction, the terms “research”, “science”, and “scientific advisors” are used with fidelity to 
the literature. More specifically, seminal texts including that by Nutley et al. and Buse et al. refer to research in the policy 
process. Texts by Jasanoff and Smith refer to science and scientific advisors in policy. The distinctions among research, 
evidence, and knowledge are discussed in more depth in the next section, but to be precise, research is the process that 
produces evidence. Evidence, in turn, refers to the empirical findings from research and is one source of knowledge. 
Broadly, this dissertation is concerned with research, evidence, and knowledge within the domain of science, and as it 





and evidence into the health policy process by convening committees of experts external to the 
government to advise on matters related to science and public policy. The U.S. government’s 
reference to external experts for advice and recommendations on policy matters has occurred since 
the earliest days of this country’s existence. Indeed, there is broad agreement in the literature that 
President Washington established the first advisory committee in 1794 when he sent a delegation of 
government officials to negotiate a resolution with a group of farmers who were protesting a new 
tax on distilled spirits that was designed to fund debt incurred during the Revolutionary War. Before 
making a decision, President Washington and numerous Presidents and government agencies since, 
have legitimized policy action by investigating a problem, seeking the advice of citizens, and acting 
on the basis of the information received (McAlpine & LeDonne, 1993). While not restricted to 
policy issues related to health or even scientific matters more broadly, the pattern of referring to 
external advisors for guidance and recommendations on policy matters provides an important 
foundation for how research, evidence, and knowledge can inform policy. 
  Over time, and as politicians “became less likely to have any detailed grasp of scientific 
matters or even to aspire to such knowledge” (Smith, 1992, p.16), the federal government’s use of 
and reliance upon advisory committees grew substantially. By the 1950s and 1960s, the 
government’s opinion of the value of research and its findings in the policy process was quite high. 
“The conviction was that research could and should be of direct use to government in determining 
and achieving its social policy objectives” (Nutley, 2007, p.10). By 1971, there were approximately 
3,000 advisory bodies in existence (Ginsberg, 2009).  However, the government’s and the American 
public’s enthusiasm for research quickly turned to “lowered expectations for American social policy 
and for research to improve it” (Fox, 1990, p.492). Congress and the public questioned the 





Broadly, there was concern that the thousands of advisory committees in existence were costly and 
wasteful. In an attempt to address the discontent about the government’s use of advisory 
committees, Congress passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) in October 1972. FACA 
still serves as the major piece of legislation that regulates federal advisory committees (FACs) of all 
types 2 (FACA, 1972).  
  While FACs can be established to provide advice and guidance on any matter of public 
policy, health seems to be a major focus of FACs, if not the focus of the majority of FACs.  
Between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY2011, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
spent $1.72 billion on its SABs, which is roughly half of the total government spending on such 
committees during the past decade (Lipowicz, 2011). If advisory committee spending from other 
agencies which address health issues is included, FACs for health easily consume the majority of all 
government spending on advisory committees. 
I. Rationale 
  Although federal advisory committees as defined by FACA have been in place for 40 years, 
are used frequently by the executive branch of government, and accounted for over $3.4 billion in 
government spending between FY 2002 and FY 2011, they remain “little-known [and] little-studied” 
(Domhoff, 2005). As described in more depth in Chapter 2, the literature about public policy and 
health policy development and implementation is surprisingly silent on advisory committees. Even 
the literature specifically assessing the role of research in the policy process – including the literature 
on evidence-based health policy – neglects FACs as a possible mechanism by which research can be 
integrated into and have an influence on the policymaking process. An exception to this pattern is 
                                                 
2 Typically, federal advisory committees are referred to as FACs. For the purpose of this dissertation and for the sake of 





texts addressing the role of science and scientific advisors in public policy. However, while this 
literature situates FACs in a historical perspective, it does not attempt to harmonize its findings with 
the literature on the theory of policymaking nor of policy analysis. As a result, not only is little 
information available regarding the theoretical position of FACs in the health policy process but 
there is little empirical evidence regarding the extent to which FACs contribute to health policy 
decision-making and the factors which affect the use of FAC recommendations. 
II. Aims 
  These gaps suggest that there is room in the existing scholarship for additional research on 
the role of FACs in the health policy process in the United States. FACs for health are uniquely 
positioned to have a potentially substantial impact on decisions about policies which could affect the 
health of millions of people.  
  The overarching objective of this study is to describe the role FACs for health play in the 
policy process. The specific aims of this study are to: 
1. Describe how FACs play a role in the health policy process and how they help to ensure 
health policy is evidence-based;  
2. Identify how internal processes and external contextual factors contribute to whether the 
recommendations of a FAC will be adopted; and 
3. Describe strategies various stakeholders, including advocacy groups, FAC members, and 
government agency staff have used to facilitate the uptake of recommendations put forward 
by FACs and propose new, effective strategies.   
This study uses a case study approach to examine these aims relative to two federal advisory 
committees; the science advisory board (SAB)  for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) established by the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) in the US 
Department of State and the National Climate Assessment Development and Advisory Committee 





Department of Commerce (DOC).3 The rationale for selecting these two committees is explained in 
depth in Chapter 4. 
III. Overview 
  Chapter 2 reviews the literature related to the health policy process and the role of research 
and evidence within that process, the evidence-based policy movement, and the legislative and legal 
history of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Chapter 3 presents and describes the conceptual 
framework that guided this research. Chapter 4 describes the methods used for data collection and 
analysis. Chapter 5 presents the case study for the PEPFAR science advisory board and Chapter 6 
presents the case study for the NCADAC. Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the cross-case findings. 
A discussion of the policy implications from this research and recommendations for future research 
are presented in Chapter 8.   
                                                 
3 OGAC refers to the advisory committee to PEPFAR as a science advisory board. Thus, when referring to the 
PEPFAR advisory committee, the acronym SAB will be used. NOAA refers to the NCADAC as a FAC. Thus, when 





 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
  As indicated in Chapter 1, the question of how federal advisory committees play a role in the 
health policy process and facilitate evidence-based or evidence-informed policy, and what and how 
contextual factors influence whether committee recommendations are taken up by policymakers 
remains largely unexplored in the literature. As a potentially significant bridge between the research 
and policy communities and as a frequently-used interpreter of data, research findings, and evidence 
for policymakers, it is somewhat surprising that the neither the scholarship on the role of research in 
health policy nor the scholarship on evidence-based policy addresses federal advisory committees.  
  The existing literature most relevant to the aims described in Chapter 1 addresses the 
context of health policy and the role of research in health policy, including theories of the policy 
process, models describing the research-policy relationship, and evidence-based policy. These areas 
are discussed below. In addition, the evolution of the legislation (i.e., FACA) governing when and 
how federal advisory committees are developed and implemented and the subsequent case law 
which clarified this legislation is addressed below, as is the existing scholarship on federal advisory 
committees. Overall, it is clear that there is room for additional scholarship on FACA committees 
and their role in the policy process.  
  Some scholars in the grounded theory field argue that any existing literature should be 
ignored so that the researcher can remain neutral and avoid any risk of prior knowledge introducing 
bias into how the findings are interpreted (Andrade, 2009, p.46). However, others argue that from a 
practical perspective, a literature review is important to conduct to ensure that the proposed study is 
truly unique, to provide context for and motivate the area of inquiry, and that the research 





purposes of the study described herein did inform the development of the initial conceptual 
framework as well as the interview protocol. However, in keeping with the grounded theory method, 
it was the data collected during this study that formed the basis from which conclusions were drawn.   
I. The Context of Health Policy 
  Public policy can be defined as “what governments choose to do or not to do” (Buse, Mays, 
& Walt, 2005).  Health policy can be considered a sub-set of public policy, at least with respect to 
action or inaction by government in the health sector. As such, frameworks which describe the 
factors that affect and influence public policy are broadly applicable to health policy as well.   
  Understanding the policy context is important to this study because FACs do not operate in 
a vacuum and in fact, may serve as critical entities in the policy process: how and when FACs are 
constructed as well the constraints they face may be influenced by the contexts that influence policy. 
Kraft and Furlong propose one framework for the “contexts” of public policy which refer to 
“systemic factors…which may have an effect on…policy” (Buse et al., 2005, p.11). Five contexts are 
described, those being the social, economic, political, governing, and cultural contexts.  
  It is important to understand these contexts for their relationship to the policy process 
independent of research and evidence: each of these contexts contributes to a policy environment 
that “determines which problems rise to prominence, which policy alternatives receive serious 
consideration, and which actions are viewed as…feasible” (Kraft & Furlong, 2010, p.10). However, 
in the context of this study, it is also important to understand these policy contexts for their 
influence on research and in turn, on evidence, because research and evidence can be seen as the 
‘currency’ of FACs for health. Thus, factors which affect this currency (i.e., factors which affect 
research and evidence) indirectly affect FACs.   





p.10) could affect what social issues are considered important. In turn, and with respect to health, 
the social context could influence what issues are considered priorities for research funding and/or 
the issues considered worthy of being addressed by a FAC. The economic context, or the state of 
the economy, could affect the volume of funding available for research and the funding available for 
the basic operating expenses of a FAC. The political context may trump all other contexts by 
elevating or squelching certain social priorities and their corresponding research funding. In addition, 
politics could affect whether a FAC is established merely to allow a policymaker to sidestep a 
difficult issue and whether its recommendations are taken seriously by policymakers. The governing 
context, which refers to the structure of the U.S. government, could affect the level at which 
research is conducted (i.e., federal, state, or local), the practical application of research findings, as 
well as determine which government entity at the federal level is responsible for establishing and 
implementing the FAC. The cultural context, which refers to political culture, could affect how 
social issues and their associated research priorities are framed.   
  Buse et al. in their health policy-specific text Making Health Policy use a framework similar 
to that of Kraft and Furlong to describe the context of health policy, which is based on the 
categories defined by Leichter in 1979 (Buse et al., 2005; Leichter, 1979). Although the Buse et al. 
framework overlaps with the Kraft and Furlong framework directly in only one category (cultural 
context), the “situational factors” described by Buse et al. broadly encompass Kraft and Furlong’s 
social, economic, political, and cultural contexts. Similarly, the “structural factors” described by Buse 
et al. are most closely related to the governing context in Kraft and Furlong’s framework. Buse et al. 
include one additional category, namely international or exogenous factors, which is useful for 
considering health issues of global import.   





research, evidence, and advisory committees in the public policy arena broadly also could occur for 
research, evidence, and advisory committees in health more specifically, given the similarities 
between the Kraft and Furlong and Buse et al. frameworks. Moreover, research and evidence may 
play a more important role in health policy relative to policy for other social sectors because of the 
unique nature of the primary outcomes in health, namely morbidity and mortality. These outcomes 
are ultimately biological processes. Policies which seek to mitigate illness and death may draw from a 
range of disciplines, but such policies must be based on knowledge about the mechanisms and 
channels by which morbidity and mortality occur. Ultimately, this knowledge is derived from 
research. Because of this unique relationship between research and health policy, the contextual 
factors affecting the policy environment may play an especially important role in facilitating or 
inhibiting the use of research and evidence by policymakers as well as in the implementation and 
outcomes of FACs for health. 
II. The Role of Research in Health Policy 
  Before discussing the literature on the relationship between research and policy, it is critical 
to define what the literature means by research, evidence, and knowledge. Research has been 
described as a process that leads to new knowledge (Buse et al., 2005; Nutley, 2007). Research 
findings must be interpreted; they “cannot speak for themselves” (Nutley, 2007, p.24). The literature 
is in broad agreement that between research and knowledge, there is evidence. Nutley argues that 
“research is often seen as one form of evidence, and evidence as one source of knowledge” (Nutley, 
2007, p.23) but recognizes that some take a narrower view and define evidence as just the empirical 
findings of research (Nutley, 2007, p.23). Buse et al. go a step further and define evidence as “any 
form of knowledge, including, but not limited to research, of sufficient quality to be used to inform 





and knowledge, where knowledge can be defined as the “interpretation of research” (Nutley, 2007, 
p.23).  
  However, describing the relationship among the three terms in this way risks 
oversimplification since “definitions of any research, evidence and knowledge invariably invoke 
implied accounts of at least one other” (Nutley, 2007, p.25). Moreover, how the terms are used may 
vary based on the subjective judgments of those using the terms and the surrounding political 
context. Nutley argues that “there are no easy or value-free ways in which research can be defined 
separately from the context of its use” (Nutley, 2007, p.25). This investigator would argue that 
knowledge is more focused on interpretation of research findings than research itself. In line with 
Nutley’s proposition, research findings and any related data used to generate those findings would 
be one type of evidence. 
  For the purposes of this study, research is defined as above and refers to the process of 
generating new knowledge. Evidence is used to refer to a combination of the definitions above, 
including the empirical findings from research as well as a source of knowledge of sufficient quality 
to inform decisions. Knowledge is used as above, to refer to the interpretation of research. 
Exceptions to these definitions arise in the remainder of this literature review where the terms 
originally used by authors are also used here in an effort to accurately reflect the characteristics of 
the articles and texts as well as their authors’ intentions. 
A. Theories of the Policy Process: Where does Research Fit? 
  Traditional models of policymaking describe the policy process as a sequence of stages 
which, at a minimum, include four components: agenda setting, formulation, implementation, and 
evaluation. This step-wise model has also been described as a cycle, to clarify that the stages of the 





models is that policymaking is a linear process and by extension, that policymakers make rational 
decisions at each stage. The implications of these assumptions for the use of evidence in policy 
decision-making are that there would be a direct relationship between evidence and policy decisions 
at each stage and moreover, that “research precedes the policy solution to a pre-defined problem” 
(Buse et al., 2005, p.160). 
  The traditional model of policymaking has been critiqued widely for its failure to adequately 
reflect “the messy complexity that typically characterizes policy making as it really occurs”(Nutley, 
2007), and has been called a “policy myth” (Colebatch, 2005, p.93). At the root of these critiques, 
there lies frustration with the models’ assumption that policymakers themselves can act in a rational 
manner. All humans – not just policymakers – have limited or “bounded rationality” because “we 
are simply unable…to deal with complex problems in ways that meet the demands of objective 
rationality” (Nutley, 2007, p.94).  
  This concept of humans’ limited ability to behave in simply rational ways was first described 
by Herbert Simon in 1957 (Simon, 1957). Simon argued that the bounds of rationality are further 
constrained for policymakers who “typically lack both access to the extensive information needed to 
carry out such comprehensive analyses, and the time to do so” (Nutley, 2007, p.94). As a result, 
policymakers will focus on outcomes that can be achieved in the short-term rather than on long-
term social problems. Simon called this “satisficing” (Simon, 1957). The concept of bounded 
rationality is important and relevant to this study because if policymakers are in fact constrained in 
their ability to be rational and also ‘satisfice’, they may not only have reason to turn frequently to 
FACs but also to adopt and implement only those recommendations which can be easily enacted in 
the short term and are likely to yield high-impact results. 





‘incremental’ (Lindblom, 1968). In Lindblom’s model, small-scale, incremental policy change is not 
only all that is politically feasible, but it also has distinct advantages, such as reducing the number of 
policy alternatives that need to be considered as well as the complexity of the policy process. 
According to Lindblom, research plays a key role in the incremental model as a bargaining chip that 
the numerous actors in the policy process can use to persuade others to cooperate. As a result, 
research can interact with the policy process at multiple points and through multiple actors. 
Research is still used in a rational manner but primarily for political or tactical means.  
  Stronger critiques of the rational policy model are manifest in the garbage can and multiple 
streams models, developed by Cohen et al. and Kingdon, respectively (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 
1972; Kingdon, 1984). The garbage can model portrays the policy process as being fundamentally 
irrational, where policy problems and their solutions are dumped into a metaphorical garbage can. 
This process is inherently chaotic and unpredictable, and may not allow for decisions to be made 
pro-actively, since problems and solutions emerge from the garbage can when new opportunities 
arise (Nutley, 2007). Kingdon’s multiple streams model serves as a slightly more organized extension 
of the garbage can model but is just as unpredictable. Concerned primarily with agenda setting, 
Kingdon posits that issues will rise to the policy agenda when and only when the following three 
conditions are met: (i) problems come to the attention of policymakers; (ii) feasible policy solutions 
to these problems are generated; (iii) and the political environment is favorable. Both the garbage 
can and multiple streams model “suggest that research…may enter policy through diverse and 
indirect routes and from a variety of different sources” (Nutley, 2007, p.97). 
  Although the traditional model of policymaking may have shortcomings, these may be 
outweighed by the model’s principal value. The policy process model offers “an ideal from which 





model of the relation between research and policy still tends to inform the day-to-day working 
assumptions of many researchers and policymakers”(Buse et al., 2005, p.160). In addition, research 
can still play a role at each stage of the process. At the agenda setting stage, research can “help 
clarify the nature of issues of concern, and to push such issues onto the policy agenda”(Nutley, 2007, 
p.93). During the implementation phase, research can help define policy alternatives and can help 
address implementation problems, through process evaluations, for example. During the evaluation 
stage, research can make a “substantial contribution,”(Nutley, 2007, p.93) since evaluation involves 
research by definition (Buse et al., 2005, p.160).  
  Thus, given the recognition by the literature that the policy process model serves as a basis 
from which other models are derived, the recognition and use it receives in applied policy settings, 
and the clear opportunities for how research can engage with each phase of the process, the cycle 
model of policymaking is used for the purposes of this study. 
B. Models of the Research-Policy Relationship 
  The discussion in the above section addresses the literature describing various models of 
policymaking. These models do not aim to specifically describe the research-policy interface. Those 
that do are “few and far between in the literature” (Nutley, 2007, p.92). Nevertheless, six additional 
models warrant discussion for their contribution to the understanding of the specific relationship 
between research and policy.   
  The two communities model, developed by Caplan, is based on the premise that policymakers 
rarely use research (Caplan, 1979a). The absence of research in policymaking results from the idea 
that “researchers and policymakers live in separate worlds, with different and often conflicting 
values, different rewards systems, and different languages” (Caplan, 1979a, p. 459). Communication 





gap between research and policy and to enhancing the use of evidence. However, just bringing 
researchers and policymakers together will not suffice to resolve the gap between the two 
communities: interaction must be effective and involves “value and ideological dimensions as well as 
technical ones” (Caplan, 1979a, p.461). 
  Similar to the two communities model, the general utilization theory model, developed by 
Wingens, focuses on researchers and policymakers as two distinct groups. It suggests that the divide 
between researchers and policymakers is rooted in functional, not cultural, differences. According to 
Wingens, research use occurs when there is interaction between the systems in which policymakers 
and researchers exist. This interaction happens when a change in social context occurs that in turn 
prompts a change in policy issues. However, for research to be used, it must be “adapted, recreated, 
and transformed” (Nutley, 2007, p.100). 
  Communication and interaction form the basis of the third model of research-policy 
interface. The linkage and exchange model, developed by Lomas, conceptualizes research and policy as 
processes, not products, which suggest that there are numerous opportunities for there to be mutual 
influence between research and policy (Lomas, 2000). These opportunities arise through the 
interaction of three spheres: information, which includes research and evidence; the institutional 
structure of decision-making; and the values that frame a decision. Importantly, researchers and 
policymakers are not the only groups linked by exchanges in this arena: research funders and 
knowledge purveyors are also key groups. Thus, “the main focus of the model is…on the interfaces 
between these four groups” (Nutley, 2007, p.101). One way this interface occurs is when 
policymakers ask researchers for advice on pressing policy problems and researchers aim to provide 
solutions. According to the linkage and exchange model, when this interface is strong, research use 





  Weiss proposes that the enlightenment model views the concepts and perspectives generated by 
a body of research as gradually diffusing through a multitude of pathways – from journal articles to 
media outlets to conversations with colleagues – to shape how policymakers view certain issues 
(Weiss, 1979). Rather than referencing the findings of a specific study as the motivation for changing 
the course of a particular policy, the enlightenment model suggests that general ideas rooted in 
research almost unconsciously enter the policy sphere. In an important departure from the problem-
solving model, the enlightenment model does not assume that research findings have to support 
policymakers’ values to be useful: any research is capable of filtering into the policy arena. And 
herein lies two of the deficiencies with this model: the sieve of indirect channels through which 
research is sifted does not screen out poor-quality research and it is an inefficient process which can 
result in outdated research informing policy decision making. 
  Not unlike the enlightenment model, the knowledge-driven model assumes that knowledge will 
be used by policymakers simply because it exists. In a linear fashion, this model suggests that basic 
research provides an opportunity for applied research to assess whether the initial findings are 
relevant for practical application. If this is found to occur, technologies are then developed and 
implemented. Weiss argues that this model is more relevant for basic research and if scientific 
findings “affect government decisions…it is not likely to be through the sequence of events posited 
in this model” (Weiss, 1979, p.427). 
  In contrast, the problem solving model, also put forward by Weiss (Weiss, 1979), suggests that 
research findings help solve policy problems. Empirical evidence is applied directly to a specific 
policy issue, which is then resolved because the gap in knowledge is filled. Weiss argues that this 
evidence can either be found by searching the existing literature, or policymakers can commission 





come and go without leaving any discernable mark on the direction or substance of policy” (Weiss, 
1979, p.428), the commissioning of research component of this model fits well with the grant-
making pattern popular in public health, whereby the government or other funders release requests 
for proposals on specific health or health policy issues.  
  Of the models discussed above, the linkage and exchange model is the most relevant for this 
study given its specific acknowledgement that an interface between policymakers and researchers is 
needed for research use to occur, and that this interface can be created when policymakers request 
the advice of researchers. Although Lomas does not suggest it, a FAC would be a natural example of 
an interface through which researchers can provide advice at the request of policymakers. 
C. Evidence-Based Policy: Rationality versus Reality  
  Without much apparent attention to the theoretical underpinnings of the research-policy 
relationship, policymakers launched a call for health policy to ground itself more fully in evidence in 
the mid-1990s, following a call for evidence-based medicine (EBM). EBM would use evidence (i.e., 
empirical findings from research) in a more direct manner during clinical practice decision-making. 
Systematic reviews from randomized controlled trials were viewed as a particularly valuable and 
important source of evidence for clinicians.   
  By the mid-1990s, the evidence-based medicine movement had expanded into a call for 
evidence-based policy (EBP), or evidence-based policymaking (EBPM). Its proponents argued that 
“research [should be given] greater weight than other considerations in shaping policy decisions” 
(Buse et al., 2005, p.159). Others had less ambitious goals and defined EBP as “the integration of 
experience, judgment and expertise with the best available external evidence from systematic 
research” (Buse et al., 2005, p.159). Regardless of how ambitious the request to use evidence in 





That politics is driven more by values than facts is not open to dispute. But at a time 
when [government officials] are arguing that medicine should be evidence based, is it 
not reasonable to suggest that this should also apply to health policy? If doctors are 
expected to base their decisions on the findings of research surely politicians should 
do the same. Although individual patients may be at less risk from uninformed 
policymaking than from medicine that ignores available evidence, the dangers for the 
community as a whole are substantially higher. The impact of policies that are poorly 
designed and untested may be disastrous...As such the case for evidence based 
policymaking is difficult to refute (Ham, Hunter, & Robinson, 1995, p.71). 
 
  As a formal movement with an associated label, EBP seems to have originated in the United 
Kingdom (UK) during the Blair government, which came into power not long after a Research and 
Development Strategy was implemented for the National Health Service (NHS) and had the slogan 
of “’what counts is what works’” as an emblem of its emphasis on policy capability (Buse et al., 
2005; Denis & Lomas, 2003; Ham et al., 1995; Head, 2009). The United States and Canada quickly 
followed the UK’s lead. In the United States, Evidence-based Practice Centers were created and 
funded under the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHRQ), and in Canada, the Prime 
Minister’s Forum on Health recommended creating a multi-year fund with $50 million in annual 
funding for evidence-based decision-making (Canada, 2004; Denis & Lomas, 2003). 
  However, the literature suggests that health policy in the United States valued research and 
was based on evidence – at least in part – long before EBP became an official movement (Fox, 
1990; Innes, 2002). As long ago as the 1930s, legislation proposing national health insurance was 
based on plans from a group of researchers. In 1966, the National Center for Health Services 
Research and Development was established by the Assistant Secretary for Health to fund studies on 
health policy. In the 1980s, “research had considerable importance to people who made health 
policy”(Fox, 1990, p.484) with the Medicare Prospective Payment System being “the most 





creation of AHRQ, which conducted much of the research on medical intervention outcomes using 
funds appropriated by Congress, the health policy environment in the United States was very much 
evidence-based, even prior to the official EBP movement. 
  Literature published early in the EBP movement focuses on maximizing the opportunity for 
research to influence policy by providing advice to researchers and policymakers alike on how to 
enhance the potential for research findings (i.e., evidence) to be integrated into health policymaking. 
Barriers to research affecting policy, such as politics, scientific uncertainty, timing, and 
communication, compound problems resulting from the assumption held by many that the policy 
process is rational. Walt argues that by recognizing these barriers and the realities of the 
policymaking process, and by “making the study of the research-policy nexus a fundamental part 
of…teaching in schools of public health…it is possible to…overcome the barriers to research 
influencing policy” (Walt, 1994, p.233). Davis and Howden-Chapman conclude that research “is 
more influential if topical, timely, well-funded, and carried out by a collaborative team that includes 
academics” (Davis & Howden-Chapman, 1996, p.865). Davies, Nutley, and Smith offer seven goals 
to “foster an enhanced role for evidence” (Davies, Nutley, & Smith, 1999, p.361) in health policy, 
and advise that researchers and policymakers should agree on “what constitutes legitimate evidence” 
(Davies et al., 1999, p.361), as well as considering the cost-effectiveness of interventions, among 
other priorities.   
  The spirit of the recommendations from this early literature is largely supported by studies 
which assess policymaker preferences for the use of research and evidence. A survey of state-based 
health policymakers in the United States about their “formal and informal methods of acquiring 
information about health policy issues” (Sorian & Baugh, 2002, p.265) indicates that policymakers 





policymakers provide similar findings (Colby, Quinn, Williams, Bilheimer, & Goodell, 2008). A 
systematic review of studies in which health policymakers were interviewed about enabling factors 
and barriers to their use of research found that in addition to being timely and concise, researchers 
should have “personal and close two-way communication with decision-makers” (Innvaer, Vist, 
Trommald, & Oxman, 2002, p.243) and strive to ensure that the research and evidence they present 
to policymakers includes effectiveness data.  
  As the EBP movement matured, two themes emerged in the literature, both of which are 
relevant to this study. Proponents of EBP, especially Dobrow et al.(Dobrow, Goel, & Upshur, 2004) 
and Gold (Gold, 2009), developed frameworks to capture how contextual factors affect the use of 
evidence as well as the pathways by which evidence is integrated into policy. Critics of EBP argued 
that at best, EBP is based on a flawed premise, and at worst, policymakers are unable to attain the 
goals of EBP. 
  Dobrow et al. developed a framework for evidence-based decision-making, with an emphasis 
on how context shapes what is considered evidence and how evidence is utilized (Dobrow et al., 
2004). Two contexts are relevant: the external context “accounts for the environment in which a 
decision is applied and includes disease-specific, extra-jurisdictional and political factors” which are 
“fixed, uncontrollable and cannot be manipulated by decision-makers” (Dobrow et al., 2004, p.210) 
(emphasis in original). This context is important because it can make a substantial contribution to 
the evidence base. The internal context “accounts for the environment in which a decision is made” 
(emphasis in original) and is important because it may alter “the range of purposes, participants, and 
processes employed” (Dobrow et al., 2004, p.215). The framework developed by Dobrow et al. 
includes three stages of evidence utilization – the introduction, interpretation, and application of 





just as much as the evidence on which those decisions are based.   
  In her article outlining pathways by which health services research influences health policy, 
Gold applies social science theory to illuminate the “black box” which often mediates the 
relationship between research and its use by policymakers(Gold, 2009). Gold outlines 10 pathways 
by which research may be applied by policymakers, which fall into three categories. The first 
category is a traditional pathway, wherein “meritorious research findings will find an appropriate 
audience without much emphasis on the mediating process” (Gold, 2009, p.1123). This category 
echoes the key features of the knowledge-driven and problem solving models. The second category 
focuses on the role of intermediaries or processes which “can support better connections between 
the policy needs of users and findings from researchers” (Gold, 2009, p.1126). This category is 
reminiscent of the linkage and exchange model. Finally, the third category involves users enhancing 
the value of research. This framework provides a useful contribution for its recognition that 
although policymaking is influenced by politics, there are still ways to enhance research use (Blendon 
& Steelfisher, 2009). 
  Critics of EBP range from those who warn researchers to “proceed with care” before 
“uncritically accepting the notion of evidence-based policy” (Black, 2001, p.275) but remain 
cautiously optimistic about the potential for EBP to be useful, to those who contend that “health 
policy decision makers are generally unable to attain the basic goals of evidence-based decision 
making…and evidence-based policy making because humans make decisions with their naturally 
limited, faulty, and biased decision-making processes” (McCaughey & Bruning, 2011, p.1). Others 
seem concerned about the negative exposure and risk EBP forces upon sound science, encouraging 
“institutions and individuals [to] grow more vigilant against…tactics…that put evidence-based 





  At the heart of the critiques of EBP is an assertion that the entire phenomenon is based on a 
set of flawed assumptions, namely that the policy process is linear and that policymakers are rational. 
Greenhalgh and Russell state that expressions related to EBP, such as knowledge translation, are 
“fundamentally inaccurate” because such terms are based on a world view that “fails to address key 
elements of the policymaking process” (Greenhalgh & Russell, 2009, p.304). Clarence argues that 
governments have many ways of using research, all of which are inherently political. She asserts that 
the goal of integrating evidence into policy is really a goal related to “depoliticizing the policy 
process” (Clarence, 2002, p.2). However, Clarence argues that because evidence needs to be 
interpreted, and because interpretation is a subjective process, “the very evidence [policymakers] 
choose to make use of is in itself an activity inherently lacking in neutrality” (Clarence, 2002, p.3). 
Marston and Watts are also concerned about the potential politicization of evidence, arguing that 
there is a risk for EBP to “become a means for policy elites [to] increase their strategic control over 
what constitutes knowledge about social problems” (Marston & Watts, 2003, p.159). However, their 
core concern is that in the process of trying to encourage policy to be based on evidence, there will 
be an over-simplification of what counts as evidence and what evidence is appropriate to apply in 
different circumstances. As a result, Marston and Watts call for “policy-makers and researchers [to] 
remain ‘context sensitive’ about the sorts of research methodologies and the types of evidence best 
suited to different circumstances” (Marston & Watts, 2003, p.160). 
III. Federal Advisory Committees and Public Health Policy 
  Although the literature may be conflicted about the role for research in the policy process 
and the theoretical and practical ability for policy to be evidence-based, policymakers in the United 
States consistently and systematically create opportunities for research to be integrated into policy 





detail below, FACs are long-standing appendages to policymaking at the federal level in the United 
States. FACs for health appear to be one of the most commonly used types of FACs, if not the most 
commonly used.  
  Advisory committees have been used by the executive branch of the United States 
government since the earliest days of the country’s history. As noted in Chapter 1, the first recorded 
use of an advisory committee was by President George Washington in 1794 during the Whiskey 
Rebellion (General Services Administration, 2011). Although the Whiskey Rebellion was ultimately 
suppressed by force, President Washington’s decision to appoint an external advisory committee 
prior to action stands out for its symbolism. “In a grave challenge to the authority of the national 
government, the president felt it necessary to legitimize his actions by first investigating the problem, 
searching for practical advice from disinterested citizens, and acting on the basis of facts presented 
to him” (McAlpine & LeDonne, 1993, p.209). While the circumstances under which this first federal 
advisory committee was called may no longer be relevant, the rationale behind using the committee 
remains applicable in contemporary times. 
IV. The Federal Advisory Committee Act: A Legislative History 
  Since 1842, Congress has legislated control over various types of advisory bodies created to 
provide policy recommendations to the federal government, primarily by limiting funding and 
committee member pay (Ginsberg, 2009). In more recent history, legislation addressing advisory 
committees was drafted because government officials and the general public were concerned that 
committees were overstepping their authority: the number of committees steadily increased over 
time and there was virtually no government oversight or supervision over committees’ work. 
Reacting to the creation of ad hoc advisory committees created by private sector industries to 





statement in 1944 indicating that industry committees could be formed to advise the government 
only at the request of the relevant government department (U.S. Congress, 1955). A decade later, 
more specific guidelines were issued by the DOJ in an opinion which indicated, among other issues, 
that committees “must be purely advisory, with government officials determining the actions to be 
taken on the committee’s recommendations” (Ginsberg, 2009, p.4). A bill was introduced in 1957 
which proposed to make the DOJ’s guidelines law. While it passed in the House, it never left the 
Senate Government Operations Committee (Ginsberg, 2009). 
  In the 1950s and 1960s, there were several attempts to regulate advisory committees but it 
was not until the early 1970s that there was enough political will in Congress to pass legislation. 
Hearings held in the late 1960s and early 1970s suggested that Congress believed that advisory 
committees were “a useful means of furnishing expert advice, ideas and recommendations as to 
policy alternatives” (Ginsberg, 2009, p.5). However, Congress was also concerned that advisory 
bodies were not accessible to the public, were a waste of government resources, and needed more 
oversight. “There are numerous such advisory bodies that are duplicative, ineffective and costly, and 
many which have outlived their usefulness” (Ginsberg, 2009, p. 5). By 1971, there were between 
2,600 and 3,200 advisory bodies in existence (Ginsberg, 2009). In his introductory remarks about a 
bill that proposed more regulation over the creation and operation of advisory bodies, Senator 
William V. Roth (R-DE) stated that “Congress has neglected to provide adequate controls to 
supervise [the] growth and activity [of advisory committees and their participation]” (Ginsberg, 2009, 
p.6). In addition, some citizens were upset that committees conducted their business “behind closed 
doors” and claimed that they did not reflect the public will.   
  Motivated by an interest in ending the ‘locker room’ discussions that were frequently the 





government secrecy”(Domhoff, 2005), Senator Lee Metcalf (D-MT) introduced legislation in 1972 
that proposed to formally regulate how advisory committees to the executive branch would operate, 
with special emphasis on chartering, transparency, and reporting. Senator Metcalf’s legislation was 
passed as the Federal Advisory Committee Act and signed into law by President Nixon on October 
6, 1972 (Domhoff, 2005).  
A. What does it mean to be a Federal Advisory Committee under FACA? 
  FACA outlines several guiding principles for federal advisory committees which clearly 
reflect “a desire to cabin the power of advisory committees and place certain constraints on the 
government’s ability to seek private sector advice” (Bull, 2011, p. 3). First, new committees should 
be established only if considered “essential” although no guidance is provided about how “essential” 
should be defined. Second, committees should be terminated once they are no longer “carrying out 
the purposes for which they were established” (FACA, 1972). Third, “the establishment, operation, 
administration, and duration of advisory committees” (FACA, 1972) should be governed by 
standards and uniform procedures. Fourth, the scope, cost, and membership of advisory committees 
should be conveyed to Congress and the public. Fifth, “the function of advisory committees should 
be advisory only, and that all matters under their consideration should be determined, in accordance 
with law, by the official, agency, or officer involved” (FACA, 1972). These principles addressed 
many of the concerns Congress and the public had about FACs in the decades leading up to the 
FACA legislation, especially regarding their governance and oversight.   
  FACA also includes specific criteria that determine whether a committee must comply with 
FACA. More specifically, FACA defines an advisory committee as: 
Any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other 





established by statute or reorganization plan, or (B) established or utilized by the 
President, or (C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of 
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies or 
officers in the Federal Government, except that such term excludes any committee 
which is composed wholly of full-time or permanent part-time officers or employees 
of the Federal Government, and any committee that is created by the National 
Academy of Sciences or the National Academy of Public Administration.(FACA, 
1972) 
  Thus, the defining features of an advisory committee that is subject to FACA are that it is 
established for the purpose of providing advice and recommendations to the government and its 
members are predominantly not federal employees. Importantly, these criteria indicate that not all 
advisory bodies established by the executive branch are subject to FACA regulations. 
  Committees can be established under four different types of authority: statutory (i.e., 
nondiscretionary establishment authority specifically mandated by law), authorized by law, agency-
established (either pursuant to a law or by the decision of the agency administrator), or by 
Presidential authority (either by executive order or some other direction from the President).  
  In the case of agency-established committees, which are the focus of this study, senior 
officials at the sponsoring agency approve the committee membership and a charter is prepared that 
outlines the committee’s mission and specific duties. Originally, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) was tasked with promulgating regulations to ensure that agencies comply with FACA 
and committees do not outlive their charters. President Carter transferred these responsibilities to 
GSA by Executive Order in 1977. Currently, the GSA Administrator is required to assess on an 
annual basis whether FACs are “executing their missions and adhering to statutes, or whether they 
are in need of revision or abolition” (Ginsburg, 2009, p.10). Based on this assessment, the 





the action to be taken for each advisory committee.  Currently, FAC charters must be approved by 
the Committee Management Secretariat of the General Services Administration (GSA) which is 
responsible for:   
 Conducting annual reviews of advisory committee accomplishments; 
 Responding to inquiries from agencies on establishing new committees or the renewal of 
existing groups; 
 Preparing an annual report covering a summary of committee activities; and 
 Maintaining a FACA database from which advisory committee information may be 
obtained via the Internet. (GSA, 2014) 
 
Typically, the charter expires after a two-year period, but can be renewed if approved by the GSA.  
  During the charter drafting and renewal process, the GSA considers whether the committee 
has balanced membership (GSA, 2011). FACA law requires “…the membership of the advisory 
committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be 
performed by the advisory committee” but does not stipulate how balanced membership should be 
achieved. Agencies are thus required to submit a Balanced Membership Plan which details how the 
agency will “consider a cross-section of those directly affected, interested, and qualified, as 
appropriate to the nature and functions of the advisory committee” during the member selection 
process and that committees that require technical experts “should include persons with 
demonstrated professional or personal qualifications and experience relevant to the functions and 
tasks to be performed.” (41 CFR § 102-3.60(b)(3)). 
  From an administrative perspective at the agency level, any agency which establishes a 
FACA committee must appoint a Committee Management Officer (CMO) and a Designated Federal 





members comply with FACA regulations. The committee can begin operation only after a required 
public notification period in the Federal Register (FR) and the filing of the charter with Congress. 
The FR notice may include a request for nominations for committee members. 
  There are seven different types of functions that FACA committees can serve. GSA assigns 
one function to each committee. The seven functions are: 
 National Policy Issue Advisory Board, which are assigned to committees devoted to 
advising agencies on the implementation of National Policy Issues. 
 Non Scientific Program Advisory Board, which are assigned to committees devoted to 
advising agencies on the implementation of Non Scientific Programs. 
 Scientific Technical Program Advisory Board, which are assigned to committees 
devoted to advising agencies on the implementation of Scientific Technical Programs. 
 Grant Review Committee, which are assigned to committees concerned with making 
recommendations for grants and awards. 
 Regulatory Negotiations Committee, which are assigned to committees concerned with 
making Regulatory Negotiations. 
 Other Committee, which are committees which either cross categories or do not fit the 
categories listed above, or a 
 Special Emphasis Panel. A Special Emphasis Panel generally has a purpose similar to a 
Grant Review Committee and is not just an advisory committee dealing with a single topic 
of great concern. This term has limited usage and most Special Emphasis Panels are located 
in NIH.(GSA, 2014) 
The three types of functions most relevant to this study are National Policy Issue Advisory Boards, 
Scientific Technical Program Advisory Boards, and Other Committees. The process for deciding 
which committee functions to include in this study is described in depth in Chapter 4.  
  GSA issued its first set of FACA regulations in 1987 and an updated set in 2001, which still 
hold to this day. While these regulations helped to clarify what is required of agencies to comply 
with FACA, there is no standard for how FACA should be interpreted; each agency is permitted to 
interpret the law how it sees fit. These interpretations – even if made in good faith – do not protect 





the variance in how FACA is interpreted by agencies has important implications for how 
committees are established, implemented, and administered. 
B. Clarifying FACA’s Coverage Post-1972 
  As it was originally drafted, an advisory committee under FACA could be interpreted as any 
exchange between a government employee and at least two people not employed by the government. 
Federal agencies have found this broad language to be vague and problematic because depending on 
how strictly the language is interpreted, FACA could apply to nearly any exchange between the 
government and private citizens. Since FACA was passed in 1972, Congress has enacted legislation 
to clarify FACA’s coverage and implementing regulations and executive orders have been issued 
with the same purpose. In addition, federal courts have ruled to narrow the scope of the law as 
originally drafted.  
1. POST-FACA LEGISLATION, IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE   
  ORDERS 
  Since FACA was passed, there have been several attempts to clarify FACA’s coverage and 
integrate measures to improve the transparency and accountability of FACA committees. In 1977, 
the Government in the Sunshine Act was incorporated into FACA which requires that FACA 
committee meetings be open and that the public can participate. If a meeting is to be closed, the 
DFO must submit a written request to the agency head at least 30 days in advance of the scheduled 
meeting justifying the rationale for closing the meeting by citing relevant portions of the Sunshine 
Act that note exceptions to the open meeting requirement (i.e., for matters of national security). This 
request is also reviewed by agency counsel. Advance notice of the meeting must be posted in the FR. 
Similarly, FACA requires that “the records, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, 





committee shall be available for public inspection and copying” unless the documents qualify for 
one of the exceptions under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).     
  GSA issued its first set of FACA regulations in 1987 and an updated set in 2001, which still 
hold to this day. While these regulations helped to clarify what is required of agencies to comply 
with FACA, there is no standard for how FACA should be interpreted; each agency is permitted to 
interpret the law how it sees fit. These interpretations – even if made in good faith – do not protect 
an agency or its committees from claims that FACA has been violated. As described in later chapters, 
the variance in how FACA is interpreted by agencies has important implications for how 
committees are established, implemented, and administered. 
  Although FOIA was passed in 1966, there have been more recent clarifications of how 
FOIA pertains to FACA. In practice, the FOIA exemption most relevant to FACA committees for 
“pre-decisional materials” (also known as exemption 5) was determined by the General Services 
Administration’s Office of Legal Counsel in 1988 to be “not generally applicable” (GSA, 1988) 
because “exemption 5 protects only inter-agency and intra-agency documents and because an 
advisory committee is not an agency” (GSA, 1988). 
  During the 1990s there were two bills introduced which clarified what entities are subject to 
FACA. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, passed in 1995, excludes from FACA meetings 
between federal officials and officials from state, local, and/or tribal governments as long as a two-
part test is met: the individuals involved have to act in their official capacity and meetings are solely 
for the purpose of exchanging information or advice about federal programs designed to share 
government responsibilities. In 1997, a set of amendments was passed that excluded meetings held 
by National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Public Administration from FACA 





by these two agencies.  
 More recently, there have been two attempts to revise FACA, primarily through measures to 
introduce greater transparency in FACA proceedings. The first bill, introduced by Congressman 
William Lacy Clay on March 5, 2009, passed by 250-124 on July 26, 2010 in the House, but the 
Senate took no further action on the bill. On March 17, 2011, Congressman Elijah Cummings 
introduced a bill that replicated many of the provisions of Congressman Clay’s bill and is now 
pending in the House.  
2. CASE LAW CLARIFYING FACA’S COVERAGE 
  The federal courts have clarified FACA’s coverage in a number of decisions, primarily by 
providing more precise interpretations of the definitional language in the original legislation. Four of 
the cases most relevant to this study are discussed here.  
  As indicated above, FACA defines “advisory committee” to include “any committee, board, 
commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or 
other sub-group thereof”. How a “group” is defined in the original legislation is ambiguous but was 
clarified in Nader v. Baroody, 396 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1975) (Nader v. Baroody, 1975). “To meet 
the ‘group’ requirement, a federal advisory committee must be more than a mere assemblage of two 
or more persons that provides information to the government: the group must include some formal 
organization and be charged with a specific task” (Bull, 2011, p. 14). In Ass’n of Am. Physicians & 
Surgeons v. Clinton,  997 F.2d 898, 909, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the D.C. Circuit Court further 
delineated what a group means under FACA: “a group is a FACA advisory committee when it is 
asked to render advice or recommendations, as a group, and not as a collection of individuals”.    
  Similarly, the FACA definitional language stating that advisory committees are established by 





In two separate cases, Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Gaus, 61 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1995) and 
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 76 F.3d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that a 
committee would not meet the FACA threshold if it was created primarily for the benefit of the 
private sector and provided factual or other non-policy related information.  
C. Scholarship on FACs 
  Federal advisory committees have been in place for nearly 40 years, are frequently used by 
the executive branch, and have accounted for over $3.4 billion in government spending since FY02. 
However, they remain “little-known [and] little-studied”(Domhoff, 2005). As discussed above, 
advisory committees do not feature prominently in the literature on public policy or health policy 
development and implementation. Even the literature specifically assessing the role of research in 
the policy process neglects advisory committees in its discussion of the models of the research-
policy relationship.   
  Existing scholarship on FACs can be grouped into three broad categories: descriptive pieces 
published by trade organizations or government agencies focused on illuminating the fundamental 
characteristics of FACs; articles centered primarily in the political science sphere which assess the 
role of industry influence or “capture” of FACs; and empirical articles and perspectives written for 
peer-reviewed journals analyzing and commenting on the selection of Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) FAC members, their conflicts of interest, and voting patterns. 
  In the descriptive arena, Wilson and Harsha provide a useful typology of FACs in their 
December 2008 newsletter to members of the Association for Computing Machinery (Wilson & 
Harsha, 2008). Blue ribbon commissions are “typically created to provide some focused policy 
direction” (Wilson & Harsha, 2008, p.25). Standing committees provide “high-level strategic 





Information Technology Advisory Committee, which was designed to provide expert advice on 
“maintaining America's preeminence in advanced information technologies” is an example of a 
standing committee (Wilson & Harsha, 2008, p.25). Specific guidance on narrowly-defined technical 
problems is provided by “highly specialized committees” (Wilson & Harsha, 2008, p.25). Without 
examples of FACs which would fall into the first and third of these three categories it is difficult to 
ascertain how the scopes and charters of FACs might vary across this typology. Though focused on 
commissions used by presidents, Zegert also defines three categories of advisory bodies: agenda 
commissions targeting the public and aiming to garner support for presidential initiatives; 
information commissions intended to provide new information to policymakers; and political 
constellation commissions which seek to “foster consensus, compromise, and cooperation in a 
policy domain” (Zegert, 2004, p.372).  
  Wilson and Harsha also indicate that there are numerous motivating factors that explain why 
FACs might be created, including breaking political deadlock, answering technical questions, 
providing strategic guidance, and obtaining perspectives from a range of stakeholders before making 
a policy decision, as President Washington did during the Whiskey Rebellion. In his examination of 
the impetus for FAC creation, Campbell takes a more cynical perspective and explains that 
committees allow politicians to evade blame for issues that are too charged and Congress to trim its 
workload (Zegert, 2004). 
  To date, literature on federal advisory committees housed within the political science domain 
has focused on FAC membership and especially on the extent to which special interests and 
corporations are represented on advisory boards. As discussed above, a key feature of FACA is its 
emphasis on balanced membership. Data from the 1970s suggest that FACA was effective in this 





the 1970s, that membership declined during the decade (Priest, Sylves, & Scudder, 1984). However, 
the concern about the “capture” of FACs by special interests, including corporations, and the related 
closing of FAC meetings to the public, has not dissipated. An analysis of committee-level data for 
1974-2000 suggests that special interests captured FACs in some agencies, with the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the DOC being the agencies with the highest proportion of 
special interest group representation (Karty, 2002). Others suggest that Congress may play a 
substantial role in creating un-balanced FACs by stipulating specific membership requirements, and 
that in doing so, Congress exerts control not only of the legislative process but also over regulation 
(Balla & Wright, 2001).  
  A sub-set of the literature on corporate influence on FACs takes an empirical approach and 
focuses on member selection and conflicts of interest in advisory committees to the FDA. The FDA 
is unique regarding its creation of FACs to advise on health issues because of its close relationship 
with the pharmaceutical industry. An analysis of all advisory committee meetings of the Center for 
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) held between 2001 and 2004 found that although conflicts 
of interest were frequently disclosed and were often of considerable monetary value, recusal of 
committee members rarely occurred (Lurie, Almeida, Stine, Stine, & Wolfe, 2006). 
D. FACs for Health: An Overview  
  In FY2014, there were a total of 1,004 active, chartered FACs that advised the executive 
branch across a wide range of issues ranging from bio-defense to aviation to rivers, with varying 
goals and membership (GSA, 2011). A search of the GSA database for active, chartered, FACs 
under the purview of the HHS and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in FY2014 returns 
270 advisory committees total, with 248 from HHS and 22 from EPA. It seems reasonable to 





rest of the executive branch which would make health the primary issue addressed by FACs.  
  HHS spends more on its SABs than any other agency. In FY2013 alone, HHS spent $185 
million on its advisory boards (Figure 2.1). Between FY2002 and FY2013, HHS spent $2.1 billion. 
Total government spending on FACs across all agencies was $337 million in FY2013 and $4.1 billion 
between FY2002 and FY2013 (Lipowicz, 2011). If spending from other agencies which address 
health issues is included, FACs for health easily consume the majority of all government spending 
on advisory committees. 
Figure 2.1. Spending on FACA committees, HHS vs. All Agencies, FY02-FY13 
 
  Given the proportion of all FACs which are devoted to health issues and especially because 
of the possibility that the majority of FACs may in fact be implemented to provide 
recommendations on health issues or issues with implications for health, additional research is 
needed on the role FACs play in the health policy process, the factors which affect whether the 













































can use to facilitate the uptake of FAC recommendations. As bodies designed to ensure that 
decisions made by the executive branch are informed by expert judgment and evidence, FACs can 
be important actors in the public policymaking process. In health, where evidence-based policy is 
frequently considered paramount, FACs may be especially critical to the development of sound 





 CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
  The initial conceptual framework (Appendix A) for this study was developed based on the 
literature review described in the previous chapter. The initial framework also informed the aims of 
this study, the categories of questions outlined in the interview protocol, as well as the questions 
themselves. The initial conceptual framework was refined based on findings of this study and the 
final conceptual framework (Figure 3.1) now provides a visual aid to summarize key elements of the 
literature. Thus, the framework presented here links the literature relevant to this study, which is 
largely theoretical, with the empirical findings. The following text describes the framework’s 
components.  
I. Policy Context 
  The context in which public policy is situated consists of several components. As described 
in Chapter 2, Kraft and Furlong identify five different “contexts” that shape the public policy 
process (Kraft & Furlong, 2010). These factors are explicitly identified in the conceptual model for 
clarity’s sake but are represented by the overarching ‘policy context’. The influence that the policy 
context has on the generation of research, data, and evidence, as well as on FACs and the policy 
process is designated by the box and arrow pointing down into the middle of the framework.  
  The social context is perhaps the most broad and dynamic, and includes factors such as 
demographic changes, how communities relate to one another, and immigration patterns. According 
to Kraft and Furlong, “social changes…alter how the public and policymakers view and act on 
problems” (Kraft & Furlong, 2010, p.10). The economic context is more straightforward and refers 
to the state of the economy which can have “a major impact on the policies governments adopt and 
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  The third category, political context, refers to politics related to the major parties, ideological 
discrepancies between groups of the public, and the ability of advocacy groups and other NGOs to 
pressure policymakers on various issues. The political context “affects public policy choices at every 
step” (Kraft & Furlong, 2010, p.12). The governing context is closely related to the political context 
and refers to the structure of the government, including separation of powers. In the United States, 
the governing context would also refer to power-sharing between the states and the federal 
government which has implications for how government agencies share authority over policy 
implementation.  





and attitudes, such as trust and confidence in government and the political process, or the lack 
thereof” (Kraft & Furlong, 2010, p.14). In a country as diverse as the United States, political culture 
can vary widely from one setting to the next resulting in conflicts which manifest “into constraints 
on policymaking” (Kraft & Furlong, 2010, p.12). 
  Although not specific to health policy, the contextual factors identified by Kraft and Furlong 
align with the categories of contextual factors defined by health policy-specific texts. The categories 
used by Buse et al. are generally broader than those identified by Kraft and Furlong. Situational 
factors are those conditions which are “more or less transient, impermanent, or idiosyncratic” and 
help to focus attention on a policy issue (Buse et al., 2005, p.11). In contrast, structural factors are 
“relatively unchanging elements of…society” such as the political system, the type of economy, and 
the employment base. Buse et al. note that the demography of a society and its technological base 
are structural factors that might specifically affect health policy.   
  One area where the Buse et al. categories align perfectly with Kraft and Furlong at least in 
title is in the cultural category, although Kraft and Furlong refer primarily to political culture rather 
than culture more broadly. Buse et al. indicate that the culture category includes religious factors, 
ethnic and linguistic patterns, as well as the extent to which a society is hierarchical. A marked 
departure of the Buse et al. framework from Kraft and Furlong is in the inclusion of international or 
exogenous factors as a unique category. This grouping addresses the multinational co-operation that 
can occur in health to address issues such as the eradication of diseases. What the Buse et al. 
framework gains by being more inclusive than that of Kraft and Furlong, it loses in specificity: it is 
not readily apparent, for example, how the situational and structural categories differ and what types 
of factors would be included under each. Thus, for the purpose of this study, the conceptual 





  The policy context can directly affect the process and recommendations of a FAC as well as 
the phase of the policy process in which the FAC is involved. Perhaps most importantly, the policy 
context can affect whether an FAC is established. For example, a governing context which values 
transparency, objectivity, and evidence in public policy which is supported by a social context that 
values addressing public health issues would likely be conducive to establishing a FAC. If the 
economic context is sound the FAC may be more likely to receive adequate funding for basic 
operational costs. The interaction between the social context and the strength of the economy could 
influence whether the agency receives new and/or additional funding to implement the FAC’s 
recommendations. The cultural context could affect the level of faith or trust held by the public, the 
government agency which established the FAC, and the media in the process and recommendations 
of a FAC. The extent to which the governing, social, economic, and cultural contexts are conducive 
to establishing FAC’s and adopting their recommendations may be determined by the political 
context. Genuine commitment by policymakers to the FAC as a mechanism that facilitates the 
integration of evidence into the policy process can enhance the legitimacy of the FAC.   
  There are also several factors which are more proximate to the operational process and 
recommendations of a FAC, including: (i) legislation, which can determine the human and financial 
resources available to support the operation and administration of the FAC, as well as the general 
categories of FAC membership; and (ii) the institutional power and dynamics of the government 
agency to which the FAC reports. These factors are considered to be a part of the policy context and 
are thus not specifically represented in the conceptual model.   
  The organizational culture of the government agency that established the FAC may be 
especially influential (Flitcroft, Gillespie, Salkeld, Carter, & Trevena, 2011). The agency’s access to 





guidance and furthermore, whether the agency is amenable to integrating the FAC’s 
recommendations into policy. The agency’s general ideology and power within the executive 
branch’s governing structure could affect its perception of whether there is a need and/or benefit to 
approaching external advisors as well as the balance of board’s members. In addition, agency power 
and ideology could affect the attention received by the FAC from members of the general public, 
advocacy groups, media, other scientists and researchers, and if relevant (i.e., depending on the issue 
addressed by the FAC), from international donors and foreign country governments.   
II. The Role of FACs in the Policy Process 
  This study is concerned with FACA committees established by agencies that address matters 
that affect the public’s health and/or public health policy. Thus, a key function of any FAC dealing 
with public health issues is to review, interpret, and evaluate the quality of data and external validity 
of research findings and evidence related to the issue(s) the board is addressing.  
  As described above, FACA committees exist to provide advice and recommendations to 
government agencies. By definition, agency-established advisory boards do not interact directly with 
the policy process but rather, engage with the various phases of the process indirectly, through the 
establishing agency. Thus, the establishing agency serves as a gatekeeper for the advice and 
recommendations put forward by the FAC.  
  The phase of the policy process to which the advice and recommendations put forward by a 
FAC are most relevant likely depends on the issue(s) the FAC is established to address, which in 
turn is determined largely by the establishing agency but also may be influenced by the policy 
context. Empirical evidence suggests that the “relationship between research and policy making [can 





analysis of the use of research in developing policies on drug use in UK prisons shows that research 
initially helped to place the issue on the policy agenda but then was used to help the prison system 
legitimize its policy. However, it is important to recognize that the case of UK policy on drug use in 
prisons addresses research, not advisory committees. As described in subsequent chapters, findings 
from this research indicate that SAB recommendations can address all phases of the policy process.  
III. Stakeholders 
  Additionally, the advice and recommendations provided by the FAC may depend on various 
stakeholders including FAC members themselves, government policymakers, and staff of NGOs 
which track the issues addressed by the FAC. These three groups of individuals are involved in and 
help to drive both the policy process as well as FAC operations. As discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 4, one of the aims of this study examines how various stakeholders play a role in the how 
and why FACs are established, influence the advice and recommendations put forward for 
consideration by the establishing agency and whether those recommendations are adopted, and 
engage with the FAC while it is active. This engagement is represented by the box and arrow 






 CHAPTER 4 : METHODS 
  This chapter describes the design of this study as well as the methods used to identify, 
collect, and analyze interview data obtained from study participants for both the PEPFAR and 
NCADAC case studies. The overall objective of this study was to describe the role of FACs for 
health in the policy process. This study employed a qualitative approach, which was considered 
appropriate because the study’s objective was exploratory not explanatory in nature, the  aims and 
associated research questions invited a complex understanding of the phenomena they were 
designed to address, and it was critical to understand the context and settings in which the units of 
analysis (FACs) and the individuals and institutions associated with them operated (Creswell, 2007). 
Additionally, because the role of FACs in health policy is an area supported by little theoretical 
scholarship or empirical evidence as discussed in Chapter 2, it was most appropriate to employ an 
inductive approach to data analysis to “move from the particular to the general [and] develop new 
theories or hypotheses from many observations” (Sbaraini, Carter, Evans, & Blinkhorn, 2011, p.3). 
Consistent with the grounded theory method, which is described in detail in Section 3 of this 
chapter, any theories of how advisory committees are used by the US government will be 
“’grounded’ in the data themselves” (Charmaz, 2006a, p.2).  
  After outlining the study’s aims and research questions in Section I, Sections II-V provide an 
overview of case study design and the grounded theory method as well as the ethical review process 
for this research. Sections VI-VIII describe the procedures followed to select the two cases included 







I. Research Questions 
 This study analyzed specific FACs using a multiple case study design (described in the next section) 
to understand how they facilitate the use of evidence by policymakers.  
AIM 1: Describe how FACs play a role in the health policy process and how they help to 
ensure health policy is evidence-based. 
 Research Question 1a: What are the mechanisms and processes by which FACs 
function, including how they are structured, implemented, convened, and operate? 
 Research Question 1b: To what extent does the theoretical disconnect between the 
literature on the health policy process and the literature on evidence-based policy 
have empirical support?  
 Research Question 1c: How do FACs facilitate and impede the utilization of research 
and evidence by policymakers? 
Building on the findings from Aim 1, the study assessed the contextual factors associated with the 
uptake of FAC recommendations as well as associated challenges. 
AIM 2: Identify and explain how internal processes and external contextual factors 
contribute to whether the recommendations of a FAC will be adopted. 
 Research Question 2a: What factors are associated with the uptake of FAC 
recommendations? 
 Research Question 2b: What challenges are associated with adopting FAC 
recommendations? 
Finally, and synthesizing the findings of Aims 1 and 2, Aim 3 examined how different FAC 
stakeholders have already attempted to encourage the integration of FAC recommendations into 
policymaking and proposed new strategies. 
  AIM 3: Describe strategies various stakeholders, including NGOs, FAC members,   
 and government agency staff have used to facilitate the uptake of recommendations put   





 Research Question 3a: How have FAC stakeholders, including advocacy groups, FAC 
members, and policymakers, attempted to incorporate FAC recommendations into 
the policy development process?  
 Research Question 3b: What are effective strategies that FAC stakeholders could use to 
facilitate the uptake of FAC recommendations by policymakers?  
To address the aims and research questions outlined above, in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with FAC members, government agency staff managing the two FACs included in 
this study, and NGO staff members tracking the issues of the FACs included in this study. In 
addition, documents produced by the FACs and their respective government agencies were analyzed. 
The approach is described in more detail in the rest of this chapter. 
II. Study Design 
  The case study has been referred to as a research method, an approach, a research strategy, 
and a type of study design (Andrade, 2009; Charmaz, 2006a; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 
2009). In his seminal text Case Study Research, Yin refers to case studies as one method among several 
that social science researchers can choose to employ, depending on the research questions, the 
ability of the investigator to exert control over the events occurring in the study, and whether the 
research addresses contemporary or historical events (Yin, 2009, p.8). Yin also describes four 
different case study designs: holistic single-case, embedded single-case, holistic multiple-case, and 
embedded multiple-case (Yin, 2009, p.46).  
  Strict fidelity to Yin’s approach would imply concurrence with the paradigm of the case 
study as both a type of study design as well as a research method which is accompanied by 
guidelines for data collection, procedures for data analysis, and criteria for evaluating the rigor of the 
research. Further, Yin’s text is positivist in its approach: while he excuses the need for study 





“essential”(Yin, 2009, p.35) to construct a preliminary theory in the design phase of a study before 
data collection begins. This step, he asserts, is the “one point of difference between case studies and 
related methods such as ‘grounded theory’” (Yin, 2009, p.35). 
  For the purpose of this research, it was most appropriate to apply Yin’s approach for its 
study design elements and the grounded theory method as the methodology guiding data analysis. 
This section draws from Yin’s text to explain the rationale for selecting the case study design for this 
research and the contribution of the approach to defining the unit of analysis and the boundary of 
each case study.  
  A case study is defined in two parts. The scope of a case study involves “an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p.18). 
The concept of the “real-life context” in which the case is embedded is particularly important for 
this research because each FAC is likely to be heavily influenced by various contexts, as described in 
Chapter 3. It would be challenging to have an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the 
research findings without considering these contexts (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The second part of the 
case study definition concerns the data collection and data analysis strategies. A distinctive feature of 
the case study inquiry is that there will be “many more variables of interest than data points…[from] 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and…benefits 
from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 
2009, p.18).  
  Broadly, case studies were appropriate for this research because “case studies are the 
preferred method when (a) ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, (b) the investigator has little 





(Yin, 2009, p.2). Since the overall objective of this study was to understand how FACs are involved 
in the policy process, which was a phenomenon over which this investigator had little control and 
existed within the institutional context of the establishing agency and the federal government more 
broadly, case studies were the most suitable approach. The case study was also appropriate for this 
study because it allowed the unit of analysis to be “some event or entity other than a single 
individual” (Yin, 2009, p.29), namely a FAC.   
  Case study research does not have a typical study design (Yin, 2009, p.25). However, there 
are components of a research design for the case study approach that are accepted as being 
fundamental, including defining the research questions; defining study propositions; and determining 
the boundaries of a case. Ultimately, the research questions define what phenomenon will be studied. 
As described above, the research questions broadly addressed the role FACs play in the policy 
process. Although Yin states that the research questions direct the researcher to the case study 
method and help to capture what he/she is interested in studying, they do not point to what should 
be studied. Thus, following the critical step of determining research questions, the researcher must 
define study propositions which put forward an assertion about why the phenomenon under study 
occurs. As described above, exploratory studies should have a purpose but do not need to have 
propositions. In addition, because this study used the grounded theory method of analysis, it would 
be contradictory to define study propositions.  
  Determining the boundaries of a case “will ensure that [the] study is reasonable in scope” 
(Baxter & Jack, 2008, p.546). One type of boundary that was critical for this study is the definition of 
a FAC. For the purposes of this study, all included FACs are subject to FACA. While the federal 
government uses many different types of advisory bodies, even for health matters, not all of these 





important advisory body to AHRQ, and more broadly to HHS, but USPSTF is not subject to 
FACA4. A more detailed description of the criteria used to determine which FACs were considered 
eligible for inclusion is provided in Section VI.  
  Another boundary that was important for this study was time. Fortunately, the topic for this 
study was identified within two months after the effective date of authority for each advisory 
committee (November 1, 2010 and December 5, 2010 for NCADAC and PEPFAR, respectively). 
While Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was not obtained until June 2012, the concurrency 
of activity in both cases with the study period allowed the investigator to collect data and attend 
committee meetings as an observer in real time. Further, it reduced recall bias among respondents 
because they were providing information about events in real time or that had occurred recently. 
Although the current version of the charters for the PEPFAR SAB and the NCADAC are not due 
to terminate until March and June of 2015, respectively, activity for both committees came to a halt 
in the late spring of 2014. A new Ambassador for the PEPFAR program was sworn in in April 2014 
and the NCADAC released the National Climate Assessment (NCA) in May 2014. Thus, the 
beginning of the time boundary for each case can be defined as the effective date of authority for 
each committee and the end of the time boundary for the PEPFAR case is April 2014, when 
                                                 
4 The Congressional Mandate which established the USPSTF exempted the Task Force from FACA, although it is 
unclear exactly why. However, the reason may be found in subtleties in the FACA language, which states that “all 
matters under [advisory committees’] consideration should be determined, in accordance with law, by the official, agency, 
or officer involved.” According to Section 1.10.1 of the USPSTF Procedure Manual, “topics can be nominated by 
organizations, individuals, EPCs [evidence-based practice centers], and Task Force members.” Thus, AHRQ does not 
determine what topics the USPSTF addresses. Further, throughout the process of review and comment on USPSTF 
reports and recommendations “the Task Force maintains its independence by making these decisions without outside 
influence by professional societies or governmental entities.” Thus, in contrast to FACA committees, the USPSTF 
maintains control of which topics it addresses as well as the recommendations it makes. The final recommendations are 
published in peer-reviewed journals, but are not “delivered” to AHRQ and then left for AHRQ to decide what (if 






Ambassador Debbie Birx took office at OGAC, and May 2014 for the NCADAC case, when the 
NCA 2014 was released. Theoretical saturation was reached and data collection for this study was 
concluded in September 2014. A wide time boundary for each case was important to capture the 
contextual factors influencing the establishment of a FAC as well as its impact, especially with 
respect to the effect of the FAC recommendations.    
  More specifically, this research employs a multiple-case study design, wherein individual 
FACs are the units of analysis (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1. Diagram of Study Design  
 
 
This was preferable to a single-case design because “a multiple…case study will allow the researcher 
to analyze within each setting and across settings…and understand the similarities and differences 
between the cases” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p.550). In addition, a multiple-case design had the benefit 
of being “considered more compelling and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more 
robust” (Yin, 2009, p.53). Finally, without multiple cases, there may not have been sufficient data 
available to answer the research questions.    
III. The Grounded Theory Method 
  The grounded theory method was first proposed in the late 1960s by Barney Glaser and 
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Anselm Strauss in their book The Discovery of Grounded Theory (B. Glaser & Strauss, 1967). At a time 
when the core principles of quantitative research—“systematic observation, replicable experiments, 
operational definitions of concepts, logically deduced hypotheses, and confirmed evidence” 
(Charmaz, 2006a, p.4) which were underpinned by a positivist epistemology—provided grounds for 
undermining the scientific value of qualitative research, Glaser and Strauss offered a method to 
systematically conduct qualitative research which was viewed as credible in its own right, in addition 
to serving as “a precursor for developing quantitative instruments” (Charmaz, 2006a, p.6). 
According to Glaser and Strauss, at its core, grounded theory involved “developing theories from 
research grounded in data rather than deducing testable hypotheses from existing theories” (Charmaz, 
2006a, p. 4) (emphasis in original). 
  While Glaser and Strauss intended for grounded theory to counter the positivistic 
assumptions permeating qualitative research methods in the mid-20th century, gradually the method 
became identified as being positivistic in its approach. A detailed description of the evolution of 
Glaser and Strauss’ work from a rejection of positivism to positivistic falls outside the scope of this 
research. Currently, the constructivist approach to grounded theory proposed by Kathy Charmaz in 
her book Constructing Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006a) is favored, rather than the positivist or post-
positivist approaches proposed by Glaser and Strauss and Strauss and Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990), respectively. At its core, the constructivist approach to grounded theory aligns with the 
original, positivist approach: both emphasize the concept that “theories [are] ‘grounded’ in the data 
themselves” (Charmaz, 2006a, p.2). According to Charmaz, the departure between the two 
approaches results from the following:  
In the classic grounded theory works, Glaser and Strauss talk about discovering 
theory as emerging from data separate from the scientific observer. Unlike their 





of the world we study and the data we collect. We construct our grounded theories 
through our past and present involvements and interactions with people, 
perspectives, and research practices (Charmaz, 2006a, p.10). 
  
This research followed Charmaz’s approach to data analysis which promotes the development or 
construction of theories grounded in the data, as opposed to the analysis approaches offered by Yin. 
Yin’s approaches are not well-suited to this research because they emphasize comparing patterns 
found through empirical results with predicted patterns and should be applied to explanatory, not 
exploratory, case studies, or involve time-series analyses (Yin, 2009, p.146-156). Thus, integrating 
Charmaz’s constructivist grounded theory approach to data analysis and the positivist approach to 
study design proposed by Yin provides an optimal way to adapt the case study method to the 
inductive approach of grounded theory. Under Charmaz’s approach, the grounded theory method 
involves the following core principles (Charmaz, 2006a, p.178): 
 The grounded theory research process is fluid, interactive, and open-ended. 
 The research problem informs the initial methodological choices for data collection. 
 Researchers are part of what they study, not separate from it. 
 Grounded theory analysis shapes the conceptual content and direction of the study; the 
emerging analysis may lead to adopting multiple methods of data collection and to pursuing 
inquiry in several sites. 
 Successive levels of abstraction through comparative analysis constitute the core of 
grounded theory analysis. 
 Analytic directions arise from how researchers interact with and interpret their comparisons 
and emerging analyses rather than from external prescriptions. 
 
  According to Charmaz, grounded theories should be situated in specific context(s) because 
this facilitates detailed cross-theory comparisons. Abstractions are constructed by comparing data. 
Across studies, such abstractions can develop into formal theories. These theories can then be 





from empirical data does not imply that results from the study sample should be representative of a 
population (Charmaz, 2006a; Yin, 2009). Rather, the focus of generalizability should be on whether 
the study’s results transfer or can be applied to other settings (Malterud, 2001, p.485).   
A. Use of Prior Knowledge, Research, and Literature in Grounded Theory 
  Chapter 2 briefly mentioned the debate in the grounded theory literature regarding whether 
and how previous knowledge, research, and literature should be included in grounded theory studies. 
This issue warrants more in-depth discussion here given the role of the researcher in theoretical 
sampling and the importance of reflexivity in qualitative research. Reflexivity is discussed in more 
detail in the next sub-section.  
  The original conceptualization of grounded theory as conceived by Glaser and Strauss argues 
strongly that the researcher should begin a grounded theory study as a blank slate. According to 
Glaser, the researcher should “enter the research setting with as few predetermined ideas as 
possible—especially logically deducted prior hypotheses. The research problem and its delimitation 
are discovered” (Glaser & Holton, 2004, p.11). The idea that hypotheses have no place in grounded 
theory research is consistent with Yin’s acknowledgement that exploratory research can be free from 
propositions. However, Glaser takes it a step further, arguing that it is important that “the start [of a 
good grounded theory analysis] is not blocked by a preconceived problem, a methods chapter or a 
literature review” (Glaser & Holton, 2004, p. 11). Additionally, “to undertake an extensive review of 
literature before the emergence of a core category violates the basic premise of GT—that being, the 
theory emerges from the data not from extant theory” (Glaser & Holton, 2004, p. 12). 
  Others are more flexible with respect to how prior knowledge and even a review of the 
literature can be incorporated into grounded theory research (Andrade, 2009; Hallberg, 2006). In 





research for assisting the investigator with maintaining theoretical sensitivity. This concept “reflects 
the researcher’s ability to use personal and professional experiences as well as methodological 
knowledge and thereby see data in new ways and think abstractly about data in the process of 
developing theory” (Hallberg, 2006, p.144). Prior knowledge, research, and literature helps to 
sensitize the investigator to what problems are in need of exploration and thus helps to focus the 
study. The theory which emerges from the data is what determines the relevance of the literature. 
The researcher keeps an “open mind” not an “empty mind” (Andrade, 2009, p.46). 
  Thus, instead of analyzing data under the framework of existing theories, a literature review 
can help focus the investigator as she constantly compares incidents to incidents, incidents to 
concepts, and concepts to concepts (Hallberg, 2010). For the purposes of this research, the literature 
initially reviewed at the study proposal phase was helpful in developing the preliminary conceptual 
framework and the original interview guide. As data collection proceeded and new themes emerged, 
it became clear that the literature review would need to be expanded to address the legal history of 
FACA, for example, among other areas.  
B. Reflexivity 
  While any findings and new theories emerging from a grounded theory study should be 
grounded in the empirical data analyzed for the research, ultimately there is some subjectivity in how 
the findings are interpreted. This results from the fact that in qualitative research studies generally, 
and in grounded theory studies in particular, “the researcher is the primary ‘instrument’ of data 
collection and analysis” (Watt, 2007, p.82). The information received from interview subjects “is 
always influenced by the interviewer and interview situation” (Maxwell, 2005, p.109) (emphasis in 
original). Further, theoretical sampling and inductive coding depend inherently on the investigator’s 





Maxwell argues that rather than focusing efforts on obviating the effects of the researcher, what is 
important is to understand “how a particular  researcher’s values and expectations influence the 
conduct and conclusions of the study” (Maxwell, 2005, p.108) (emphasis in original).  
  This understanding can be achieved through reflexivity, which is defined as “thoughtful, 
conscious self-awareness” and “explicit meta-analysis of the research process” (Finlay, 2002, p.532). 
The ambiguity of what reflexivity means in practical terms is acknowledged as are its numerous 
approaches (Dowling, 2006; Finlay, 2002; Jootun, McGhee, & Marland, 2009). “When it comes to 
practice, the process of engaging in reflexivity is perilous, full of muddy ambiguity and multiple trails” 
(Finlay, 2002, p.212). While reflexivity should be constantly engaged through all of the phases of a 
study, and was in this research, it is not always feasible or practical for a researcher to provide a 
detailed account of her reflexive process, particularly in academic settings which value publication in 
journals that impose word limits on their authors. In addition, there is an opportunity cost to an 
intensive focus on reflexivity, namely that  it could come at the expense of focusing on the study 
participants (Finlay, 2002). For these reasons, this study limited its discussion of reflexivity to a 
reflexive statement in this section, as recommended by Finlay (Finlay, 2002, p.543).  
  Overall, however, reflexivity was integrated throughout the process of conducting this 
research. Once data collection was initiated, the investigator sent bi-monthly progress updates to her 
academic advisor. These updates provided an opportunity for the investigator to reflect on the data 
obtained during the interviews conducted since the prior progress report, not only in terms of the 
dynamic and rapport between the investigator and the respondents and how those two elements 
varied across the cases but also provided an opportunity to note when new themes that were not 
initially anticipated as being relevant emerged from the data. The progress updates usually included 





monthly in-person meetings between the investigator and her advisor, ideas and theories emerging 
from the interview data were discussed at length, particularly in terms of how these ideas and 
theories related to the study’s research questions whether these new themes warranted additional 
exploration or even a shift in the study’s direction, and how the investigator’s own professional 
experience in the policy arena in Washington, DC was affecting her interpretation of the data. In 
addition, the investigator met annually with her thesis advisory committee during the study period, 
during which time preliminary findings and decisions about analytical and methodological issues 
were discussed. 
1. REFLEXIVE STATEMENT 
  The role advisory committees for public health-related issues play in the policy process is a 
topic that interested me initially because of my work experience in global health financing and 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the aid provided by donors to low- and middle-income countries 
for health. Over time, I have observed first-hand how the major issues on the global health policy 
agenda shift in priority and how funding for those issues can increase or decrease rapidly depending 
on their prominence on the global agenda. Oftentimes, these shifts in policy priorities are not 
necessarily aligned with the latest evidence on the effectiveness of a certain intervention or the actual 
burden of disease (Schieber, Gottret, Fleisher, & Leive, 2007; Shiffman, 2006a, 2006b; Shiffman & 
Smith, 2007). While I had a clear understanding that evidence was not the only factor that 
policymakers considered when making decisions about how to allocate resources, I did find it 
challenging to accept that evidence at times seemed to play such a small role.  
  More specifically, my interest in studying FACs established by US government agencies 
stemmed from an announcement in January 2011 that PEPFAR had established a science advisory 





which valued research. Initially, it was acknowledged that PEPFAR was serving as an emergency 
response to the dire situation of high HIV morbidity and mortality in low- and middle-income 
countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, and that research was not a primary concern. 
However, PEPFAR also has been criticized for allocating resources to priorities that evidence 
indicated to be ineffective or inappropriate for the setting. Thus, I was curious about the changes to 
the political and institutional environment at OGAC that provided the right context for establishing 
the SAB as well as what types of scientific and policy issues the SAB was going to address. 
  I was familiar with the PEPFAR program prior to starting this research because I had 
worked for one organization that received PEPFAR funding and for another organization that 
tracked both the funding PEPFAR received from Congress as well as the effects of changes made to 
the legislation re-authorizing PEPFAR, which was passed in 2008. I did not, however, know any 
individuals working for PEPFAR at the time this study was initiated and was not at all familiar with 
the internal processes involved with deciding how PEPFAR resources were be allocated.  
  My experience with the PEPFAR program and in the global health policy field more broadly 
may have affected the interviews I conducted for the PEPFAR case. I felt more relaxed during these 
interviews than during the interviews conducted for the NCADAC case because I have more 
knowledge about the global HIV/AIDS epidemic than climate change and because of my familiarity 
with the broad policy context in which the PEPFAR program operates. My sense was that interview 
respondents for the PEPFAR case felt comfortable being candid about their perspectives when I 
told them about my work experience because it helped to build rapport and they may have felt they 
were talking to “one of their own”. While I do not have a background in climate science, I admitted 
this freely to my respondents, which seemed to encourage them to be especially descriptive in their 





associated with the climate change field.  
  More broadly, the dynamic in the interviews with the NCADAC respondents was similar to 
that of a professor (the respondent) teaching a student (me), whereas the dynamic in the interviews 
with the PEPFAR respondents was more peer-to-peer. The difference in the interview dynamics 
between the two case studies did not seem to affect the data or the analysis; surprisingly, the 
respondents in the NCADAC case were generally less formal and had a more relaxed style than the 
respondents in the PEPFAR case, so the professor/student and peer-to-peer dynamics were 
tempered by the demeanor of the individual respondents. However, I did find that to feel adequately 
prepared for the interviews for the NCADAC case I needed to conduct more background research 
prior to each interview than for the PEPFAR case as a result of my initial lack of exposure to climate 
change science.   
  My interactions with the interview respondents were also likely to have been affected by my 
status as a young, educated, female who was comfortable and broadly familiar with the dynamics of 
the Washington, DC policy and advocacy communities. Over the years, I have worked with 
individuals in the US government, at NGOs/advocacy organizations, and with researchers. Thus, 
going into this research, I expected that several of the respondents from the advisory committee and 
the government official categories were likely to be older males. Similarly, I expected respondents 
from the NGO/advocacy organizations to be closer to my own age. Further, I knew from my 
research prior to conducting each interview that some of the interview respondents were quite 
senior in their fields. While it was certainly exciting to be granted an interview with individuals of 
remarkable professional achievement, because I was accustomed to working with each type of 
respondent, I was not intimidated during the interviews beyond some initial nervousness related to 





many of the respondents have doctoral degrees themselves and remembered their own dissertation 
process and were empathetic and interested in helping me to complete my degree. This common 
history may have introduced some selection bias into the sample; those respondents who had PhDs 
may have been more likely to respond to my request for an interview. However, given that nearly all 
potential respondents from both cases had either PhDs or MDs (or both), I do not think that the 
similarity in educational backgrounds substantially biased the self-selection of participants.  
C. Criteria for Evaluating Grounded Theory Research 
  As described above, case study and grounded theory research rely on different principles for 
external validity than quantitative studies; instead of selecting cases or interview subjects with the 
goal of statistical generalizability, which would facilitate making an inference about a population 
based on a sample, grounded theory and case study research emphasize generalizing to the level of 
theory, or analytical generalizability. However, Charmaz and Diaz-Andrade both offer additional 
criteria beyond just external validity to evaluate the quality of studies such as the one described here. 
  Diaz-Andrade adapts Yin’s criteria for evaluating the quality of case studies to align more 
directly with the principles of grounded theory research. Diaz-Andrade proposes that construct 
validity in grounded theory research is best represented by theoretical saturation, or theoretical 
sufficiency. He argues that these concepts “should allow interpretive researchers to build up and 
work upon constructs which emerge from the problem under investigation” (Andrade, 2009, p.48). 
Similarly, internal validity is addressed by theoretical coding, which permits researchers to build theory 
linked conceptually to the original data. External validity, as mentioned above, is focused on 
theoretical generalizations rather than testing hypotheses. Finally, Diaz-Andrade argues that reliability in 
grounded theory research should not focus on the ability of a second researcher to replicate the 





but rather should emphasize the trustworthiness of the research. In this case, trustworthiness refers to 
presenting a chain of evidence in the analysis that would allow another researcher to trust the results 
and find them meaningful (Trauth, 1997, p.242). 
  Charmaz offers four other criteria for evaluating grounded theory research which do not 
align well with the four criteria listed above (Charmaz, 2006a, p.182). Credibility broadly refers to 
whether the claims made by the researcher are supported by sufficient data and evidence so that 
another individual could make an independent assessment of the research and agree with the claims 
proposed. This research sought to ensure credibility by transcribing interviews verbatim, using in-
vivo coding as part of the initial coding process, collecting rich data through semi-structured, in-
depth interviews, and interviewing three categories of respondents in an effort to triangulate data on 
the role of FACs in the policy process. Originality is self-explanatory, referring to whether the 
research makes a novel contribution to the field and has social and theoretical significance. As 
explained in Chapter 2, this study makes a novel contribution to the literature given the paucity of 
empirical research or theoretical assessments of FACs in public policy broadly or health policy more 
specifically. At its core, resonance refers to whether the study participants or others in their 
circumstances agree that the proposed theories make sense. Throughout the data collection process, 
the investigator engaged in member checking or member validation, which involves providing study 
participants with the opportunity to judge whether the themes emerging from research resonate with 
their own experiences (Kuper, Reeves, & Levinson, 2008). During interviews, the investigator 
occasionally would indicate that a particular theme was beginning to emerge from the data, based on 
interviews with other respondents, and she would ask the respondent for his or her opinion about 
the extent to which the emerging theme resonated. Finally, the research has usefulness if it can spark 





academic settings. As discussed in more depth in Chapter 8, the findings from this research offer a 
number of opportunities for future, follow-on research both in applied and academic settings and 
could ideally inform efforts to establish FACs going forward. 
IV. Grounded Theory Steps  
  The first step in grounded theory research is data collection based on theoretical sampling 
with the goal of achieving “’analytic generalization’” (Yin, 2009, p.38). Theoretical sampling, 
according to Charmaz, “involves starting with data, constructing tentative ideas about the data, and 
then examining these ideas through further empirical inquiry” (Charmaz, 2006a, p.102). The process 
of constructing ideas about the data and then exploring them through additional data collection is 
facilitated by collecting and analyzing data concurrently, memo-writing, and the constant 
comparative method.   
  Data analysis in grounded theory research involves coding the data in a series of steps which 
are outlined below. Theories emerge as data are coded, which help to define gaps in the data and 
direct the investigator to additional data collection needs. Memo-writing allows the investigator to 
reflect on the appropriateness of the codes used, explore new concepts emerging from the data, and 
refine future data collection efforts (Charmaz, 2006a). The constant comparative method, as 
described by Hallberg, means “every part of data, i.e., emerging codes, categories, properties, and 
dimensions as well as different parts of the data, are constantly compared with all other parts of the 
data to explore variations, similarities and differences in data” (Hallberg, 2006, p.143). 
  Grounded theory calls for inductive coding, which was appropriate for this study given its 
exploratory nature. Deductive coding would have been more appropriate had propositions been 
applied, and would have involved creating a codebook before analysis began and applying the pre-





‘bottom-up’ approach whereby patterns and themes emerge from the data as codes are applied in a 
series of steps (Andrade, 2009; Charmaz, 2006a).  
  Inductive coding is implemented in two phases: initial coding and focused coding (Charmaz, 
2006a). Initial coding involves coding sections of interview transcripts line-by-line or incident-by-
incident. This phase of coding should stay close to the data and often uses the words from the 
respondents themselves, which is referred to as in vivo codes. Charmaz acknowledges that this 
method of coding is a departure from earlier grounded theory approaches, which advocated that the 
investigator should not have any pre-conceived notions in mind when coding begins (B. Glaser, 
1978, 1992). Charmaz agrees that the researcher should remain open through the coding process, 
but accepts that prior ideas may affect coding (Charmaz, 2006a, p.48). One advantage of initial 
coding is that it puts a buffer between the investigator’s own perspectives and the data. Through the 
coding process, the investigator is forced to gain distance from the data and study it in such a way 
that new interpretations of participants’ responses emerge (Charmaz, 2006a, p.55). 
  Following this initial phase, focused codes are developed based on codes which appear 
frequently in the line-by-line codes. At this stage, codes should be applied to large segments of data 
and the investigator can begin to compare interpretations across interviews. The last step involves 
developing category codes based on topics that were particularly salient through the interview 
process and which relate categories to subcategories (Charmaz, 2006b). The application of codes to 
data obtained from interviews in this research is described in detail in Section 8 of this chapter. 
  In summary, Yin’s positivist approach to case study design and Charmaz’s constructivist 
approach to grounded theory may seem to have irreconcilable epistemological differences but the 
two approaches actually can be complementary provided that selective components of each are 





unit of analysis, the time boundaries for each case, and for the screening and ultimately, the selection 
of viable cases. Charmaz’s guidance on data collection and analysis was particularly relevant for this 
study, given its exploratory nature and the goal of developing new theories about how science 
advisory boards play a role in health policy.  
V. Ethical Review  
  Approval for this study was obtained from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health IRB in June 2012. The IRB determined that the study was minimal risk (Appendix B). In 
spite of this determination, a number of steps were taken to ensure the privacy and confidentiality of 
the study participants.  
  An electronic copy of the informed consent document was attached to the initial interview 
request email sent by the investigator to potential respondents, before they agreed to participate. The 
informed consent document described in detail the purpose and procedures of the study, the 
potential risks and benefits, how data would be kept confidential and privacy protected, and the 
voluntary nature of participation in the study (Appendix C). The contact information for this study’s 
Principal Investigator and the IRB were provided in case the participants had any questions or 
concerns.  
  All interviews began with a brief discussion of the study aims and objectives and a review of 
the informed consent form. Prior to beginning each interview, participants were permitted to ask 
any questions about the consent form and/or the study itself. In addition, the investigator ensured 
that participants understood that providing consent for the interview included providing permission 
for it to be audio recorded. Participants interviewed by Skype printed, signed, and returned the 
signed consent form via email or fax before the interview. A fully executed copy was then emailed to 





was conducted in person.  
  An amendment (Appendix D) to the informed consent document was approved by the IRB 
in July 2014 to include language requested by a government agency, which cleared two of its 
employees to participate in this research. The language noted that the respondents were participating 
in this research with authorization and in their official capacity as an employee of the US 
government. 
  Identifiers, namely the name, titles, organizational affiliation, and email address(es) of 
interview participants were stored in password-protected Excel spreadsheets (one spreadsheet for 
each case study) on the investigator’s password-protected laptop. Identifiers were needed to keep 
track of recruitment efforts and to arrange second interviews as needed. These spreadsheets were 
stored separately from interview transcripts, which used pseudonyms for participant names. As 
indicated in the informed consent document, names, organizational affiliations, and titles are not 
reported in the study findings.  
  All study materials were stored on the investigator’s password-protected computer. Copies 
of files with participant personal identifiers (i.e., signed consent forms from participants interviewed 
by Skype, audio recordings, recruitment tracking spreadsheets, lists of potential interviewees 
provided through snowball sampling, and interview transcripts) were maintained for back-up 
purposes using a secure online service (SpiderOak.com). Other non-sensitive files were backed up 
SpiderOak.com and Dropbox.com. The recruitment tracking spreadsheets and other documents 
listed above, as well as any back-up copies will be destroyed one year after any manuscripts resulting 







VI. Case Selection 
  As recommended by Yin, this study implemented a two-stage case study screening process 
because the number of potential eligible cases was larger than 20-30 FACA, 1972; Yin, 2009, p.92). 
It was important to develop a case selection process that narrowed the pool of potential cases in an 
objective and transparent manner. From a feasibility perspective, carefully selecting cases prior to 
data collection was critical to ensure that each case was viable and adequately represented an 
instance of what this investigator intended to study. 
  The first stage of the screening process consisted of collecting “quantitative data about the 
entire pool [of cases] from some archival source” (Yin, 2009, p.92), namely, the FACA database 
maintained by the General Services Administration (GSA). The goal of this first stage of screening 
was to “reduce the number of candidates to 20 or 30 and then to conduct the second screening stage” 
(Yin, 2009, p.92). During the second stage of screening, the candidate cases were evaluated 
according to a “defined set of operational criteria whereby candidates will be deemed qualified to 
serve as cases” (Yin, 2009, p.91).  
A. Stage 1 Screening Process 
  According to Yin, the process of selecting cases should follow a replication logic, whereby 
“each case…[is] carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) 
predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)” (Yin, 2009, p.54). 
This logic is similar to what is used in multiple experiments: upon discovering a significant finding 
from one experiment, the study would be repeated in an effort to replicate the finding. These 
replications might duplicate exactly the conditions of the first study or they might vary certain 
conditions to ascertain whether the finding could still be replicated. The first stage of the screening 





theoretical replication.   
  The objective of the first stage of the case study screening process was to narrow the pool of 
FACs according to criteria that would ensure literal replication across characteristics that were 
believed to influence the policy context of the FAC and how FACs are structured, staffed, and 
implemented (Figure 4.2). The constructivist approach to grounded theory would likely not employ 
replication logic in case study selection but rather would use cases more holistically (Andrade, 2009, 
p. 51). However, given the large number of potential cases (i.e., FACA committees), replication logic 
was critical to ensure the feasibility of this research. 
Figure 4.2.  Stage 1 Case Screening Criteria  
 
  These criteria are based on the characteristics of the PEPFAR SAB, which provided the 
initial motivation for this research. While it was important to have some diversity across the cases to 
adequately address the research questions, it was critical that all the cases had some factors in 
Agency-established      No presidential appointments
Common function                              Public health oriented 
Broad charter objectives                Committee name                       
Phase 1 Pool 





common so that the research could better isolate the contextual factors which might have affected 
the uptake of FAC recommendations. Variation in the cases was introduced in the second stage of 
the screening process (described below).      
  The Stage 1 case screening criteria were applied to the pool of all FACA committees, as 
contained in the GSA FACA database. This database contains information on FACA committees 
established since 2002 so it is not possible to determine how many committees have been 
established since FACA was passed in 1972. The database would not permit a single download of all 
FACA committees at one time. Thus, to obtain the complete universe of all FACA committees, four 
separate downloads were conducted5, one for each of the four establishment authorities for FACA 
committees (agency authority, statutory authority/Congress created, authorized by law, and 
Presidential). The four separate files created from these downloads were merged using STATA 11. 
Subsequent steps taken to further narrow the database as described below were also conducted 
using STATA 11.  
  The initial merging of the four files of FACs, grouped by establishment authority, yielded 
11,049 FACs. However, this total does not accurately represent the number of unique FACA 
committees because FACs existing over multiple years were included as individual, separate 
committees, creating a substantial number of duplicate listings. For the purpose of this research, one 




                                                 
5 This download and all data management were conducted on February 26, 2012. As such, the pool of all FACA 
committees considered eligible for inclusion in this study was developed from the FACA database as it existed on 





Table 4.1.  Application of Phase 1 Case Study Screening Criteria  
Phase 1 Screening Criteria # of SABs 
Unique FACA Committees in FACA database 1,611 
      of which  Agency-established with no Presidential appointments   883 
              Common Function  
                  National Policy Issue Advisory Board                                
                  Scientific Technical Program Advisory Board 
                  Other 
   654 
   72 
   133 
   449 
                  of which Public-health Oriented (23 topics from 5 categories)      67 
                         of which  Potentially viable case studies        14 
 
All FACs not established by agency authority or established by agency authority with Presidential 
appointments were excluded, yielding 883 FACA committees. The next step was to limit the 
potential pool of cases based on the function of the FAC. As described in Chapter 2, this study 
focused on FACs which addressed policy issues that were scientific in nature. Some FACs which 
addressed these issues, such as the PEPFAR SAB, were designated as having an ‘Other’ function. 
Within the group of committees established by agency-authority, FACs identified as National Policy 
Issue Advisory Board, Scientific Technical Program Advisory Board, and Other were included, 
yielding 654 committees.  
  While all of these 654 FACs addressed policy issues and/or scientific matters, not all of them 
addressed issues related to public health. Each FACA committee is ‘tagged’ in the GSA database 
with a topic. However, topic tags are not unique – committees can be listed under multiple topics. 
There were a total of 41 categories, which are sub-grouped into 169 topics, 20 of which relate to 
public health, broadly defined (see Appendix E for a list of all categories and topics). There were 67 
committees tagged in the GSA database with topics that relate broadly to public health.  
  A review of the names of the 67 FACs which were tagged with public health-related terms 
showed that not all of them actually addressed public health matters. For example, FACs tagged 





FACs with this tag was the Advisory Committee for Geosciences, which was not directly relevant to 
public health. Of the 67 FACs tagged with topics broadly related to public health, 14 were 
determined to be eligible for additional review in screening Stage 2 (Appendix F). 
B. Stage 2 Screening Process 
  Preliminary research was conducted on each of the 14 FACs identified through the Stage 1 
screening process. More specifically, committee charters and websites were reviewed to obtain 
information about the scope and objectives of each FAC. Several exclusion criteria were identified 
through this additional review process to ensure the feasibility of the study but also to ensure literal 
replication (e.g., topics addressed are only tangentially related to public health or are very narrow in 
scope). (See Appendix G for list of excluded committees with rationale for exclusion.) From the 
initial results of Stage 1 screening, four advisory committees were selected for inclusion (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2.  Final List of Eligible FACs  
 Committee Acronym Agency 
1. 
 
National Climate Assessment and 
Development Advisory Committee  
NCADAC Department of Commerce  
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association) 
2. President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief  
PEPFAR Department of State  
(Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator) 
3. National Emergency Medical Services 
Advisory Committee     
NEMSAC Department of Transportation  
(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration) 
4. National Advisory Committee on 
Microbiological Criteria for Foods  
NACMCF Department of Agriculture  
(Food Safety and Inspection Service) 
 
  Data collection was initiated in March, 2013. Instead of initiating data collection with all four 
cases at once, the decision was made in consultation with the investigator’s thesis advisory 
committee to initiate the research with two cases due to the anticipated volume of data to be 
collected and the importance of maintaining clarity about the patterns and themes emerging in each 





sufficient to address the research questions, it would be unethical to continue data collection with 
two additional case studies. While the IRB deemed this study “minimal risk” there is still some risk 
posed to participants if confidentiality were breached; exposing additional respondents to this risk 
after saturation was reached is not necessary or ethical.  
  The PEPFAR SAB was the impetus for this research study and the model from which the 
inclusion criteria were constructed, and it was of special interest to the investigator because of her 
professional background. The PEPFAR SAB case study focuses on the SAB as it stood under 
Ambassador Eric Goosby. The NCADAC was the second case selected for inclusion out of the final 
list of eligible committees because like global HIV/AIDS, climate change is a high-profile policy 
issue within the US and internationally, and has substantial implications for global health.  
VII. Interview Data 
  In-depth, semi-structured interviews served as the primary source of data for this research. 
This type of interview was considered most appropriate given the likelihood that the investigator 
would only have once chance to interview each respondent because all of the respondents were 
either “high-level bureaucrats [or] elite members of a community—people who are accustomed to 
efficient use of their time” (Bernard, 2006, p.212). To enhance the reliability and comparability of 
the interview data, an interview guide was developed prior to the start of data collection.  
  The guide addresses three major topics: how FACs function and their role in health policy; 
the impact of FACs; and how different groups can facilitate the uptake of recommendations put 
forth by FACs. Since the interviews were semi-structured, there was flexibility to explore topics 
brought up by the interview respondents through probing. The full range of probing techniques 
suggested by Bernard (Bernard, 2006) were used and proved successful to clarify information 





not explicitly addressed in the guide.  
  As data collection proceeded, the interview guide was edited to more accurately reflect the 
key themes emerging from the data. While the three major topics included in the guide remained 
constant throughout the study, some of the initial background questions were excluded because it 
quickly became clear that they were too basic and it would be inefficient to use interview time 
addressing them. In addition, biographical sketches for the respondents were available online and 
read prior to the interview as a part of the preparatory research which essentially answered the 
original background questions. Other questions were left out when the respondent’s expertise was 
squarely within one of the topics of the guide, and still others were refined to be more specific and 
clear. Further, questions were added to address new themes raised by respondents in initial 
interviews. For example, questions were added to address participant perceptions of how the 
membership of the FAC is balanced in terms of expertise and other criteria, how the size of each 
FAC affects the proceedings and efficiency of its operations, and how the government agency that 
established the FAC plays a role in managing the FAC. This gradual and iterative revision to the 
interview guide aligns with the principles of theoretical sampling in grounded theory (Draucker, 
Martsolf, Ross, & Rusk, 2007). The final version of the guide is included as Appendix H. 
A. Interview Sampling Frame 
  The first potential interview participants approached for each case were the FAC Chair(s) 
and the government officials managing each FAC. The key government officials for each FAC 
consisted of the DFO and others who were responsible for the oversight and management of the 
FAC or managed research and science within the government agency which established the FAC. In 
the PEPFAR case study, the SAB Chair was a consultant to OGAC and thus considered a 





DFO for each advisory committee. The DFO is responsible for ensuring that the FAC complies 
with FACA, including maintaining records on FAC proceedings, managing FAC meetings, and 
ensuring the FAC operates efficiently (Secretariat). Thus, for each case study, the initial sample 
consisted of a core group of three individuals.  
  These individuals were purposively sampled for several reasons. First, it was thought that 
they could provide rich information to address the study’s research questions given their familiarity 
with the history, implementation, proceedings, and recommendations of the FAC as well as the 
actors involved. Second, it was thought that these individuals would be the most appropriate 
individuals to recommend additional interview participants via snowball sampling. Finally, these 
individuals were approached first to maximize the feasibility of the study by showing respect for the 
leadership role of the Chair and ensuring that each government agency was aware of the research 
from its initial stages.  
  Snowball sampling was used to identify additional potential interview participants from all 
categories of informants. The importance of maximum variation sampling was emphasized to each 
person interviewed to mitigate the potential for bias in their recommendations.  
B. Interview Data Collection Procedures 
  FAC member lists are publicly available through the FACA database and through Google, as 
all committees have their own web pages hosted on their respective government agency websites. 
These lists also identify the Chair of each FAC. Member lists contained in the FACA database were 
cross-referenced with agency member lists because agency websites often had been updated more 
recently than the FACA database. If there were discrepancies between the FACA database member 
lists and the lists obtained through Google searches, the more recent list was used.  





affiliation, and email address for each individual in the three categories of interview subjects in 
Microsoft Excel. Initially, the databases only included information on the FAC members, which was 
downloaded from the FACA database, and the government officials who were part of the initial core 
sample. As they were populated through the snowball sampling process, the databases served as a 
tracking tool to manage participant recruitment. As discussed in Section V of this chapter, to protect 
the confidentiality of interview participants, these files were maintained separately from any 
interview transcripts which used pseudonyms in place of respondents’ actual names, and the Excel 
databases did not include these pseudonyms. 
  Potential interview participants were contacted via email. Email addresses for the individuals 
included in the initial core sample for each case study were obtained through Google searches. 
Email addresses for subsequent participants were also obtained via Google searches or from the 
interviewee who recommended the new participant. If potential interview respondents did not reply 
to the initial email within two weeks, a follow-up email was sent. An amendment to the research 
protocol was approved by the IRB in July 2014, to permit the investigator to send one additional (i.e., 
a third) email to non-respondents and follow up with a phone call. Thus, a total of four contacts 
from the investigator were permitted. If no reply was received after the fourth contact, that 
respondent was excluded from the pool of potential interview subjects. 
  Between March 2013 and August 2014, a total of 50 individuals were contacted for 
interviews. Of these, 11 failed to respond. Only six individuals declined to participate. Three 
individuals declined because of workload constraints and three individuals declined because they felt 
they were not the most appropriate people to interview. In the NCADAC case, there were two 
individuals who initially agreed to participate in the research and even proposed days and times for 





attempting to finalize the interview. 
  A total of 33 individuals were interviewed, with 17 individuals interviewed for the PEPFAR 
case and 16 individuals interviewed for the NCADAC case. Table 4.3 summarizes the responses for 
each case study by category of respondent. Of these 33 total interviews, five completed interviews 
were from the core group of six initially identified through purposive sampling. One of the 
individuals from this core group never responded to an interview request. The remaining 27 
interviews were suggested via snowball sampling. In the PEPFAR case study, seven SAB members, 
six government officials, and four staff members from NGOs were interviewed. The total number 
of interviews conducted for the PEPFAR case study was 17 and the overall response rate was 68 
percent. There is a similar distribution for the NCADAC case, with interviews conducted with eight 
NCADAC members, four government officials, and four NGO staff. The total number of 
interviews conducted was 16 and the overall response rate for the NCADAC case study was 64 
percent. 










SAB Member 7 1 2 10 70% 
Government Official 6 1 3 10 60% 
NGO/Advocacy/Civil Society 4 1 0 5 80% 
TOTAL INTERVIEWS 17 3 5 25 68% 
 
          
 










SAB Member 8 1 3 12 67% 
Government Official 4 1 2 7 57% 
NGO/Advocacy/Civil Society 4 1 1 6 67% 





  Table 4.4 provides summary data on the method of interview by case study. In-person 
interviews were conducted with 19 participants total, nine from the PEPFAR case and 10 from the 
NCADAC case. This represents 58 percent of the total sample. When in-person interviews were not 
possible because respondents lived in another state or country, the interview was conducted via 
Skype (without video). Skype was used to conduct 14 interviews, which represents 42 percent of the 
total sample. Eight interviews from the PEPFAR case and six from the NCADAC case were 
conducted via Skype. Using Skype increased the interview completion rate because the software 
allowed the investigator to conduct interviews that would not have otherwise been feasible.    







SAB Member 1 6 3 5 
Government Official 5 1 3 1 
NGO/Advocacy/Civil Society 3 1 4 0 
TOTAL 9 8 10 6 
TOTAL INTERVIEWS 17 16 
  
  Although Skype audio-only interviews do not allow the investigator to observe participants’ 
body language and other visual cues, a review of literature on telephone interviews in qualitative 
research indicates that “there is little evidence that data loss or distortion occurs, or that 
interpretation or quality of findings is compromised when interview data are collected by telephone. 
In fact, telephones may allow respondents to disclose sensitive information more freely, and 
telephone conversation has been reported to contain several features that render it particularly 
suitable for research interviews” (Novick, 2008, p.397). 





conduct interviews while non-Washington, DC-based respondents were in the area for a business 
trip. In-person interviews were recorded using an Olympus VN810005 digital voice recorder with 
the investigator’s iPhone 4S or iPhone 5 (after December 2013) used for a back-up recording with 
the QuickVoice application. Skype interviews were recorded using free Skype recording software 
called MP3 Skype CallRecorder, Version 3.1.  
  Interviews lasted between 30 and 98 minutes. The average interview length was 61 minutes. 
All of the interviews were transcribed by the investigator. Given the lengthy data collection period, 
the transcription process helped to ensure that the investigator was constantly familiar with the data, 
self-critiquing her interview technique throughout, and fostered an iterative process whereby the 
investigator modified the interview guide to reflect the data obtained from the interviews, as 
previously described. Transcripts were imported into Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software 
(7.0.82) for coding and analysis, as described below.  
VIII. Data Analysis 
  As described in Section III and IV, the grounded theory method provides specific guidelines 
for how and when data analysis should occur, namely that data collection and analysis occur 
concurrently. This study implemented a modified approach, whereby analysis was initiated as data 
collection was concluding. This approach was employed for several reasons. Interviews were often 
scheduled close together, with some occasions of two interviews occurring on the same day, so it 
was not possible to complete transcription and code the transcribed data before the next interview. 
However, as noted above, the investigator transcribed all of the interviews herself instead of sending 
the audio files to a transcribing service. This provided an opportunity for the investigator to be 
constantly aware of new topics emerging from the data collection process and to modify the line of 





made every effort to transcribe the interviews soon after the interview occurred and prior to the next 
interview. If this was not possible, the investigator reviewed her notes prior to the next interview. At 
each interview, the investigator took notes by hand on a legal pad of paper. The purpose of this was 
primarily to note key issues raised by the respondent about which the investigator wanted to probe 
or follow-up.  
  Interview transcripts were coded using the qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti and 
followed the grounded theory process outlined by Charmaz and described in Section IV of this 
chapter (Charmaz, 2006a). Interviews conducted early in the study period were coded with initial 
codes line-by-line and used in-vivo codes to the extent it was appropriate so that the interview 
respondents’ own language was maintained through the analysis process. As new codes were 
developed or old codes were refined, transcripts were re-visited to adjust the coding. Comparisons 
were made between individual interview transcripts within each category of interview respondent 
within each case study as well as across respondent categories within each case, and also across the 
two case studies.  
  The coding process evolved into focused coding because of the number of initial codes 
generated (nearly 200). Focused codes are more conceptual than initial codes, require the researcher 
to make decisions about which initial codes should be used to categorize data, and should be applied 
to large amounts of data (Charmaz, 2006a). The initial codes that were most frequently applied or 
significant were used while examining the data to subsequently condense it. Categories, which are 
intended to integrate patterns from several codes, were developed from the focused codes that had 
the most explanatory significance across the interviews. 
  Given that the interview guide was developed to address the aims and research questions 





Categories were based on these themes. There were three categories that emerged: FAC operations, 
factors affecting use of FAC recommendations, and stakeholder engagement. The following tables 
show the progression of coding from initial codes to focused codes to categories that were used for 
each case. Each case study includes particularly salient quotes linked to the focused codes. 
  Initial codes were linked with categories using the Code Family Manager in Atlas.ti. This 
option essentially provides a way to create “families” (i.e., categories) and then select codes relevant 
to each category from all of the codes used for each case study. Once the relevant initial codes were 
grouped by family, the investigator sub-divided them by focused code. As part of this process, the 
quotes linked to each focused code were reviewed to further refine the initial and focused codes to 
ensure that the categories accurately reflected the original data provided through the interviews. This 
process was followed for the coding of transcripts for both the PEPFAR and NCADAC case 
studies. 
Table 4.5.  Coding Progression for PEPFAR Case Study 
Initial Codes Focused 
Codes 
Categories 
Reaching out to main State to find out how to implement a FACA 
committee; working with RM and L Bureaus; provide guidance on legal 
processes; charter renewal and membership goes through M and H 
bureaus; FACA training only for direct hires; helpful if FACA training 




Seeking recommendations from other agencies; wanting breadth of 
expertise and leaders in the field; personal preference for certain 
individuals; Ambassador’s preference for individuals; variety of 
institutions and perspectives represented; membership should be broad-
based; wanting to consult with external, non-USG expertise; adding 
members with specific expertise; wanting leaders in specific areas of 
expertise; recommendations based on what PEPFAR needs; no patient or 
community advocate on the board; more rabble-rousers needed; long-
standing relationship with Ambassador; Ambassador hand-picked SAB 
members; aggressive, assertive people selected 
Selecting SAB 
members 
Weak representation from scientists and implementers outside the US; 
patient community from PEPFAR-funded countries is completely 
unrepresented; can’t not have experts who PEPFAR also funds; 







Initial Codes Focused 
Codes 
Categories 
recognize that situation is deeply conflicted 
Establish a new working group if there is a topic of interest that arises; 
based on needs of SAB; based on needs of Ambassador; working group 
participants volunteer or are nominated by Ambassador; huge amount of 
work for PEPFAR when a working group is established; PEPFAR staff 
integrate comments from SAB members into WG reports; not effective 






Assuming Chair and DFO could not be same person; bringing in external 
advisor to Chair; there is no Chair for SAB, working groups have leaders; 
meetings facilitated by different people; letting discussion run; a little 
more direction on some occasions; late in getting agendas together; late in 
coming onto conference calls; did not hold disciplined discussions; Chair 
should be someone experienced in advisory boards; did not have 
discipline to shut off SAB members; Chair should be someone from 
outside agency; SAB needed a manager 
Effectiveness of 
SAB Chair 
Difficulty thinking of what scientific questions PEPFAR should answer; 
challenging to think of what SAB should address; the SAB defined 
priorities; reflecting that PEPFAR should have narrowed issues for SAB 
consideration; shared with SAB members beforehand; internal PEPFAR 
staff preparing specific questions for SAB; SAB needed someone to 




Too little time to let them talk; doesn’t make good use of members; 
debate is robust; members are comfortable expressing opinions; members 
raise tough issues in the meetings; too burdensome to have meetings 
twice a year; conference calls are operator-assisted; moving through 
agendas on time; hard to schedule conference calls because SAB 
members are involved in too many things at once; beneficial to meet 





Having consensus in what is put forward to the Ambassador; evidence 
supports PEPFAR taking action; looking to SAB for advice about 
priorities; looking to SAB for advice about how scientific findings should 
influence PEPFAR program; discussing issues in open forum and noting 
dissent; ensuring recommendations are feasible; having dialogue between 
SAB and OGAC; including implementation as a consideration in 
recommendations; increasing specificity of questions for SAB; relevancy 
of recommendations; synergy between SAB and OGAC priorities; 
timeliness of SAB given 052 results; SAB discussions are transparent and 
well-documented; receiving guidance from establishing agency to refine 
SAB scope; SAB members knew PEPFAR program well; SAB members 
understanding what was needed on the ground; providing 
recommendations that are best practices in terms of policy 
Facilitating the 
use of evidence 
Factors Affecting Use 
of SAB 
Recommendations 
Wanting to drill down into issues; not staying at right level; need to 
provide advice to the Ambassador; absence of novel information or 






Initial Codes Focused 
Codes 
Categories 
neutral SAB; failing to ask hard questions is rubber stamping business as 
usual; lack of funding limits take-up of SAB recommendations; lack of 
understanding of how PEPFAR works; SAB recommendations not 
politically feasible; advice has to be actionable; recommendations are 
inappropriate in terms of regulatory constraints; not bringing anything 
new to the table; lack of familiarity with PEPFAR program; ensuring 
recommendations are within PEPFAR’s mandate; irrelevant or low-
priority advice; recommendations are not financially feasible;  lack of 
direction or management from host agency 
Obama as a leader in using evidence to inform policy; favorable political 
context; previous policy context not conducive to using science for 
policy; SAB provides validation for PEPFAR; ensuring the SAB is 
independent and not providing too much guidance; timeliness of HPTN 
052 results; support of agency leadership; Ambassador has history as 
convener; Republican Congress under Bush did not follow science  
Contextual factors 
Surprised about lack of engagement; public comment period is short; 
want input from NGOs but don’t want to be dominated by their voice; 
influencing SAB by calling members; influencing SAB by working with 







Meetings require two days away from the office; not a big yield by 
engaging with SAB; 
Time constraints 
Engagement with NGOs is ongoing; SAB not a huge nexus for NGOs; 
topics of interest to NGOs not necessarily same as topics of interest to 
SAB; questioning relevancy of advocacy community in influencing the 
scientific evidence base; SAB issues aren’t hot topics for the American 
public; contentious issues aren’t necessarily scientific issues; people don’t 
think it’s politically important; end-users of PEPFAR are in other 
countries and cannot attend SAB meetings; lack of recognition of what 






Given that the same aims and research questions were applied to each case study, the coding process 
used the same focused codes and categories for all interviews. Consistent with the grounded theory 








Table 4.6.  Coding Progression for NCADAC Case Study 
Initial Codes Focused Codes Categories 
Hurry up and meet the law; lack of clarity on how to 
implement a FACA committee; a lot of time talking to 
GAO; FACA is severely flawed; different agencies interpret 
FACA differently; spirit of the law is transparency and 
access to documents in a timely manner; some agencies are 
very lax in interpretation and others are very strict; NOAA 
is so strict it is almost hard to function 
Navigating FACA Legislation FAC Operations 
Experts from a variety of climate science issues and other 
areas; Federal government did not have expertise to do 
NCA properly; lengthy process of selecting members; 
negotiations over nominations for six months; co-
production model of drafting the NCA; deliberate attempt 
to have balance of perspectives; Commerce, NOAA, and 
OSTP involved in reviewing applications; seeking expertise 
in climate science as well as demographic diversity, 
geographic representation; collaborative, collegial people 
end up on FACs; screen out people who would take NCA 
in a different direction; choice of members gets buy in 
from certain groups; White House and NOAA came up 
with additional names; second tranche of NCADAC 
members had less climate expertise than first set of 
nominees; engaging a network of people by 
Selecting NCADAC Members 
Ex officio members tend to be turf conscious; membership 
is too incestuous; initial list of members seen as not 
balanced;  
Bias and Balance among NCADAC 
Members 
No one’s full time job; helpful to have discussions off the 
record;  
Establishing and functioning of 
NCADAC Working Groups 
Want someone who can handle delicate balance with 
committee and NOAA Administrator;  
Effectiveness of NCADAC Chair 
 Setting NCADAC meeting agendas 
Conversation was stiff; hierarchical organization; decision-
making at top; consensus is not an easy process; need for 
consensus delayed report by a few months; hard to oppose 
something by the time it comes to a vote; sustained 
assessment report was contentious; quality of internal 
communication 
Managing NCADAC meetings 
 
Perception that NCADAC is independent and less biased 
than government opinion; transparent process to 
understand decision making; having federal agencies at the 
table; public acceptance comes with having right people on 
committee; blind review of public comments; consensus-
based process; people on the ground are part of the NCA; 
important to know how agency functions; filter 
Facilitating the use of evidence Factors Affecting 






Initial Codes Focused Codes Categories 
controversies in data and publications to form 
recommendations; transparent process; bring the best 
science; serving as an ambassador back to communities; 
alignment with objectives of Administration; providing 
sufficient guidance to FAC; adequately representing 
different segments of users of information;  
NCA is not decision support; lack of political use for NCA; 
agency may disagree with advice; may not have legal 
authority to implement advice; lack of financial resources 
to implement recommendations; FAC members do not 
understand regulatory context of agency; receiving end 
doesn’t know what to do with advice; policy prescriptive 
instead of policy relevant; recommendations are not 
logistically feasible; 
Impeding the use of evidence 
Very complicated thing that involves lots of different 
people; all kinds of administrative and technical support 
provided; possible to get across transitions in 
Administrations if well managed; same core group involved 
in all NCAs; lawsuit claiming original assessment violated 
Federal Data Quality Act; process for peer review in IPCC 
reports; right people being in leadership; alignment with 
objectives of Administration; recommendations are too 
difficult to implement institutionally; releasing draft NCA 
after the election; Congress could not care less about 
climate change;  
Contextual factors 
Decision makers and scientists have to be able to put 
themselves in each other’s shoes; it’s in the interaction 
between scientists and managers that people will have their 
thinking changed; ongoing process needed to bring 
management experts together with science experts; 
communications has to be part of the process; build a 
network of partners; co-production model; public 
comment period not useful; no one reads Federal Register 
notices; public comment period is too short; NCAnet helps 
gain buy in to NCA; NCAnet partners not used effectively; 
direct contact between NGOs and key NCADAC 
members and White House officials through personal 
connections 
Formal and informal engagement Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Difficult to get people engaged; no time to actively sell 
NCA; people assume their interests are represented already; 
no time to attend two-day meetings; no opportunity to 
interact in real-time with NCADAC; NCAnet partners not 
provided with enough information to be useful 
Time constraints 
Interactions between scientists and people makes 
dissemination broader; interest from USGCRP in 





Initial Codes Focused Codes Categories 
engagement is just lip service; inclusivity not what it could 
have been; attempt to pull in on-the-ground knowledge; 
most communities aren’t personally invested; stakeholders 
did not understand NCA process; climate change affects 
many aspects of our lives;  
 
IX. Strengths and Limitations 
  The primary strength of this study is that it represents the first empirical assessment of FACs 
for health at the federal level in the United States. Other studies have considered FACs broadly as 
well as the role their members play in the public policy process but none have looked specifically 
and only at FACs for health. Given that U.S. government agencies which include health in their 
purview consistently and systematically establish federal advisory committees to provide 
recommendations regarding how research and evidence can be integrated into policy, gaining a 
better understanding of how FACs operate makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of 
how research and evidence are integrated into the health policy process.   
  In addition, including PEPFAR and the NCADAC as case studies allows for a novel and 
‘real-time’ examination of two high-profile advisory boards addressing issues that are front and 
center in the public policy arena. PEPFAR is the largest program to combat a single disease by any 
nation. In the context of repeated funding cuts from Congress and calls by policy elites for an 
“AIDS Free Generation”, PEPFAR is faced with tough decisions about how best to finance anti-
retroviral treatment in low- and middle-income countries given new science showing that treatment 
can substantially reduce the risk of sexual transmission of HIV in sero-discordant heterosexual 
couples. Climate change is now a major policy priority for the Obama Administration, which 






  FACs as a mechanism for the provision and potential integration of research into policy 
decisions are not well-understood but, in the context of ever-increasing healthcare costs in the 
United States, ensuring that health policy is based on sound evidence is increasingly important. This 
may be especially true for policies determining what programs receive government funding and the 
volume of funding allocated. The renewed interest in evidence-based policy suggests that FACs may 
be used more frequently in the coming years, although the highly politicized and partisan nature of 
public policy in the United States may complicate efforts to inform policy with sound evidence and 
inhibit FACs from operating successfully. This research makes a novel contribution to the 
understanding of how FACs function in the policy process.    
  There are several limitations to this study that are important to address. The first limitation  
relates to the interview data. The interviewees self-selected into the study: not all invited participants 
responded and some declined. The perspectives of those who did agree to be interviewed may not 
be representative of others in their interview “group” (i.e., committee members, NGO/advocacy 
staff, and government officials). A few of the participants who did not respond to multiple requests 
for an interview or declined were recommended by a large number of other participants, which 
suggests that there may have been a missed opportunity to obtain additional and rich data. However, 
saturation was reached and the findings from each case study (see Chapter 5 and 6) are responsive to 
the study’s research questions.  
  There are also potential limitations related to theoretical or analytical generalizability. Aim 3 
seeks to outline a set of strategies or recommendations that stakeholders can use to facilitate the 
uptake of FAC recommendations into the policy process. Ultimately, these strategies are based on 
only two case studies. However, this concern is mitigated to some extent because replication logic 





theory, replication may be claimed” (Yin, 2009, p.38). Generalizing to the level of theory “becomes 
the vehicle for generalizing to new cases” (Yin, 2009, p.54).  
  Finally, the departure from the grounded theory method in the timing of data analysis 
relative to data collection is a limitation because it may have compromised theoretical sampling. The 
investigator raised ideas with respondents during data collection based on her memory of topics 
raised in previous interviews and her interview notes, which she reviewed in between interviews. 
Although all interviews were transcribed by the investigator which enabled her to remain close to 
the data, recall bias may have affected which topics were ultimately raised as the interview questions 





 CHAPTER 5: THE PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS 
RELIEF SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD - A CASE STUDY 
I. Introduction 
  This case study provides empirical evidence about how the PEPFAR SAB contributed to 
decisions about what issues should be considered priorities for HIV prevention, care, and treatment 
policy as well as formulating and changing OGAC policies in these areas between 2010 and 2013 
under the leadership of Ambassador Eric Goosby. The evolution of the PEPFAR program is 
described, beginning with the initial announcement made by President George W. Bush in June 
2002 about a large HIV program, to the most recent legislation authorizing the PEPFAR program. 
This background information, discussed in Section II, focuses on the stipulations for how PEPFAR 
funds were to be allocated, especially for the prevention of HIV, to highlight how the role of science 
and research in PEPFAR has changed substantially since the program’s inception. Some of the 
challenges associated with PEPFAR’s prevention funding stipulations are discussed in Section III. 
Core components of the SAB are discussed in Section IV, including the SAB charter and 
stipulations contained therein for the membership of the SAB. Sections V and VI address the 
findings from the document review and in-depth interviews, respectively. Conclusions are offered in 
Section VII. 
II. Background 
  The origins of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) date back to a 
speech made by President George W. Bush in the Rose Garden on June 19, 2002 (The White 
House, 2002) during which he announced a $500 million initiative to address the transmission of 





one million women on an annual basis with nevirapine, an anti-retroviral drug which had proven to 
be cost-effective for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV, and reduce 
by 40 percent the number of children infected with HIV over a five year period in 12 African and 
Caribbean countries (Guay et al., 1999; Lallemant et al., 2004). However, the President had larger 
goals in mind, stating at the end of the speech that “as we see what works, we will make more 
funding available” (The White House, 2002). Following the Rose Garden announcement, the 
President’s then Chief of Staff Josh Bolten told Dr. Anthony Fauci, the Director of the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) that the President wanted his advisors to 
“think big” (Dietrich, 2007, p. 2).  
  During the following six months, Dr. Fauci, along with one of his deputies, Dr. Mark Dybul, 
developed a five-year plan with goals for the prevention, care, and treatment of HIV focused in 
countries with the highest burden of disease and where the United States government already had a 
strong presence in global health (Donnelly, 2012).6 Dr. Dybul and others drafted a concept paper for 
the plan, which was based heavily on Uganda’s experience with treating individuals with HIV 
because clinical trials there testing the efficacy of different approaches to providing anti-retroviral 
therapy (ART) had been successful (Donnelly, 2012). The concept paper emphasized treating the 
HIV epidemic as a global emergency and funds would be used to rapidly build systems and 
infrastructure to establish basic health system capacity in focus countries so that their governments 
could then expand efforts to prevent, care, and treat HIV/AIDS. The plan included stipulations that 
US government agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) work together to integrate their 
                                                 






service delivery efforts under a global AIDS coordinator. Cost projections informed the 
development of scenarios for prevention, care, and treatment goals. The concept paper included 
treatment and care targets to be achieved by 2008: provide antiretroviral therapy to two million 
people and other medical care to 10 million people. The target to prevent seven million new 
infections was set for 2010. During his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, President 
George W. Bush requested Congress appropriate $15 billion, which included $9 billion in new 
money for the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief to “’meet a severe and urgent crisis abroad’”(Bush, 
2003).  
III. PEPFAR Authorizing Legislation: A Brief History 
  The legislation which initially authorized PEPFAR in 2003 and then re-authorized the 
program in 2008 is important to this case study because of the requirements stipulated in the 
legislation for how funding should be allocated, especially for the prevention of HIV. While 
PEPFAR program implementers, advocates, and researchers acknowledged that PEPFAR was 
initially designed as an emergency response to the growing HIV pandemic, the funding requirements 
stipulated by Congress – especially for the prevention of sexual transmission – were widely criticized 
for not aligning with scientific consensus (Lyerla, Murrill, Ghys, Calleja-Garcia, & DeCock, 2012; 
IOM, 2013; Santelli, Ott, Lyon, Rogers, & Summers, 2006; Santellia, Speizerb, & Edelsteinc, 2013 ). 
The disconnect between funding allocations and the evidence base was amplified by the fact that 
such large volumes of money were appropriated. This historical element of the PEPFAR program is 
important because the creation of the SAB marked a substantial departure from prior philosophies 






1. THE LEADERSHIP ACT 
  Congress passed on May 27, 2003 the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (the Leadership Act), which authorized a total of $15 billion 
to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria globally from FY2004-FY20087. Included in this 
legislation was language authorizing $9 billion of the total $15 billion to address HIV/AIDS 
prevention, care, and treatment in 15 focus countries8 for the program President Bush announced in 
his State of the Union address in January 2003, now known as PEPFAR. The legislation established 
OGAC at the U.S. Department of State to oversee all U.S. Government (USG) efforts to combat 
HIV/AIDS globally.  
  The Leadership Act provided recommendations and requirements for PEPFAR’s funding 
priorities. It was recommended (i.e., the “sense of Congress”) that for FY2004-FY2006, 55 percent 
of funds be allocated for the treatment of individuals with HIV/AIDS, prevention of new infections 
and palliative care for persons living with HIV receive 20 percent and 15 percent of total funds, 
respectively, and 10 percent of funds be allocated for orphans and vulnerable children (OVC)9 
(Figure 5.1). Of the prevention funds, Congress recommended that 33 percent be allocated for 
abstinence-until-marriage programming.  
  The legislation stipulated requirements for how funds were to be allocated for FY2006-
FY2008: at least 55 percent of total funds should be spent on treatment of people living with HIV, 
of which 75 percent was to purchase antiretroviral drugs and 25 percent was for related medical 
care; 20 percent of total funds were to be spent on prevention, of which at least 33 percent was to 
                                                 
7 Actual appropriations by Congress reached nearly $19 billion by FY2008. 
8 Initially, the following 14 countries were designated as PEPFAR focus countries: Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Vietnam 
was added later by President George W. Bush.  





be spent on abstinence-until-marriage programs; and no less than 10 percent of total funds were to 
be spent on OVC, with at least 50 percent of those funds directed to organizations working at the 
community level (e.g., non-profits, NGOs, including faith-based organizations).10 Thus, while there 
was no difference between the “recommendations” and “requirements” in terms of allocations for 
overall funding priorities (i.e., prevention, care, and treatment), the specific stipulations of the 
legislation for FY2006-FY2008 had substantial implications for how PEPFAR allocated funds 
within categories.  
  
 
The targets for prevention, care, and treatment outlined in the Leadership Act matched those that 
were defined in the concept paper drafted by Dr. Dybul and Dr. Fauci: prevent seven million new 
HIV infections; care for 10 million people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, including orphans 
and vulnerable children; and treat two million people with HIV/AIDS. 
                                                 
10 The sum total of these spending category allocations is only 85 percent. It is unclear from the legislation and related 
documents on what the remaining 15 percent of funds were to be spent. However, given that the requirements state that 
the funding proportions should be “no less than”, it may be the case that the remaining 15 percent of total funds could 
























  As mentioned above, the recommendations and requirements in the Leadership Act for how 
prevention funds were to be used has been the subject of considerable debate. The legislation 
defined prevention activities as those that are: 
designed or intended to impart knowledge with the exclusive purpose of helping 
individuals avoid behaviors that place them at risk of HIV infection, including 
integration of such programs into health programs and the inclusion in counseling 
programs of information on methods of avoiding infection of HIV, including 
delaying sexual debut, abstinence, fidelity and monogamy, reduction of casual sexual 
partnering, reducing sexual violence and coercion, including child marriage, widow 
inheritance, and polygamy, and where appropriate, use of condoms ("United States 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003," 2003). 
  More specifically, the legislation touts the “Abstain, Be Faithful, use Condoms” (ABC) 
model implemented by Uganda nationwide in 1986 as an exemplary approach to prevent the sexual 
transmission of HIV. The campaign emphasized three behaviors, in order of priority: abstaining 
from sex until marriage; being faithful to one partner (“zero-grazing”); and using condoms when 
necessary. The prevalence of HIV declined in Uganda between the 1980s and the early 2000s, but 
the extent to which the change in the course of the epidemic can be attributed to the ABC campaign 
or any of its individual components is unclear (Cohen, 2006).     
  With the Leadership Act as guidance, OGAC defined five areas for HIV prevention 
programming: (i) abstinence/faithfulness (“AB”); (ii) “other prevention” which included programs 
for high-risk groups and condom promotion and distribution, among others; (iii) prevention of 
mother to child transmission; (iv) safe medical injections; and, (v) blood safety. Any abstinence-until-
marriage activities fell under “AB” prevention programming. Thus, prevention efforts were 
categorized into two broad areas: prevention of the sexual transmission of HIV, which would focus 





transmission, which would occur through programming in the other three areas.  
  OGAC’s guidance to its officials implementing PEPFAR programs in the 15 focus countries 
indicated that country teams should develop interventions that responded to the epidemiologic 
profile of the countries’ HIV epidemic while taking cultural norms into account (OGAC, 2006). At 
least 50 percent of prevention funds at the country level were to be allocated to sexual transmission 
prevention activities with AB activities receiving 66 percent of that funding. Country teams were 
required to specifically designate AB spending in their annual reports to demonstrate adherence to 
the spending requirement. Some country teams were allowed to request a waiver from these policies, 
for example if they had small budgets, so that they could respond appropriately to the countries’ 
prevention needs. The focus of the debate on PEPFAR’s prevention expenditures focused on 
programming related to the prevention of sexual transmission. This debate is described in more 
depth below. 
  Apart from the spending directives for prevention, care, and treatment, the Leadership Act 
also required the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to conduct a study on the performance of the 
different components of PEPFAR by 2006.  
2. THE LANTOS-HYDE ACT 
  In 2008, Congress passed the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-
293) (the Lantos-Hyde Act). The legislation authorized appropriations up to $48 billion between 
FY2009 and FY 2013, of which $5 billion was designated for anti-malaria efforts globally, $4 billion 
was allocated for anti-tuberculosis efforts globally, and $2 billion was allocated for the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Thus, up to $37 billion was available to PEPFAR. The 





the Leadership Act.  
  The most significant departure of the Lantos-Hyde Act from the Leadership Act was the 
elimination of the requirement that 33 percent of prevention funds be spent on abstinence-only 
programs although the Act does not specify the proportion of overall PEPFAR funding that should 
be allocated to prevention. However, while the law stipulated that funding for programs addressing 
the sexual prevention of HIV should be “balanced”, an emphasis on the role of abstinence and 
faithfulness to one partner in the prevention of sexual transmission of HIV remained in the law. The 
Lantos-Hyde Act required the Global AIDS Coordinator to develop a strategy for each focus 
country that allocated 50 percent of prevention funding “for activities promoting abstinence, delay 
of sexual debut, monogamy, fidelity, and partner reduction”. If funding in any one country dropped 
below the 50 percent threshold, the Global AIDS Coordinator was required to report to Congress to 
justify the discrepancy.  
  The abstinence spending requirement was tempered by the inclusion of language allowing 
spending on additional prevention measures that aligned with the new emphasis on “balanced 
funding” for the prevention of sexual transmission of HIV. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
and CDC were granted authority to research the development and use of microbicides. In addition, 
voluntary male circumcision was added as a method that could be supported under PEPFAR to 
prevent or reduce the risk of transmission of HIV. In terms of behavioral interventions, the Lantos-
Hyde Act included language allowing PEPFAR funds to be used to promote the reduction of 
multiple sexual partners. Finally, with respect to the purchase of commodities, the Act allowed the 
purchase of male and female condoms (as opposed to just male condoms in the Leadership Act).  
  The spending directive for treatment was also changed: 50 percent of funds would be 





percent under the Leadership Act). Funding for OVC programs remained the same, at 10 percent of 
total funds. Due largely to the absence of a directive on the proportion of overall funds to be 
allocated for prevention, it is not possible to compare funding priorities by overall category between 
the two Acts. 
  The targets and goals for prevention, care, and treatment under the Lantos-Hyde Act were 
increased and new goals were added. The goal for prevention was increased by five million, so that 
the new target was to prevent 12 million new HIV infections. Similarly, the goal for care was 
increased by two million, so that the new target was to care for 12 million individuals living with 
HIV, including five million OVC. The goal for treatment was more complicated. The Lantos-Hyde 
Act indicated that treatment target should be increased above the original two million people target 
from the Leadership Act by at least the percentage increase in the amount appropriated for  
bilateral global HIV/AIDS assistance in any fiscal year as compared to FY2008 and that the 
treatment goal should be increased above this calculated number in proportion to the decrease in the 
per patient cost to the United States Government of providing treatment in countries receiving 
bilateral aid, as compared with fiscal year 2008. Thus, the treatment target would theoretically vary 
from fiscal year to fiscal year.  
  New goals were added for several areas, all of which involve providing assistance to partner 
governments/countries11 to achieve various targets. Assistance would be provided to help partner 
countries: reach a PMTCT coverage target of at least 80% of pregnant women; provide care and 
treatment to children with HIV/AIDS in proportion to their share of the HIV-infected population 
in country; train at least 140,000 new health workers; and equip teachers with skills needed to 
                                                 
11 The term ‘partner government’ means a government with which the United States is working to provide assistance to 






  Similar to the Leadership Act, the Lantos-Hyde Act also required studies from the IOM. In 
the re-authorizing legislation, the IOM would submit three studies on PEPFAR’s performance, 
impact on health outcomes in the prevention, care, and treatment areas, and collection and use of 
data, respectively. In addition, the legislation required a report from the Comptroller General on the 
performance of the various global HIV/AIDS programs funded by USG and a report from 
PEPFAR on its best practices.  
3. THE PEPFAR STEWARDSHIP AND OVERSIGHT ACT OF 2013 
  Unlike the Leadership Act and the Lantos-Hyde Act, the PEPFAR Stewardship and 
Oversight Act of 2013, which was signed by President Obama on December 2, 2013, is not a full re-
authorization. It largely extends various provisions of the prior law that were set to expire on 
September 30, 2013 and strengthens PEPFAR’s reporting duties to Congress.  
  The new reporting requirement mandates that OGAC submit an annual report to Congress 
with information on a variety of areas related to setting and achieving targets and metrics for 
measuring progress. Particularly relevant elements of the new reporting requirement include 
progress toward achieving prevention, care, and treatment targets by country and how that progress 
contributes to a reduction in incidence; HIV treatment rates and retention rates in treatment 
programs by country; and a description of efforts to achieve greater cost-effectiveness in PEPFAR 
programs at the country level.  
  One important divergence from prior legislation is the absence of any funding requirements. 
Instead of authorizing appropriations for an overall funding level, such as the $15 billion or $48 
billion in the Leadership Act and the Lantos-Hyde Act, respectively, the new legislation is silent on 





The specific allocation for treatment (50 percent of overall funds) and OVC (10 percent of overall 
funds) remain intact. However, the absence of an overall funding requirement may have been a 
strategic political maneuver to ensure that the bill would be passed relatively quickly; had Congress 
been required to vote on a bill with large requests for foreign aid, it may not have ever been passed 
given the political environment in Congress at the time.  
IV. PEPFAR Prevention Programming: Scientific Debate, Human Rights Issues, 
and Operational Challenges 
  As mentioned above, there has been considerable debate about the funding allocation 
requirements stipulated in the Leadership Act and the Lantos-Hyde Act. Under the Leadership Act 
era of PEPFAR, this debate focused on the program’s emphasis and related funding allocations for 
ABC programming as a means to prevent the sexual transmission of HIV, which was viewed by 
many behavioral scientists, HIV program implementers, and advocates to be inappropriate for the 
epidemics in the PEPFAR focus countries or in any country, not based on scientific consensus, and 
challenging for country teams to comply with.  
  Objections to the emphasis on abstinence-only programming stemmed from several 
perspectives. Scientific critiques questioned the efficacy and the accuracy of information included in 
abstinence-only programs. Several rigorous evaluations of abstinence-only curricula conducted in the 
United States and elsewhere found that the programs failed to have a positive effect on key 
outcomes such as increasing condom use, delaying initiation of sexual intercourse, or partner 
reduction (Chin, 2012; Kirby, 2008; Kirby, 2009; Mavedzenge, 2011; Trenholm, 2008; Underhill, 
2007). The CDC conducted a meta-analysis of 23 abstinence-only evaluations and referred to the 
findings from these evaluations as “inconsistent”, but the only evidence of a reduction in the 





federally-funded abstinence education programs conducted by the U.S. House of Representatives in 
2004 found that programs contained false information about the effectiveness of contraceptives and 
the risk of abortion (United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform—
Minority Staff, 2004).  
  In addition to the critiques of abstinence-only education from the scientific arena, concerns 
were raised about the human rights implications of such programming. In particular, there were 
questions about the potential efficacy of focusing on abstinence in countries where women often 
have limited control over their sexual relationships. In many PEPFAR focus countries, transactional 
or commercial sex is used as a mechanism to generate income for school fees, for example. Focusing 
on abstinence denies women who engage in transactional sex access to comprehensive information 
about how to prevent the acquisition of HIV as well as other diseases. Further, even the “Be 
Faithful” element of the programming was potentially problematic given that in many countries, 
being married was actually a risk factor for women to acquire HIV given the high rates of extra-
marital sex among married men. Finally, focusing on the A and B without the C ignored vulnerable 
groups, or key populations, such as men who have sex with men and people who inject drugs 
(PWID) (Murphy, 2006).  
  Aside from the scientific and human rights concerns about PEPFAR’s focus on abstinence-
only and be faithful programming as strategies for preventing the sexual transmission of HIV, there 
were operational challenges for the PEPFAR country teams in complying with the spending 
requirement. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report issued in 2006 which reviewed 
PEPFAR’s prevention strategy provides key information about how the 15 PEPFAR focus country 
teams interpreted and implemented OGAC’s ABC guidance and abstinence-until marriage spending 





that the majority of country teams found components of OGAC’s ABC guidance to be confusing. 
For example, country teams found the definition of at-risk populations in the guidance to be unclear 
and were concerned that populations in need of ABC programming would not receive it because 
they did not meet the guidance definition of at-risk. Further, the guidance was unclear about what 
activities were permissible under “C” programming and what messages could be delivered about 
condom use to groups which included youth younger than 15, who were prohibited under the 
guidance from receiving condom information through school-based programs. As a result, teams 
were concerned about violating the guidance and felt constrained in what information they could 
provide about correct and consistent condom use. Interviews conducted by GAO also revealed that 
country teams found that the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement complicated their 
efforts to develop programs which were appropriate for the epidemiology and socio-cultural norms 
of the country in which they were working (OGAC, 2006). 
V. The PEPFAR SAB 
  The PEPFAR Science Advisory Board was established on November 5, 2010, and was 
officially in operation one month later, on December 5, 2010. As described above, the SAB was 
established by the authority of the U.S. Department of State. Ambassador Eric Goosby was the 
Global AIDS Coordinator at the time the SAB was established. He was sworn in by President 
Obama on June 23, 2009 and resigned on October 31, 2013. Currently, Dr. Debbie Birx serves as 
the Global AIDS Coordinator (Department of State, 2014). This case study focuses on the SAB as it 







A. The PEPFAR SAB Charter 
  Since it was first implemented, the PEPFAR SAB has had its charter renewed twice. The 
FACA database contains two charters from December 2010, one of which was signed on December 
5, 2010 and the other was signed on December 13, 2010. The next charter contained in the database 
was signed on December 21, 2012. The primary webpage for the PEPFAR SAB lists the current 
charter date as March 28, 2013 and a termination date of March 28, 2015. This discrepancy is due to 
the fact that the charter signed in December 2012 was not filed until March 28, 2013. It is unclear 
why there was a three-month delay between when the charter was signed and when it was filed.  
  In accordance with FACA, each charter terminates after two years, unless it is renewed. 
However, every year, the agency which established the committee must justify to GSA why the 
committee should continue on an annual basis. The justification provided in December 2011 was 
the following: “The committee is necessary to keep PEPFAR programs at the forefront of scientific 
knowledge” (GSA, 2013). A year later, the justification was similar:  
The committee is necessary to keep PEPFAR programs at the forefront of scientific 
knowledge. The members of the committee have specific expertise which is relevant 
and crucial to S/GAC12 in creating and implementing high-quality programs. Advice 
received by S/GAC from the committee in the past fiscal year has assisted S/GAC 
in building strengthened programs that have evolved to meet S/GAC's presidentially 
mandated targets (GSA, 2013).  
 
In 2013, the justification for continuing the SAB was identical to the justification provided in 2012. 
The current charter is set to expire on March 28, 2015. However, the SAB has not been convened 
since Ambassador Goosby stepped down.  
  As outlined in the charter, the objective of the PEPFAR SAB is to advise the Global AIDS 
Coordinator on scientific, implementation, and policy matters related to the global response to 
                                                 





HIV/AIDS. The charter notes that these issues are relevant to PEPFAR because of how they might 
influence “the priorities and direction of PEPFAR evaluation and research, the content of national 
and international strategies and implementation, and the role of PEPFAR in the international 
discourse regarding appropriate and resourced responses” (Department of State, 2010). 
  As is consistent with FACA, the PEPFAR SAB serves the Global AIDS Coordinator in a 
purely advisory capacity. The Ambassador is under no obligation to adopt any of the SAB’s 
recommendations. The charter notes the following five areas on which the Ambassador sought the 
advice of the SAB: 
1. Advise on priority global evaluation and research issues to guide the PEPFAR agenda; 
2. Review the quality and relevance of the scientific and technical evidence being used or 
proposed as the basis for PEPFAR policies; 
3. Review research programs and the technical basis of implementation strategies of particular 
relevance to PEPFAR; 
4. Advise on broad scientific matters in technology, social and economic issues relevant to 
PEPFAR; and  
5. Advise on emergency and short-notice scientific issues of immediate concern to PEPFAR. 
 As described in Chapter 2, FACA committees can have a variety of functions. The PEPFAR SAB 
has duties which are cross-functional which is what determined its classification as “Other”: the SAB 
advises OGAC on the implementation of scientific programs, which is the defining characteristic of 
Scientific Technical Program Advisory Boards, as well as on the implementation of policy issues, 
which is the defining characteristic of National Policy Issue Advisory Boards.  
  The charter indicates that the board will meet semi-annually in Washington, DC and that 
conference calls may be held in the interim on a quarterly basis. The board met annually in 
Washington, DC, and conference calls were held periodically. More frequent conference calls were 
held among the three working groups that were created under the SAB which are not required by 





permissible under FACA and under the PEPFAR SAB charter as long as they report to the SAB as a 
whole and not the Ambassador. However, the charter did not specify which working groups should 
be created. Rather, the SAB, in collaboration with OGAC officials, determined the need for working 
groups on three topics: Combination Prevention, Most at Risk Populations, and Data. The efforts of 
these three groups are described under the section on SAB recommendations. 
B. PEPFAR SAB Membership 
  The PEPFAR SAB under Ambassador Goosby originally had a total of 50 members. All of 
the members were appointed for one-year terms with an option for renewal for one additional year. 
The total number of SAB members has remained relatively constant since the SAB was established: 
at the time Ambassador Goosby stepped down, there were 49 members. Over the lifetime of the 
board, there was one addition, one board member passed away, and another member’s term was not 
renewed.  
  As stipulated by the charter, the members served without compensation, although travel 
expenses were covered by the State Department. The first two charters indicate that the SAB shall 
consist of 25-30 members, but the most recent charter excludes that language. The charter indicates 
that “the membership will be representative of the HIV/AIDS community, academia, international 
experts, partner government representatives, multilateral and bilateral agency representatives, 
foundations, advocates, and non-governmental organizations”(Department of State, 2010). 
  With respect to the demographic characteristics of the board members as originally 
constituted in 2010, 14 board members were employed at institutions based in other countries, half 
of which were in Sub-Saharan Africa and the other half in Western Europe (Geneva or London). 
No other regions were represented on the board. The remaining 36 board members were employed 





affiliations of the board members. 
Table 5.1.  Summary of SAB Members’ Organizational Affiliation 
Organizational Affiliation Number of SAB Members 
of which (not US based) 
University  18 (5) 
Research Institution (not affiliated with a university)  14 (6) 
US Federal Government Agency 5 
UN Organization/Global Health Partnership  4 (3) 
Foundation 3 
NGO 3 
Think Tank 2 
Private Sector Company 1 
TOTAL 50 
 
There were nine women on the board, which represents 18 percent of the total membership. A 
Balanced Membership Plan was filed with the GSA on December 13, 2011, but it contains no 
additional information apart from what was already written into the charter, other than to note that 
the board is composed of individuals “representing a diversity of backgrounds and perspectives” 
and that “the membership will be fairly balanced in terms of the points of views represented” 
(Department of State, 2011). Findings related to the balance of the board are discussed below.  
  While OGAC did indeed strive to have an SAB whose members were balanced in their 
backgrounds and perspectives, many of the individuals on the SAB work for organizations which 
receive PEPFAR funding. Although such information was disclosed when each SAB member was 
vetted by the State Department before his or her appointment, questions about the independence of 
the board’s recommendations linger given the potential bias of members receiving large volumes of 







VI. Findings from Document Review: Issues and Recommendations Addressed by 
the PEPFAR SAB  
  The PEPFAR SAB made a number of recommendations to OGAC during its tenure. 
According to the PEPFAR SAB page of the FACA online database, the SAB made 25 separate and 
distinct formal recommendations to Ambassador Goosby, of which approximately 25 percent have 
been fully implemented and 50 percent have been partially implemented (GSA, 2013). However, this 
database is not well-maintained: none of the meetings of the SAB are listed in the appropriate fields, 
none of the reports issued by the SAB are available through the database, and one of the working 
groups of the SAB is not listed. Unfortunately, there is no official list of recommendations received 
by OGAC from the SAB to cross-reference with the FACA database, nor is there any publicly 
available information that tracks which recommendations have been fully or partially implemented, 
and if partially implemented, what aspects of the recommendation have and have not been adopted, 
aside from the recommendations related to the use of anti-retroviral treatment as prevention.  
  A review by this investigator of the minutes of all of the SAB meetings, official reports of 
recommendations from the SAB, and all of the presentations given at SAB meetings to date does 
reveal 25 recommendations formally labelled as such. However, there are numerous additional 
presentations that include what could be interpreted as recommendations, but are not formally 
presented as such. Rather, they are conveyed as key messages, conclusions from data, or “bottom 
lines”.  
  Assuming that the 25 recommendations formally labelled as such in the PEPFAR SAB 
reports, meeting minutes, and presentations are indeed the same 25 recommendations noted in the 
FACA database, the following sections briefly summarize the four sets of formal recommendations 





repeatedly over the course of this study.  
A. SAB Recommendations to OGAC for PEPFAR Research and Evaluation 
  At the PEPFAR SAB’s inaugural meeting on January 6-7, 2011, OGAC requested that the 
SAB develop recommendations for Ambassador Goosby on directions for PEPFAR’s future 
research and evaluation agenda. Over the course of the two day meeting, the SAB generated 
recommendations for six areas needing in-depth review and discussion including: overarching issues, 
care and treatment, bridging care and treatment with prevention, data sharing, and streamlining 
funding modalities (PEPFAR SAB, 2011). Essentially, these recommendations served as advice to 
the Ambassador on what topics the SAB should address going forward.  
  Broadly, the overarching issues identified by the SAB related to the management, 
coordination, and rigor of future PEPFAR-funded research. The SAB noted that a research agenda, 
consisting of identifying priority research studies, should be planned strategically in coordination 
with other agencies. The SAB recognized that some of these studies would need to be centrally 
managed while others could be decentralized and managed by individual agencies. Finally, the SAB 
recommended that the speed with which study protocols were reviewed be greatly increased while 
simultaneously recommending that the rigor of those protocols also be improved.  
  In the area of care and treatment, the Board identified improving the efficiency of service 
delivery and improving the implementation cascade as the two priority areas. The “implementation 
cascade” refers to the spectrum of services, from testing to retaining individuals on treatment, that 
are needed to improve programmatic and health outcomes.  
  The second area of recommendations concerned the need to bridge care and treatment with 
prevention. Specific issues the SAB thought should be addressed were the prevention benefits of 





collection and use. Relatedly, in the area of prevention, the SAB recommended that several priorities 
be pursued, including strengthening the implementation, scale-up, and evaluation of proven 
interventions (e.g., PMTCT), behavioral interventions, and new interventions.  
  Finally, a number of cross-cutting areas were identified by the SAB as needing additional 
attention, such as linkages to care for those co-infected with HIV and associated diseases (e.g., 
tuberculosis) and how best to address key populations such as PWID and men who have sex with 
men (MSM) who may be in need of specialized programming.  
B. SAB Recommendations to OGAC for Treatment as Prevention 
  In April 2011, the findings from the HIV Prevention Trials Network’s (HPTN) study 052, 
which assessed the efficacy of ART as a method to prevent or reduce the rate of transmission 
among sero-discordant, heterosexual partners in sub-Saharan Africa, were released. More 
specifically, the trial results showed that the sexual transmission of HIV was reduced by 96 percent 
when the infected partner was treated with ART, and the couple received counseling and used 
condoms (Cohen et al., 2012). Given the relevance of these findings to PEPFAR, Ambassador 
Goosby called a meeting of the SAB after which a working group was established specifically to 
discuss the science of the trial and implications for PEPFAR. The “052 subcommittee” presented its 
recommendations at the SAB meeting held on September 14-15, 2011. Over the course of the two 
days, there was extensive and vigorous debate among the SAB members about the 
recommendations, particularly with respect to their external validity. Ultimately, the SAB reached 
consensus on the scope and priority of the recommendations. The subcommittee issued a detailed 
report on behalf of the SAB, which includes the scientific rationale for each recommendation, 
estimated financial implications, public health impact, and implementation issues (PEPFAR SAB, 





by OGAC in response. 
  The SAB issued the following six recommendations to OGAC regarding the use of ART as 
a method to prevent the transmission of HIV or substantially reduce the risk of transmission:  
1. Accelerate the support of the scaling up of ART to all HIV-infected people with CD4+ cell 
count < 350 cells=mm3, irrespective of WHO disease stage for treatment and prevention 
(goal: 90% provision of ART) 
2. Offer ART to all patients with HIV-related TB, irrespective of CD4+ cell count, and 
integrate during TB treatment. 
3. Endorse WHO guidelines for PMTCT in pregnant and breast-feeding women with a CD4+ 
cell count > 350 cells=mm3, with a preference for option B (ART throughout pregnancy 
and breast-feeding) where locally appropriate. 
4. Support use of ART in specific populations with mid-level cell counts (CD4 > 350) to 
prevent transmission to others based on the results of HPTN 052. The benefit of this 
intervention has been demonstrated for heterosexual discordant couples. Careful 
evaluations, including assessment of benefit/risk/impact/feasibility and modeling exercises 
are urgently needed to identify populations to be prioritized for this intervention. 
5. Intensify efforts to establish effective programs for key affected populations in HIV 
programs. Take particular care to ensure key populations eligible for treatment receive ART 
in an enabling environment that supports their human rights. 
6. Seek and secure sufficient resources to implement the recommendations, given the 
scientific basis for, and potential impact of, their implementation. 
The recommendations are listed in the order of how they were prioritized by the SAB, with the first 
recommendation taking precedence over the others. WHO changed its guidance for treatment as 
prevention in April 2012 to align with the first recommendation.  
C.  SAB Recommendations to OGAC for Key Populations 
  As noted above, at its inaugural meeting the SAB recommended to OGAC that key 
populations13 (KP) be included as one of the topics it addressed over the course of its tenure. A 
subcommittee was formed following that inaugural meeting and it presented its recommendations to 
                                                 
13 The SAB chose to use the term “key populations” instead of the often-used “Most At Risk Populations (MARPs)” 
because it felt “key populations” is less stigmatizing. Broadly, these populations include groups who are at high-risk for 





the SAB at the SAB meeting held on September 14-15, 2011. The SAB accepted the following 
recommendation put forward by the subcommittee (PEPFAR SAB, 2011a): 
The KP sub-group, on behalf of the PEPFAR SAB, recommends that PEPFAR 
intensify programmatic activity and implementation science that addresses focused 
prevention, treatment and care programs for key populations. These key populations 
include PWID, MSM, and sex workers and their clients in PEPFAR partner 
countries.   
  Two years later, at the PEPFAR SAB meeting held on October 2-3, 2013, a presentation was 
given on prevention and treatment for key populations (Beyrer, 2013). The presentation concluded 
by offering the following “bottom lines”: 
1. KPs need tailored prevention services, and treatment, from which they are often excluded  
2. Many are in couples, some discordant  
3. Women who sell sex and are living with HIV need PMTCT  
4. We need to study the continuum of care for these people, identify barriers, and intervene 
to make real headway 
 These “bottom lines” are relevant here because they suggest that the Key Populations 
subcommittee felt that there was still room for OGAC to more completely adopt the original 
recommendations on key populations offered in 2011. 
D.  SAB Recommendations to OGAC on PEPFAR Data 
  The recommendations to OGAC from the Data Working Group (DWG) were provided at 
the last SAB meeting held under Ambassador Goosby’s tenure in October 2013 and include the 
following: 
1. Establish and maintain a PEPFAR public access knowledge portal 
2. Strengthen, streamline and publicly disclose PEPFAR’s collection and management of 
key program indicators 
3. Establish, collect and publicly disclose activity-based budget, expenditure and cost data 





  The DWG developed their recommendations using a set of five principles, which were 
informed by President Obama’s Open Government Initiative, which emphasizes transparency, 
participation, and collaboration in government (Orszag, 2009). First, the DWG believed that the 
monitoring and evaluation of USG spending on HIV/AIDS programs could be improved through 
the use of good data on an appropriate set of indicators. Second, the DWG operated under the 
assumption that data are a public good that could benefit both US nationals but also individuals in 
other countries. Third, the DWG emphasized the importance of public disclosure of relevant (an 
anonymized) data to enhance the transparency and accountability of US-funded programs such as 
PEPFAR. Fourth, any data made publicly available should be accessible to both the government and 
other researchers through a common interface or “platform” which uses the same units of 
observation. Finally, the DWG emphasized the importance of the replicability of data analysis by the 
public research community. 
  In summary, the recommendations provided by the SAB to OGAC between 2011 and 2013 
address a number of issues the SAB, in collaboration with OGAC, believed to be priorities (Table 
5.2). As described above, some of the recommendations have been implemented with greater speed 
and fidelity to what the SAB recommended than others. As discussed in Chapter 4, the second aim 
of this study is to understand the contextual factors which affect whether recommendations put 
forward by advisory committees are taken up by government agencies. The findings in this area are 






Table 5.2.  Summary of PEPFAR SAB Major Recommendations to OGAC 
Topic Area Working Group Date of 
Recommendation 
Recommendation(s) OGAC Action  
(if known) 




Whole SAB January 6-7, 2011 1. Overarching Issues 
 Plan a research agenda in coordination 
with other agencies and identify which 
studies should be managed centrally 
versus decentralized.  
 Reduce review time and improve rigor 
of study protocols. 
2. Care and Treatment 
 Improve efficiency of service delivery 
and the implementation cascade 
3. Bridging care and tx with prevention 
 Investigate how tx can be optimized for 
prevention  
 Investigate how to generate and sustain 
demand for tx 
 Improve data collection and use.  
4. Prevention 
 Strengthen the implementation, scale-
up, and evaluation of proven 
interventions, behavioral interventions, 
and new interventions.  
5. Cross-cutting areas  
 How to integrate tx for associated 
diseases (e.g., tuberculosis) with ART  






HPTN 052 Writing 
Group 
September 14-15, 2011 1. Expand ART to all HIV-infected 
people with CD4+ cell count <350 
cells=mm3, irrespective of WHO 
disease stage. 
2. Offer ART to all patients with HIV-
related TB, irrespective of CD4+ cell 
1. Expand treatment according to WHO 
recommendations; 
2. Support large-scale, community-based 
trials of combination prevention, with 






Topic Area Working Group Date of 
Recommendation 
Recommendation(s) OGAC Action  
(if known) 
count, and integrate during TB tx. 
3. Endorse WHO guidelines for PMTCT 
in pregnant and breast-feeding women 
with a CD4+ cell count > 350 
cells=mm3, with a preference for 
option B14 where locally appropriate. 
4. Support use of ART in specific 
populations with mid-level cell counts 
(CD4 > 350) and conduct evaluations 
on benefit/risk/impact/feasibility and 
modeling exercises to identify priority 
populations  
5. Intensify efforts to establish programs 
for KPs.  
6. Seek and secure sufficient resources to 
implement the recommendations. 
3. Promote implementation science in a 
number of countries throughout 
Africa and Asia, with a focus on use 
of treatment for prevention. 
 
Key Populations Key Populations Working 
Group 
September 14-15, 2011 1. KPs need tailored prevention and tx 
services 
2. Women who sell sex and are living with 
HIV need PMTCT  
3. Study the continuum of care for KPs, 
identify barriers, and intervene  
Melbourne Declaration signed at 20th 





Data Working Group October 2-3, 2013 1. Establish and maintain a PEPFAR 
public access knowledge portal 
2. Publicly disclose data on key program 
indicators and; 
3. on activity-based budget, expenditure 
and costs 
4. Require each future grantee and 
contractor to submit a “Data 
Management Plan” 
 
                                                 





VII. Interview Findings 
  This section discusses the results of the in-depth interviews conducted between March 2013 
and September 2014 with PEPFAR SAB members, OGAC staff, and managers or staff employed by 
advocacy groups active in the HIV/AIDS community. These results are presented in relation to the 
aims and research questions described in Chapter 4. The results are presented in this way to ensure 
that there is a parallel structure between this case study and the NCADAC case study and to 
facilitate the cross-case analysis, which is presented in Chapter 7. In addition, presenting the results 
by aim, rather than by category of respondent, helps to maintain the confidentiality and anonymity 
of the interviewees. 
A. Aim 1: The Role of the PEPFAR SAB in the Policy Process 
  Given the history of the PEPFAR program’s relationship with scientific evidence and 
research, particularly as it related to the allocation of funding for the prevention of sexual 
transmission of HIV, the creation and implementation of the PEPFAR science advisory board 
represented a substantial shift in OGAC’s perspective on the importance of using evidence to 
inform their policy decisions. The use of a FACA committee by PEPFAR was unprecedented in the 
history of PEPFAR as well as in the history of other large-scale global health programs in the United 
States (e.g., the President’s Malaria Initiative). Thus, the PEPFAR SAB provided empirical evidence 
for how FACs function, the extent to which the literature on the role of evidence in the policy 








1. RESEARCH QUESTION 1: WHAT ARE THE MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES BY WHICH SABS  
  FUNCTION, INCLUDING HOW THEY ARE STRUCTURED, IMPLEMENTED, CONVENED, AND  
  OPERATE? 
i. Implementing the PEPFAR SAB 
a) Navigating State Department and FACA Rules 
  The decision to establish an SAB constituted of external advisors triggered the process of 
creating a FACA committee which in turn, necessitated the involvement of four different bureaus at 
“Main State” (which refers to the Harry S Truman building in Washington, DC), including the 
Bureau of Resource Management (RM Bureau), now called the Bureau of Budget and Planning (BP 
Bureau), the Office of the Legal Advisor (L Bureau), the Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H Bureau), 
and the Office of the Under Secretary for Management (M Bureau). The BP Bureau assisted with 
posting a public notice of the intent to establish the PEPFAR SAB in the FR, ensuring PEPFAR 
SAB meetings were announced in the FR, as well as renewing the SAB Charter. The L Bureau 
advised OGAC on the legal processes involved with establishing the SAB, given that it fell under 
FACA. The H Bureau liaises with Congress and sent letters notifying Congress of the PEPFAR 
charter and charter renewal. Finally, the M Bureau assisted with vetting SAB members.  
  A key finding related to the implementation of the PEPFAR SAB is that the staff directly 
involved with the day-to-day management and administration of the SAB could not access the State 
Department training on FACA committees. At the State Department, the training on FACA 
committees is open only to employees who are “direct-hires” which is a hiring authority that can be 
invoked by any government agency when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) determines 
that there is a “severe shortage of candidates” or a “critical hiring need”. The agency must 
demonstrate either of these two circumstances to OPM. While this type of authority allows the 





there remains a considerable burden on the agency to justify the need for a direct hire. Thus, across 
the US government direct-hire staff are few and far between. Positions are filled primarily by 
individuals who are technically employed by government contractors. The FACA training, as well as 
others, are not open to these individuals because agencies view their direct hires as an investment in 
the future of the agency whereas the contractors are considered to be more temporary staff 
(although many contractors have worked at their agency for decades).  
  One implication of this was that no OGAC staff attended any State Department training on 
FACA committees when the SAB was being established. As a result, OGAC was not aware that any 
and all conference calls held for the whole SAB were subject to FACA and were thus required to be 
announced in the FR and open to the public, just like the in-person meetings, until Spring 2013, two 
years after the SAB met for the first time. While information on FACA committees was sent to the 
DFO, respondents reported that it was challenging to understand the legal information and how it 
applied to OGAC.   
b) PEPFAR SAB Member Selection  
  While he could have chosen to create a USG-only advisory body, Ambassador Goosby was 
intent on tapping into the expertise of individuals outside of the U.S. government. While there was 
some discussion about keeping the advisory body internal to the U.S. government, one respondent 
reported that there was a  “quick conclusion was there are a lot of great people in government but 
there’s a lot more talent out there that we don’t tap into. So it really was we could always go to USG 
but we can’t always go to the outside unless we organize it somehow.” A key theme which emerged 
from the interviews regarding the selection of SAB members was the importance of long-standing 
relationships between Ambassador Goosby, OGAC staff, and the potential SAB members. While 





suggestions of who to nominate to create an initial pool of potential SAB members, the process for 
making the final selection of individuals to nominate was far less formal and based on professional 
and personal relationships. When asked what factors influenced the narrowing of the overall pool, a 
respondent replied:  
Kind of what they represented in the research arenas. We wanted enough breadth to 
cover the breadth of PEPFAR, but also kind of leaders in their field. And 
recognizing that maybe of the 10 leaders in such and such a field, I happen to like 
these three. The other ones are great but I don’t like them so that certainly influences 
who gets identified.  
Further, there was some attention given to whittling the initial pool down to a reasonable number of 
people.  
The vetting was a little bit kind of you want to get down to a certain number and so 
who do we give up in this particular arena of research…we can only use two of these 
people and we’ve got five, so what’s the preference, chop, chop, chop. And then the 
next level would be are you willing to participate. I don’t recall that a lot of people 
said no. 
 Given the already-existing relationships that OGAC had with the potential SAB members, the next 
step involved OGAC staff approaching the potential members informally to assess their interest in 
and willingness to serve on the SAB.  
It was kind of ‘we’re [OGAC] thinking of doing this, is this something you think 
would be good and if so would you be prepared to serve on it’. We agreed and then 
the formal letter came some weeks later and we’d already been primed. I think it you 
know, it was a lot about relationships. As I say I had this mutual respect with 
Ambassador Goosby for a long time and so it was one feeling very honored to be 
part of this but also wanting to contribute what was in our opinion quite a tough job. 
Similarly, another respondent noted that “there are a lot of people here who have had relationships 





noted that the pattern of selecting individuals who had long-standing relationships with Ambassador 
Goosby was not the only criterion. One respondent noted that “We all made recommendations with 
the same lens, which is what does the program need? Does the program need expertise here? Does 
the program need expertise there? Ultimately it’s the Ambassador’s decision.” 
c) PEPFAR SAB Membership Bias and Balance 
  As mentioned above, the primary area of concern about bias among the PEPFAR SAB 
stemmed from the fact that many SAB members received PEPFAR funding. Respondents had 
mixed opinions about the extent to which this affected the advice and guidance the SAB provided. 
One respondent noted that: 
I think everyone feels constrained, right? They’ve all got a reputation. They don’t 
want to be the troublemaker. They’ve got a lot of relationships a lot of them having 
to do with funding that they don’t want to mess with. Criticizing the program is 
deadly in terms of so many things including money. 
This suggests that rather than members making recommendations that would eventually lead to 
OGAC directing funding to their own areas of expertise, which could also be a potential source of 
bias, the PEPFAR SAB members were reluctant to be candid about their critiques of the PEPFAR 
program for fear of retribution in terms of the amount of funding they received as well as other 
issues. A respondent suggested that the PEPFAR SAB “need[s] more rabble rousers. They need 
more people that aren’t getting paid by the machine.” However, others felt differently:  
I think that the scientific advisory board could not care less who’s in the room. 
Nobody is censoring what they’re going to say. And I don’t know, I don’t care who’s 
in the back of the room. If they get mad at me I’ll probably hear about it in the 
coffee break. But I like to share what I think about the issue. 





So, when I’m in this SAB, when I can say what I actually believe, there is no 
inhibition. We take our role as advisors to the Ambassador a lot more seriously than 
we take the fear factor into account that some loony bin might be in the audience 
who would think ill of us. 
Interestingly, both of these respondents interpreted the question about whether they tempered their 
advice in any way as addressing a concern about the reactions of individuals in the audience, rather 
than possible repercussions from OGAC. Others, however, understood the concern about SAB 
members feeling squelched in giving candid feedback to be related to the fear of retribution as 
discussed above: 
We have private sector and advocacy community [but] there are more academics 
than anything else, and many of the academics also do PEPFAR implementation, I 
mean they have programmatic associations so they are very familiar with some of the 
issues…In academia it is a very comfortable space to throw things out there and yell 
at each other so I don’t feel like it’s a real reticent, controlled…I think people say 
‘No, Bob, I think you’re wrong’ and they do say that in public which might be 
different from other kinds of discussions that go on in government policy settings 
…the debate is pretty robust and I feel like if people have a concern with things 
people feel comfortable saying that right out. So the meat of the discussion really is 
represented for the public there and in the final documents that are produced. 
  The sentiment that little could be done about potential conflicts of interest was also 
expressed: 
You know, the experts that you should have around the table are also the people you 
should probably wind up funding. And they’re certainly going to agree with that. But 
you can’t not have them at the table. They’re the experts. So you have to just go in 
and say this is a deeply conflicted situation but let’s go in and be as good as we can 
be. 
  This statement suggests that there was some resignation to the fact that there would always 





More specifically, one could argue that the optimal level of conflict of interest on federal advisory 
committees is not zero, because an absence of conflicts of interest would indicate that the 
committee is not comprised of the appropriate experts. 
  A respondent also noted that among the pool of potential SAB members, there were others 
that could have been selected who would have been less likely to be honest in their advice and 
recommendations:  
There are a lot of folks who….I think there’s a fair number who get a lot of 
PEPFAR funding…I think those that they’ve chosen have been relatively 
independent people who get a lot of funding. I could imagine a sub-set of people 
who get a lot of PEPFAR funding who don’t challenge PEPFAR ever. I think a 
bunch of the people who they put on the committee actually are the opposite of that. 
They may have major treatment programs but I think they just say what they 
want…I do think that [OGAC] did that pretty well and did that nicely. 
  In terms of balance of the PEPFAR SAB membership, respondents generally agreed that the 
appropriate and relevant areas of scientific expertise were well-represented on the SAB. However, 
there were doubts about whether there was adequate representation from PEPFAR focus countries. 
One respondent summarized the complexity of the country-representation issue, noting: 
It’s a tricky one because I think it’s an unusual situation where the activity is all 
happening offshore but the money is all being generated in country. So there’s an 
element of accountability for what’s being spent on the one hand where I can 
absolutely see that OGAC has a requirement to be accountable for it, that it’s 
spending wisely and in a way that is in the best interests of everyone. But then there’s 
a perception that if this is happening in other countries shouldn’t those countries be 
represented? You could argue that well, we needed fair representation of the 
taxpayers versus we needed fair representation of the international side.  
Unfortunately, while there were SAB members from institutions in South Africa, Uganda, and 





scheduling conflicts and difficulties arranging travel. 
ii. Managing the PEPFAR SAB 
  OGAC did not have a staff dedicated solely to the management and administration of the 
SAB. As a result, any time OGAC staff did dedicate to the SAB was in addition to their other work. 
As one respondent noted, “the first year was a huge struggle because it was just another of the many 
jobs we try to balance.” The “unfunded mandate” nature of managing the SAB had negative 
implications for both OGAC staff and SAB members. Initially, it was conceived that the SAB would 
meet in-person biannually, but this proved to be too time consuming for OGAC to manage and too 
difficult for SAB members to incorporate into their schedules.  
It was originally intended that this would be a twice a year meeting but we soon 
found that it worked better as a once a year meeting with a semi-annual call just 
given the number of people involved and the burden of trying to plan for face to 
face meetings.  
  The lack of a full-time staff or secretariat at OGAC dedicated to the oversight of the SAB 
seems to have compromised the ability of OGAC staff to devote adequate time to the SAB: the SAB 
was marginalized as a priority due to the many other professional commitments of OGAC staff.  
  Respondents identified two ways that SAB members experienced the “unfunded mandate” 
element, namely through receiving SAB meeting agendas just a few days in advance of the meetings, 
which left little time to prepare, and through poorly conceived meeting agendas. The week before 
one of the SAB meetings, one respondent noted that:  
The one area where I think that it doesn’t work so well is in the planning of the 
meeting. For example, I don’t have an agenda for next week’s meeting yet. And I 
know that they’re over there at OGAC…and they’re all fighting over what it’s 
supposed to be and how to do it. Because I haven’t seen a draft, I don’t know what 





  In addition, SAB members were often not able to participate in the conference calls that 
were held in between in-person meetings because of other professional commitments and 
sometimes, were not able to travel to Washington, DC for the annual in-person meeting for the 
same reason. 
a) PEPFAR SAB Working Groups 
  As discussed in more depth in Section VI, several Working Groups were established to 
develop recommendations on key issues the SAB and OGAC determined to be priorities. 
Respondents indicated that these Working Groups were established because Ambassador Goosby 
specifically requested a sub-group of the SAB address a specific issue or because SAB members 
requested that a Working Group be established. In terms of who sat on the Working Groups, a 
respondent indicated that: 
Pretty much the working group decides. Or if it’s something the Ambassador comes 
up with he might say be sure to get so and so on it or something like that. And they 
can bring people into the working group who are not part of the scientific advisory 
board. And that happens all the time.  
 
Given the large size of the SAB and the varied expertise of its members, establishing 
these Working Groups was necessary to ensure that the SAB fulfilled the requests made of it in a 
timely way, the only way to manage workflow, and the best way to tap the specific expertise of its 
members. However, for OGAC staff, managing the outputs of the Working Groups was particularly 
time consuming: 
Well, it depends on the group…they’re tasked with something to do, so you need to 
facilitate that and make sure it happens in a timely way. And unless…I don’t know 
about this, but, I’m not sure if in order for that to happen it requires our input or 





into the recommendations. When the SAB gives comments back, we’re the people 
who are integrating it, we’re the people who are sending it out. We’re the people who 
are convening meetings of the working group. Right now I have like three million 
working group things to do before our next meeting. So it’s a lot of work. And 
actually it’s worse…the person who sort of administrates it…it’s time consuming for 
me and for her it’s really time consuming.  
   Importantly, any recommendations developed by a Working Group were presented first to 
the SAB as a whole. Under FACA law, the Working Groups are not permitted to make 
recommendations directly to the government agency which created the FACA committee because 
they are a subset of the committee and only the committee as a whole can make recommendations 
to the establishing agency. In the case of the PEPFAR SAB, draft recommendations were presented 
and then discussed. SAB members also had the opportunity to provide written comments on the 
draft recommendations, which the Working Group would have to address. Respondents indicated 
that some SAB members provided comments on all recommendations while most SAB members 
only commented on the recommendations that were of interest to them or fell under their area of 
expertise. Once finalized, the recommendations were submitted to OGAC and Ambassador 
Goosby. The specific recommendations made by the SAB and formally submitted to OGAC under 
Ambassador Goosby’s tenure are discussed in Section VI. 
b) PEPFAR SAB Chair 
  A critical element to the management of the PEPFAR SAB is the Chair. Three key findings 
emerged from the interviews about the role of the Chair related to OGAC’s interpretation of the 
FACA law about who could be appointed as Chair and the implications of this interpretation for the 
perceived independence of the SAB’s recommendation, the lack of clarity among SAB members 





style and the efficiency of SAB meetings.  
  When establishing the PEPFAR SAB, OGAC interpreted the FACA law to require the Chair 
to be someone different than the DFO. In fact, this is not the case: the DFO – who is required to 
be a government employee or official – can technically also serve as Chair. Importantly, no FACA 
committee meeting can occur in the absence of the DFO and the DFO has the authority to adjourn 
any meeting he/she is designated to chair or attend. In the case of the PEPFAR SAB, the chair was 
a Professor at an academic institution who was contracted by OGAC as a consultant to serve as a 
special advisor to Ambassador Goosby. 
  While the Chair of the SAB is information that is publicly available through the FACA 
database, many SAB members were confused about who actually was their Chair. This uncertainty 
resulted partly from how SAB meetings were administered: respondents indicated that different 
people would facilitate discussions for different sections of the agenda. Thus, there was no 
consistency in who was facilitating or chairing the meetings. One respondent noted that there was 
no Chair of the PEPFAR SAB. 
  Those who were aware of who the Chair was had strong opinions about the fact that the 
role was filled by someone who was a consultant to OGAC in addition to serving as Chair. One 
respondent noted the following: 
I think the best approach to a SAB is not to have it chaired by the people who are 
getting the advice. And [the Chair] was working under contract to OGAC at that 
time and so [the Chair] was one of the people getting advice. So I think that was a 
mistake. 
 The implication of having a Chair who was also a consultant to the agency which established the 
board is that there could be the perception that the recommendations provided are not independent. 





say it’s an outside recommendation rather than an inside recommendation.”  
  The findings also indicate that the management style of the SAB Chair is a critical influence 
on how discussions at SAB meetings are structured and on the extent to which certain SAB 
members dominate the discussion. One participant offered the following suggestion for the type of 
experience and character a SAB Chair should have: 
I think what they should have done is picked somebody who is very experienced in 
advisory boards and has a track record and can help the discussion both stay on time 
and on topic. And if that means interrupting the dean of the school of public health 
of elsewhere, so be it. And if that means cutting off discussion with the WHO 
person speaking, so be it. I mean you gotta have the guts to run these things with 
some discipline. 
iii. Convening the PEPFAR SAB 
a) Setting PEPFAR SAB Meeting Agendas 
  The process of setting the agendas and convening SAB meetings, both in terms of the work 
that needed to be done in advance of the meeting by OGAC staff and SAB members as well as the 
process of administrating the meetings themselves, proved to be time consuming for all involved 
and at times, wrought with frustration.  
  Respondents indicated that the process for determining which issues were on meeting 
agendas was driven both by Ambassador Goosby as well as SAB members.  
Setting the agenda is mostly driven by the Ambassador’s priority questions although 
when we do our quarterly calls, SAB members can bring up and ask for those and 
the Ambassador is generally very responsive about what the SAB sees as priority 
issues and they tend to be the same thing in terms of what are priorities. 
  It appears that this system of accepting all suggestions for agenda items was not effective. 





And even the agendas that are put forth to them like this last one in particular it was 
just packed and yet there was no time…no time isn’t correct. There was much too 
little time to actually let them talk. Okay you’ve got 15 minutes okay move on to the 
next thing. It really doesn’t make good use of them. Didn’t prepare them well in 
advance. 
This response suggests that determining what and how many items should be included on SAB 
meeting agendas should be weighed in terms of the anticipated time needed to discuss each agenda 
item in a robust and open manner which in turn involves consideration of the personalities of the 
committee members. The idea that the ability of the SAB to be effective is influenced by not only 
the number of items on the agenda but also by how the meeting discussion is managed suggests that 
the agency which establishes the SAB has an important role to play in ensuring that it obtains 
actionable, relevant recommendations based on the conclusions of robust SAB discussions. 
b) Managing PEPFAR SAB Meeting Discussions 
  Several respondents noted that the discussions at the SAB meetings were not managed in an 
optimal way. Respondents had mixed opinions about the implications the size of the SAB had for 
the management of discussion. While respondents recognized that the board was quite large – nearly 
double the original estimate for the number of members – some did not think this created 
challenges for the management of discussion, while others did. One respondent questioned the 
utility of even creating a board of the PEPFAR SAB’s size, noting: 
Well I’m not sure that sure that convening a board of 40 people is ever particularly 
useful. The way I look at it, within the board you have immense expertise but it’s 
highly diverse. So if you can do what we did to some extent, which is break the 
board into working groups, and give them a tough assignment…[and] for us to then 
work on that between meetings and have a series of calls and actually present a 
report, that was the SAB work process at its finest in my judgment. 





information exchange and then [break] up into groups where detailed issues could have been 
hammered out with OGAC, CDC, [US]AID, whomever, personnel that would have been perhaps 
more meaningful to everybody in the room.” Similarly, another respondent suggested that materials 
to be discussed at the meeting should have been distributed electronically in advance of the meeting 
to maximize the productivity of the meeting itself. With time managed in a stringent manner, there 
should have been “the invitation that everyone with a further point to make - everyone - make it to 
both the committee chair in the writing and the appropriate PEPFAR staff member copied. And 
those comments would all be collated as inputs from the scientific advisory board.” 
  Others indicated that the personalities of the SAB members themselves were partly to blame 
for the difficulty in managing meeting discussions. One respondent noted, “Working with a lot of 
strong personalities, whether or not they can be managed is a good question, but we’ll go off on 
tangents that we’ve never successfully pulled them in. Say great, great, okay, next time and pull it 
back so they will kind of get scattered.”  However, it is difficult to separate SAB members’ 
personalities from the Chair’s ability to control the meeting:  
But when you let meetings run on and run over, because in general whoever is 
chairing - and different people were chairing at different times - but it always ran 
over, again because you had such strong people in the room, …that you really have 
people that think that their word is the last word on this topic and need to be heard. 
And as I say, me included. With no shrinking violets, the leader has to exert a strong 
hand and say ‘sorry guys time’s up, I didn’t call on you, I know you have these 5 
people waiting to talk’. 
Interestingly, others felt that discussion of some specific issues was not permitted to be as robust as 
it should have been.  
I think it was too managed to reach the conclusions that CDC wanted to reach. CDC 
and OGAC. So, I think that made it useful to Ambassador Goosby because he knew 





that were presented, he could be more certain to get there. I think that basically the 
downside of raising the CD4 threshold was not given sufficient attention. And by 
that I mean partly cost, partly feasibility, and partly really a serious issue that people 
start too early. They may not adhere. So those issues of course we don’t have enough 
empirical data even now, but I think those issues were largely swept under the rug 
much more than they should have been. 
These findings suggest that the task of implementing, managing, and convening the PEPFAR SAB 
was challenging.  
2. RESEARCH QUESTION 2: TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE THEORETICAL DISCONNECT  
  BETWEEN THE LITERATURE ON THE HEALTH POLICY PROCESS AND THE LITERATURE ON  
  EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY HAVE EMPIRICAL SUPPORT? 
  As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the traditional model of the policy process assumes that 
policymaking is inherently linear, with policymakers engaged at each stage as rational actors. The 
push for policy to be more evidence-based or even evidence-informed relies heavily on these 
assumptions. Critics suggest these assumptions are flawed and argue that any call for policy to be 
evidence-based ignores the reality of the policy process, including that it is inherently irrational and 
political. This case study provides an opportunity to assess whether this disconnect has any bearing 
in practice. Overall, the evidence suggests that at times, the disconnect does bear out in practice, but 
at other times, it does not. There is support for a number of the different theories of the policy 
process as well as different models of the research-policy relationship.  
  The inherent assumption of the step-wise or cyclical models of the policy process is that 
policymaking occurs in a series of stages and that policymakers are capable of making rational 
decisions at each stage. With respect to the use of research findings or evidence, an implication of 
these models is that a problem is defined, and research is conducted which then informs the policy 





these assertions. Respondents suggested that part of the reason why the SAB was established was to 
lend credence to the argument for investing more in HIV treatment because there were skeptics 
across the U.S. government who were questioning the cost-effectiveness of ART and arguing that 
funding should be directed away from treatment and towards prevention. At the time, the results of 
the HPTN 052 trial had not been released, but a number of observational studies had already 
indicated that ART can be effective in reducing the risk of transmission of HIV among sero-
discordant couples (Bunnell et al., 2006; Del Romero, Castilla, Hernando, Rodriguez, & Garcia, 
2010; Donnell et al., 2010; Reynolds et al., 2011). Thus, the problem was the conflict between 
stakeholders within USG about how funding should be allocated. While HPTN 052 was not 
commissioned by PEPFAR, it was already underway, and when the trial results were released on 
April 28, 2011, Ambassador Goosby requested that the SAB form a working group to assess the 
study’s findings and make recommendations.  
  Between April and September 2011, the working group developed draft recommendations 
which were debated vigorously for two days at the September 2011 SAB meeting. Those 
recommendations, which are detailed in Section V.B, were adopted as PEPFAR policy following the 
SAB meeting. This example of PEPFAR changing its policy for ART based on the results of the 
HPTN 052 trial results lends support to the idea that the policy process can be linear. Further, it 
seems to refute Simon’s satisficing concept, which suggested that policymakers will choose the 
solution that is merely adequate rather than the optimal solution (Simon, 1957). It could be argued 
that OGAC was opportunistic by waiting for the HPTN 052 trial results to be released before 
changing its treatment guidelines. Indeed, the SAB was scheduled to meet in the Spring of 2011 but 
the meeting was postponed until September of that year so that the committee had adequate time to 





confirm through a randomized control trial what had already been reported from observational 
studies. This suggests that it may have in fact been the optimal solution for OGAC to enact policy in 
response to the 052 findings. Similarly, Lindblom’s model of incrementalism, which suggests that 
policy change is optimal when it occurs gradually because this simplifies the process, and Cohen’s 
garbage can model, which suggests that it is not feasible to be proactive about changing policy 
because solutions arise when problems emerge from a metaphorical garbage can, both seem to be 
refuted by this example. PEPFAR policy was changed quite substantially, not incrementally, and it 
was changed pro-actively (Cohen et al., 1972; Lindblom, 1968). In contrast, Kingdon’s multiple 
streams model, which posits that a favorable political environment is a necessary ingredient for 
issues to rise to the policy agenda does seem to have some support: the issue of how to change 
PEPFAR’s treatment policy rose to the agenda of the SAB because Ambassador Goosby requested a 
working group address the findings of HPTN 052, which provided the data needed to propose a 
recommendation for PEPFAR (Kingdon, 1984). 
  In terms of models of the research-policy relationship, the example of the PEPFAR SAB 
case provides support for some models and not for others. There is strong support for the problem 
solving model, which suggests that research findings help solve policy problems by applying 
empirical evidence directly to a specific policy issue, which is then resolved because the gap in 
knowledge is filled (Weiss, 1979). Similarly, there is also strong support for the linkage and exchange 
model which suggests that when the interface among researchers, policymakers, research funders 
and knowledge purveyors – all of whom are stakeholders involved with the PEPFAR SAB – is 
strong, research will be used (Lomas, 2000). One way this interface occurs is when policymakers ask 
researchers for advice on pressing policy problems and researchers aim to provide solutions. 





which leads to a change in policy issues for policymakers and researchers to interact (Nutley, 2007). 
It could be argued that the change in the Administration and its new approach to using data to 
inform policy was a change in social context that allowed certain policy issues to be brought to the 
fore, which were then discussed by the SAB. Further, the SAB “adapted, recreated, [and] 
transformed” the research findings from the 052 trial into recommendations appropriate for OGAC 
(Nutley, 2007, p.100).  
  The two communities model, which is based on the premise that policymakers rarely use 
research and exist in two almost irreconcilable cultures, can almost be dismissed out of hand, simply 
because the establishment of the PEPFAR SAB indicates that PEPFAR policymakers do, in fact, use 
research. Similarly, there is little support for the enlightenment model, which suggests that policy is 
not changed due to the findings of a specific study but rather because general ideas rooted in 
research almost unconsciously enter the policy sphere, and the knowledge-driven model, which 
suggests that basic research provides an opportunity for applied research to assess whether the initial 
findings are relevant for practical application (Weiss, 1979). 
  Findings from this case study support the assumption proposed in Chapter 2: the linkage 
and exchange model does appear to be relevant to this study given its specific acknowledgement that 
an interface between policymakers and researchers is needed for research use to occur, and that this 
interface can be created when policymakers request the advice of researchers. Although Lomas does 
not suggest it, a FAC would be a natural example of an interface through which researchers can 
provide advice at the request of policymakers. In addition, the problem solving model is relevant as 







3. RESEARCH QUESTION 3: HOW DO SABS FACILITATE AND IMPEDE THE USE OF EVIDENCE  
  BY POLICYMAKERS? 
  Respondents noted that a key way for the PEPFAR SAB to facilitate the use of evidence by 
policymakers at OGAC or USG more broadly is to provide scientific justification for a policy 
decision.  
First of all, just the discussion, from some of the best HIV minds around, is just 
extremely useful to hear the opinions, the different stands on things articulated, to 
have the resource of people who can be tasked with ‘this is an issue based on some 
new evidence, lay out for us what’s there’, which has been very useful. And then I 
think being able to ensure that we demonstrate both of those things. That we are 
using that evidence when we look at programming decisions is extremely useful to 
policymakers. It’s legitimizing, it’s also just consonant with a science-based approach 
to PEPFAR programming, it helps us be able to prioritize with that evidence 
purpose. So I think in that sense it’s extremely useful for policymakers, it gives us 
cover in how we respond to Congress, to our overseers about how we do things, 
having that objective basis. And so by having that SAB these ideas are vetted and 
discussed and really gives us that validation…gives us the evidence base and validates 
it. 
 A related but distinct finding was that the SAB provided a way for OGAC to remove itself from 
arguments about policy directions and defer to the experts on the SAB. One respondent noted that 
the SAB “gives us traction we wouldn’t have had on our own, a place to fall back.” Yet another 
noted that “PEPFAR is able to invoke the guidance of this scientific advisory board as sort of 
external validation.”  
  Respondents also noted that HIV prevention, care, and treatment is wrought with political 
and ideological debates that are not always based on sound scientific evidence. Interviewees noted 
that an SAB constituted by renowned and respected academics can help to resolve ideological 
differences.  





certainly even inter-PEPFAR disagreements at times. Because as you know very well 
I’m sure after all these interviews and after advocacy work as well, these are not 
monolithic entities. And given different currents within them especially when it 
comes to how do you spend $6 billion dollars a year, the prioritization fight is an 
essential question within PEPFAR at all times. And I think there was and continues 
to be struggles within PEPFAR for turf, struggles between agencies for funding, and 
I think things that the SAB did and in fact was established to do was to help answer 
some of those questions. Sometimes because they were genuine questions or 
sometimes because subjects within PEPFAR wanted legitimacy for what they wanted 
to do versus what others wanted them to do.  
 Respondents had considerable difficulty conceiving how a SAB – either the PEPFAR SAB 
or a generic SAB – could impede the use of evidence by policymakers. Across all categories of 
respondents, there was a strong belief that policy should be informed by evidence, at a minimum, if 
not based on it, and that in the area of HIV prevention, care, and treatment in particular, scientific 
evidence in support of policies that have been politically controversial (e.g., needle-exchange 
programs) could help to mitigate ideological differences and facilitate the development of policies 
that are beneficial for public health.  
 Respondents noted that if SAB members do not understand the intricacies of the PEPFAR 
program and how it operates, their recommendations could be inappropriate for PEPFAR’s 
mandate or impossible to implement. “There could be times when advisory board members who 
aren’t as familiar with the PEPFAR program and with the structures that PEPFAR…might serve as 
at least a temporary barrier to saying ‘here’s the research and here’s what the evidence base shows, 
how do we actually build programs that rely on that’”. This relates to the issue of conflict of interest 
and reinforces the idea that a “good” FAC is comprised of implementers and researchers. It was 
noted that to some extent, the establishing agency has a duty to be clear about what priorities and 





it spirals out of control.  
 
B. Aim 2: Contribution of Contextual Factors to Adoption of PEPFAR SAB 
Recommendations 
  While the institutional environment at OGAC is the most relevant context that influenced 
whether and how the SAB’s recommendations were adopted, the broader policy context of the US 
government during Ambassador Goosby’s tenure at OGAC was identified by many interviewees 
across respondent categories as a critical influence on OGAC. Several respondents noted the 
different tenor of how science and research were treated under the Obama Administration relative 
to the Bush Administration. One participant described this historical context in depth, noting that: 
It definitely was a different tenor for the Bush-era PEPFAR and the Goosby-era 
PEPFAR or the Obama-era PEPFAR under Goosby in that at least the rhetoric and 
the public discussion [has been] much more about science and ‘we’re going to follow 
the science’. This is not to say that Mark Dybul did not follow the science. But there 
[has been] less of a political overtone in how PEPFAR was talked about by the new 
Administration. And it’s not that there wasn’t science in the first few years, but a 
couple things: one it was an emergency response and I think in retrospect everyone 
agrees that there should have been much more embedded in it – evaluation and all 
kinds of things, but I think given the emergency nature and that was an era in June 
2003 [when] we just didn’t have all the proven interventions. By 2009 and 2010 we 
had a lot more. And we also had an IOM report that had come out that basically said 
that politics shouldn’t trump science so that was a key thing. Several GAO reports 
kind of said the same thing and basically said that politics was driving some of the 
decision-making and it should be driven by science. Those independent bodies said 
that, you had a president [Obama] who was much more focused on that as an idea, 
and Eric as well. And before that, my understanding was that most of the scientific 
stuff – they had the public health evaluations, which nobody ever saw or anything 
but they had those. 
  OGAC’s new and heavy emphasis on funding research and using the results of scientific 





Administration’s focus on transparency, accountability, and evidence-based policy but also 
encouraged by it. According to one respondent, “it starts with the President. I mean he’s a law 
professor. There’s an evidence-based ethic.” In addition to the overall approach of the current 
Administration to the value of science, participants noted the timeliness and importance of scientific 
evidence that was generated during the course of Ambassador Goosby’s tenure at OGAC. One 
participant noted that: 
I think this Administration is way more interested in being evidence-based but then 
also they’ve benefited from a time in history when the science has been absolutely 
terrific…I mean, the science of the last few years would just drive you to pay 
attention because it’s so startling. 
  More proximate to the SAB was the context of OGAC itself under Ambassador Goosby’s 
leadership. Respondents unanimously identified Ambassador Goosby as the driving force behind 
not only the creation of the PEPFAR SAB but also the utilization of its recommendations to inform 
and change PEPFAR policy. Interviewees viewed the Ambassador as someone who has a long-
standing and deep commitment to ensuring that policy is evidence-based: 
He comes from academic medicine. And he himself sort of is that way. So I think 
he’s used to that. He’s used to functioning in an academic environment. He always 
thought that not necessarily academic medicine but academic science absolutely had 
a role to play. That was his vision from day one.  
  When asked specifically about the factors that influenced OGAC’s adoption of the SAB’s 
recommendations, several themes emerged from respondents’ answers. Interviewees indicated that 
the ability to link the recommendation very clearly to scientific evidence would be important because 
such a connection would establish the legitimacy of the recommendation and assist OGAC in 





I think scientific rigor and really getting that input from the scientific community was 
the first priority. And then I think demonstrating that in fact those things were 
brought in because programmatic realities are sometimes…so as we look at if there 
are new WHO normative guidelines then those are often an ideal, and when we look 
at them from a PEPFAR standpoint, how should we tell our countries about how we 
should move forward with this knowing that individual countries may not be where 
the Ministry of Health has chosen to go? Or your guidelines are different and how 
do we work these. And to really have a dialogue with the scientific community about 
how we approach that and to have this transparency and documentation that those 
discussions did happen and that PEPFAR policies aren’t arbitrary in that sense or 
weren’t taking that science into consideration. 
  In addition, the extent to which the recommendations address a high-priority issue for 
OGAC and are feasible for OGAC to implement were noted as contributing factors. Participants 
noted that feasibility involves the availability of financial resources to implement the 
recommendation as well as the political mandate to do so. For example, one participant noted that: 
The two things that immediately come to mind is that one, [OGAC does not] have 
the money to do it or we’re proposing a much larger research agenda than OGAC 
can really take responsibility for. [OGAC] may not disagree with what we’re talking 
about but it’s beyond the scope of what they can do. Or it may not be politically 
feasible, what we’re suggesting. An example there would be I had no doubt that the 
scientific advisory board – we certainly discussed this – supports funding syringe 
exchange programs. The Administration also supports that. It’s not feasible for them 
to do that. 
  In contrast to the issue of needle exchange programs, it was feasible for OGAC to react 
quickly to the SAB’s recommendations following from the HPTN 052 trial results. The response by 
OGAC is well-documented by Cohen et al., who describe how the science of treatment as 
prevention evolved over time as well as how WHO and PEPFAR responded to the new evidence 
(Cohen et al., 2012). The article indicates that both institutions reacted quickly to the HPTN 052 





1. expand treatment according to WHO recommendations; 
2. support large-scale, community-based trials of combination prevention, with treatment as 
prevention as the foundation.  
3. promote implementation science in a number of countries throughout Africa and Asia, with 
a focus on use of treatment for prevention. 
 
  The factors which affect OGAC’s uptake of the SAB’s recommendations were addressed 
during the interviews conducted as a part of this case study and are discussed in depth below. 
However, it should be noted that the speed with which OGAC reacted to the 052 findings and the 
SAB’s recommendations for how they could be integrated into PEPFAR programming is unique; 
the outcome of the recommendations from the other two working groups (described below) 
remains unclear. 
  Similarly, when asked what challenges might impede OGAC’s adoption of the SAB’s 
recommendations, there were several common themes that emerged, which largely echo those 
identified as being associated with the uptake of recommendations. Participants noted that 
recommendations would be unlikely to be adopted if they were not politically or financially feasible, 
or fell outside the scope of what OGAC could take on in terms of research. In addition, it was 
suggested that if there was not scientific consensus within the recommendation, it could challenge 
OGAC’s ability to adopt the SAB’s guidance. Finally, already-existing systems or guidance at various 
levels could challenge efforts to translate the SAB’s advice into operationally-applicable actions. 
C. Aim 3: Stakeholder Engagement with the PEPFAR SAB 
  When this study was initially conceived, the third aim was developed based on the 
investigator’s assumption that there was a vibrant advocacy community actively lobbying and 
advocating for certain policies in both the HIV arena and that these groups would be actively 





the absence of knowledge about how the advisory committees functioned and the dynamics 
between the committees and their establishing agencies, it was assumed that SAB members 
themselves served almost as lobbyists, in addition to science advisors, in their capacity as committee 
members.  
  However, after conducting the first few interviews for each case study and attending 
PEPFAR SAB meetings, it became clear that there was little NGO or advocacy group engagement 
with the PEPFAR SAB and that the committee members took their role as science advisors quite 
seriously, and largely set personal agendas aside. Thus, the research questions originally defined for 
the third aim quickly seemed less relevant than originally anticipated. Instead, it became clear that 
there was a far more nuanced dynamic occurring between NGOs and the SAB involving both 
formal and informal mechanisms of communication. Further, the informal communication that was 
occurring was influenced heavily by already-existing and long-standing personal relationships. 
Finally, it was apparent that the mechanism built into FACA for engagement with the public – the 
mandatory public comment period held at FACA committee meetings – was ineffective. Chapter 7 
will address these issues across the two case studies. 
  The key finding from this research related to stakeholder engagement with the PEPFAR 
SAB is the lack thereof. Respondents in all categories of interviewees expressed surprise at how little 
interaction there was between NGOs and advocacy groups working on global HIV/AIDS and the 
SAB. This seems to be due in part to the fact that the SAB meetings were not widely publicized.  
It’s just not been well-publicized, well-shared, that it exists. I’m aware of other 
advisory boards where there is much more awareness of them and there’s always 
public comment and there’s always people posting this meeting is coming up and 
this hasn’t happened with the SAB. I mean I could guess…it’s relatively new, there’s 





  While FACA requires that the meetings be announced in the FR, respondents indicated that 
no one ever checks the FR. Further, while meeting announcements were added to the PEPFAR 
SAB website they were not announced on the main PEPFAR website nor were they sent out via 
listservs. Thus, it was often the case that concerned stakeholders were unaware that SAB meetings 
were occurring. 
  Even if there was awareness about the occurrence of an SAB meeting, some respondents 
indicated that they felt that attending the meetings were not worth their time. One respondent 
identified the following as reasons for not attending: “Didn’t have enough of a heads up, didn’t 
think about it, one couldn’t go, to be honest with you, I don’t tend to go to meetings unless I’m 
presenting at this point. I just don’t have the time.”  The only opportunity to comment on SAB 
proceedings is during the FACA-mandated public comment period that is only 10 minutes long and 
scheduled at the end of each day of a FAC meeting. However, this investigator noted from attending 
PEPFAR SAB meetings that in practice, the agenda for the SAB meetings were often re-arranged on 
the day of the meeting because discussion on various agenda items ran over the allotted time. This 
included the time scheduled for public comment, which meant that if someone was planning on 
attending at a specific time to make remarks, he may be too late.  
  Several participants expressed surprise at how little engagement there was during the public 
comment period and were puzzled as to why this was the case.  
I think it’s obviously – in addition to being required – I think it’s very important. I 
have been a little bit surprised at how little engagement there is on that front. I’m not 
if that’s a reflection of a lack of concern, I mean a general supportiveness of what’s 
going on…or if it’s a bureaucratic issue, you know…it’s a relatively small window. I 
think the public comment section has to be – if you’re going to get these people into 
a room together to talk about the issues you do have to control some of the time 
limit. You’re sort of stuck with that. There are requirements about posting it and 





that there aren’t more public comments or larger attendance from some, but I don’t 
know why. 
Others noted that the public comment period may have been less effective than it could have been 
because the comments received from advocacy groups were not directly related to matters OGAC 
was considering or because the issues were diplomatically too sensitive for OGAC to approach.  
I think that my experience in our SAB has been that the comments from the 
advocacy community are often targeted toward particular issues of interest which are 
important [and] which we have an ongoing engagement on, but they are not 
necessarily related to the topics that have been put on the advisory board. So, maybe 
that means there’s is a deficit in what comes up there. If your issue that you’re 
concerned about relates to treatment of certain populations in various countries and 
we know there are human rights issues that are associated with these - if that’s you’re 
issue and that’s what you’re passionate about and what you work on, you will come 
to the SAB and you will discuss this. And it is not that the issue isn’t important and 
it’s not that we’re not engaged on that issue, it’s just that there may not really be 
anything that the SAB could discuss. It may be that the science is really clear but the 
policy implications in terms of the host nation government…we may just not have a 
lot of options. And so I think often the discussions that come out of the public 
comment tend to fall more into that category. 
Some respondents perceived the public comment period to be a mere formality required by law 
rather than a time to productively engage with the SAB because there is no opportunity for the SAB 
to respond to comments received. 
  While the formal mechanism for stakeholder engagement (i.e., the public comment period) 
was rarely used, respondents indicated that already-existing personal relationships among the various 
stakeholders involved with the SAB enabled engagement through informal channels. One 
participant indicated that “If I felt I wanted [the SAB] to do a particular thing I would feel no 
resistance about weighing in or just going down the list and calling them. And I mean I probably 





communicating directly with OGAC at the staff level ‘off the record’ provided an opportunity to 
understand the issues on which there was a difference of opinion between OGAC leadership and 
OGAC staff. Efforts were then made to influence the SAB to align with the OGAC staff position 
without actually involving OGAC staff.  
Sometimes I’ll work with an OGAC staff member who…doesn’t want his or her 
name used. But we’re always… talking to insiders at OGAC who are just like stealth 
people. The system depends on that. Disgruntled employees. I mean it’s interesting 
though not everybody thinks about that. I said to somebody from the White House 
the other week that you need to know that you’re hearing one thing from OGAC 
leadership and the people below that completely disagree with that. And they’re like 
“really?” And I’m like “yeah.” 
Others indicated that they would contact SAB members directly in advance of meetings to try to 
influence them to raise or support certain issues at the SAB meetings. Respondents also noted that 
SAB meetings were only one venue at which current issues related to HIV prevention, care, and 
treatment science and policy were being discussed: other conferences, such as the Conference on 
Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections (CROI) and to some extent, the International AIDS 
Conference, as well as meetings held by the World Health Organization (WHO), also provided 
opportunities for stakeholders to engage with each other.   
  It was also noted that the topics of discussion during SAB meetings may not be appealing or 
interesting to a wide audience. The amount of funding appropriated for PEPFAR by Congress 
receives a lot of attention, but that issue was not the subject of debate at the SAB meetings. As 
discussed above, the SAB focused much more specifically on scientific evidence and implications for 
the operational aspects of PEPFAR programs. Respondents suggested that this type of discussion 
may not be perceived as politically important beyond a small group with highly specialized 





PEPFAR programs are individuals living in focus countries, who obviously cannot attend SAB 
meetings held in Washington, DC.  
VIII. Conclusion 
  Since its inception in 2003, the PEPFAR program has evolved considerably from one 
focused on responding to the emergent nature of the HIV pandemic in ways that partly ignored 
scientific consensus, to a program intent on using scientific evidence to inform its policies and 
evaluating the impact of its efforts. The shift in how the PEPFAR program and OGAC viewed the 
value of research and evidence seems to have coincided with the change in Administrations between 
President George W. Bush and President Obama and correspondingly, with the change in OGAC 
leadership. Thus, while the State Department is only one of many government agencies, it seems 
clear that the overarching policy environment of the executive branch was a critical influence on the 
institutional environment at OGAC. In addition, and more proximally related to PEPFAR, was the 
importance of Ambassador Eric Goosby’s commitment and dedication to evidence-informed policy. 
His decision to create the PEPFAR SAB is perhaps the prime example of this. 
  Over the course of Ambassador Goosby’s tenure at OGAC, the SAB discussed a number of 
issues that they were requested to provide guidance on by OGAC and that were added to the agenda 
by the SAB itself. The synergy between the priorities raised by the “demand side” (i.e., OGAC) and 
the “supply side” (i.e., the SAB) seems to have been a key contributing factor to the uptake of the 
SAB’s recommendations. Although there were challenges with implementing, managing, and 
convening the SAB, findings suggest that having a staff dedicated full-time to the SAB, as well as 
prioritizing meeting agenda items more judiciously and managing SAB meetings more effectively 
could help to ameliorate some of the problems noted by respondents. However, to some extent 





  Although there appear to be some changes that could be easily implemented to facilitate 
more frequent and robust engagement between the SAB and civil society, such as more widespread 
announcements of the SAB meetings, the FACA-mandated public comment period remains a 
substantial barrier to real-time and meaningful interaction. With only 10 minutes and no response 
from the SAB or OGAC, it is not immediately obvious how to encourage greater engagement. 
However, findings suggest that informal communication has provided a sufficient if not preferred 
substitute to the opportunity to make formal comments during SAB meetings.  
  The PEPFAR SAB offers a striking contrast to the NCADAC (discussed in the next 
chapter) on many levels. However, these differences as well as the similarities between the two 






CHAPTER 6: THE NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE – A CASE STUDY 
I. Introduction 
  This case study provides empirical evidence about the role of the NCADAC in the drafting 
of the Third NCA. The evidence focuses on the operational elements of the NCADAC because 
while the final version of the NCA was released by the NCADAC in May 2014, it was technically 
submitted to President Obama and Congress, and then became a government document. Thus, 
given the boundaries of this case study, which span from April 2011, when the charter was signed, 
to May 2014, this case study does not address any policy actions taken after the release of the 
NCA15.  
  The evolution of the program responsible for overseeing the drafting of climate assessments 
– the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) – is described, beginning with the 
first announcement of a presidential initiative on global climate change made by President Ronald 
Reagan in January 1989, and including the relevant legal history related to the findings of 
assessments released prior to the 2014 NCA. This background information is discussed in Section 
II, and precedes a brief overview of the state of climate change science, which is presented in 
Section III. Core components of the NCADAC as it existed between 2011 and 2014 are discussed in 
Section IV, including the charter and committee membership. Section V addresses the findings from 
the in-depth interviews and NCADAC meeting documents. Section VI discusses the key 
                                                 
15 While there have been several major efforts and actions by the White House related to climate change since the NCA 
was released, it is not possible to attribute those policy actions directly to the NCA because the endpoint of the case 
study precluded tracking such actions and more importantly, because establishing a causal link between the release of a 






recommendations from the 2014 NCA with a focus on those related to research and public health. 
Conclusions are offered in Section VII. 
II. Background 
  In January 1989, just before he left office, President Ronald Reagan announced a presidential 
initiative for fiscal year 1990 called the US Global Change Research Program. President George 
H.W. Bush reaffirmed the initiative when he took office and Congress passed the US Global Change 
Research Act (GCRA) on November 16, 1990 (P.L. 101-606). The purpose of the Act was to 
establish the USGCRP, which would understand and respond to “global change16, including the 
cumulative effects of human activities and natural processes on the environment, to promote 
discussions toward international protocols in global change research, and for other purposes.  
  More specifically, the GCRA stipulated that the Federal Coordinating Council on Science, 
Engineering, and Technology in the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the Office 
of the President establish a Committee on Earth and Environmental Sciences (CEES). In turn, 
CEES was charged with developing a plan for how the USGCRP would be implemented, which was 
to be submitted to Congress one year after the GCRA was passed and at least every three years 
thereafter. As guidance, the GCRA did specify seven over-arching program objectives of the 
USGCRP plan, and an additional five elements for research, and three elements for coordinating 
across the US government and collaborating with other countries. Importantly, and most relevant to 
this case study, the GCRA also specified that an assessment should be prepared and submitted to 
the President and Congress every four years that:  
                                                 
16 Global change was defined as “changes in the global environment (including alterations in climate, land productivity, 
oceans or other water resources, atmospheric chemistry, and ecological systems) that may alter the capacity of the Earth 





 Integrates, evaluates, and interprets the findings of the Program and discusses the scientific 
uncertainties associated with such findings 
 Analyzes the effects of global change on the natural environment, agriculture, energy 
production and use, land and water resources, transportation, human health and welfare, 
human social systems, and biological diversity 
 Analyzes current trends in global change, both human- induced and natural, and projects 
major trends for the subsequent 25 to 100 years. 
Currently, USGCRP coordinates the research arms of 13 government agencies which support the 
United States’ response to global change. It is now overseen by the Subcommittee on Global 
Change Research, which is a sub-group of the National Science and Technology Council’s 
Committee on Environment, Natural Resources, and Sustainability, which is, in turn, a committee of 
the OSTP. Thus, while there have been changes in the names of the entities involved in the 
oversight of USGCRP since its inception in 1990, the program is still responsible for managing 
relationships with a diverse array of government agencies and there remains a complex hierarchical 
layering of oversight, which ultimately begins in the Office of the President. The organizational 
structure of USGCRP can best be described with a diagram (Figure 6.1) (U. G. C. R. Program, 
2014). This structure is important because of the implications it has for the government agencies, 













III. National Climate Assessments in Historical Perspective 
  Although the GCRA did not mandate that USGCRP establish a FACA committee to 
develop the climate assessments, each assessment to date has been written by a committee that fell 
under FACA’s purview. The 2014 NCA is no exception. In fact, the NCADAC was not only the 
largest committee established to draft a NCA to date, but was involved with the most 
comprehensive effort thus far to engage stakeholders across the country throughout the Assessment 
process. The first two climate assessments, issued in 2000 and 2009, respectively, were met with 
substantial backlash from conservative public policy groups and politicians which fueled legal action. 
In turn, these experiences led USGCRP and the NCADAC to engage in special efforts to comply 
with FACA and ensure that all meeting proceedings and NCADAC decisions were as transparent as 
possible. The relevant legal history and related events are discussed below. 
  There is some debate about the number of assessments which have been issued since the 
GCRA was passed in 1990. As mentioned above, the Act stipulated that an Assessment should be 
submitted to Congress and the President every four years. If this requirement had been adhered to, 
the latest Assessment would be the sixth NCA17. However, according to USGCRP, the 2014 NCA is 
the third assessment.  
  Previous assessments were drafted by FACA committees, but the name of the committee 
has changed over time. The first assessment was written by the National Assessment Synthesis 
Team (NAST), which was established by the National Science Foundation (NSF) as an independent 
FACA committee. Consisting of 14 members with an additional 10 individuals as lead authors, the 
NAST initiated the process of drafting the first NCA in 1997 by conducting 20 workshops around 
the country involving academics, representatives from manufacturing, power generation, and 
                                                 
17 If one assumes that a national assessment would be issued every four years from the inception of the USCGRP in 




tourism, and people who work closely with land and water ecosystems including resource managers, 
ranchers, farmers, foresters and fishermen. Scientific, university-led regional studies were initiated 
after most of the workshops, the results of which were then used to inform the National 
Assessment Report. The NAST released the “Climate Change Impacts on the United States: The 
Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change” report in June 2000.  
  On the day of the Assessment’s release, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), a 
libertarian think tank, issued a press release stating that the Assessment was a “scientifically 
dishonest, alarmist document based on junk science and intended to advance a political agenda 
rather than provide a sober look at the state of the science and its uncertainties involving the theory 
of climate change” (Institute, 2000). On October 3, 2000, CEI and several other plaintiffs filed a 
lawsuit against President Clinton and Neal Lane, who was then the Director of OSTP (Competitive 
Enterprise Institute v. Clinton, D.C. Cir., 1:00-cv-02383). Given the hierarchy of supervision of the 
assessment process, President Clinton and Neal Lane were named as defendants. The lawsuit alleged 
that President Clinton and Neal Lane had violated FACA because the NAST held closed meetings 
and meetings without the DFO present. In addition, the lawsuit alleged that the GCRA had been 
violated because the NAST report had not been filed in the timeframe required by the GCRA and 
was incomplete. The third count named in the suit was an alleged violation of Public Law 106-74, 
which requires that if appropriated funds are to be used in completing assessments under the 
GCRA, any reports should be subject to peer review and released for a public comment period, 
neither of which occurred.  
  In spite of this lawsuit, the White House proceeded with steps to release the report. 
President Clinton sent a pre-publication version of the report to key members of Congress on 
November 11, 2000. A PDF of the document was put online on the same day, and printed copies 




final version of the report was sent to Congress and it was posted online in July 17, 2001. Ultimately, 
the lawsuit against Clinton and Lane was dismissed in September 2001 following a statement issued 
by Rosina Bierbaum, the then Acting Director of OSTP, stating that the information included in the 
NAST report was not a policy position or official statement of USG.  
   Two years later, on August 3, 2003, CEI filed another lawsuit, this time against President 
Bush and George Marburger, who was then the Director of OSTP. The suit alleged that the NAST 
Assessment violated a different law, the Federal Data Quality Act (FDQA), because the NAST used 
“demonstrably inaccurate computer models, and dissemination of historical temperature data that it 
modified to inaccurately omit the occurrence of recognized climatic periods” (Competitive Enterprise 
Institute v. Bush [D.D.C. No.03-1670]). Again, Bush and Marburger were named as defendants 
because of the oversight structure of the assessment process. The suit was dismissed after the White 
House settled with CEI, on the condition that the USGCRP website include language stating that 
the NAST and the reports it issued were not subjected to OSTP’s Information Quality Act 
Guidelines. Essentially, this discredited the assessment and provided fodder for CEI to issue a 
statement that the NAST assessment was propaganda, not science. However, it should be noted that 
the FDQA did not exist when the NAST report was issued in November 2000: the FDQA was 
passed in 2001.  
  According to the schedule outlined in the GCRA, the next assessment should have been 
issued in November 2004. The NAST no longer existed under the NSF, so it could not be 
responsible for drafting the report. Instead, the Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), created by 
President Bush in 2002, was the entity which coordinated and directed US government responses to 
climate change and thus was responsible for issuing the 2004 assessment. CCSP issued a strategic 
plan in July 2003, which included a schedule for preparing 21 reports on specific topics related to 




national assessment. The schedule indicated that all 21 reports would be completed by 2007, which 
was three years behind the schedule outlined in the GCRA and meant that seven years would have 
elapsed between the first and second assessments. Only two reports were completed by 2007 and by 
mid-2008, two reports were still outstanding. The distinct reports were compiled into one large 
report, titled the “Scientific Assessment of the Effects of Global Change on the United States”, and 
was submitted to the President and Congress as being in compliance with the requirements of the 
GCRA (USGCRP, 2008).  
  In June 2009, the USGCRP issued another national assessment, titled “Global Climate 
Change Impacts on the United States”. Initially, USGCRP stated that this report was not being 
submitted in compliance with the GCRA (Karl, Melillo, and  Peterson, 2009). However, that 
position was reversed. Currently, this 2009 assessment is referred to as the second national 
assessment, with no acknowledgement of the 2008 assessment. As stated above, the 2014 NCA is 
referred to as the third national assessment. Ultimately, it seems the 2008 assessment is not 
considered in compliance with the GCRA, even though there is clear language in the front matter of 
the report stating it is submitted under that act. Thus, according to USGCRP, national climate 
assessments have been issued in 2000, 2009, and 2014. It is unclear why there is contradictory 
information about whether the 2008 report satisfies the requirements of the GCRA. 
IV. Climate Change Science: A Summary of the State of the Field 
  There is global consensus that the planet is warming and that human interaction with the 
environment is the primary cause of global warming over the past 50 years (Figure 6.2) (IPCC, 2014; 
USGCRP, 2014). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)18, the international body 
                                                 
18 There are 195 countries which are members of the IPCC, which was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological 
Association and the United Nations Environment Program. The objective of the IPCC is to provide policymakers with 
assessments of climate change science, the impacts and risks of climate change, and options for mitigation and 




which assesses the science related to climate change, issued its fifth assessment report in stages 
between September 2013 and November 2014, with three key messages: the influence of human 
activity on climate change is clear and increasing; urgent action is needed to avoid deleterious 
outcomes; and there are options available for the mitigation and adaptation of climate change 
(IPCC, 2013).  
Figure 6.2.  Influence of human and natural factors on global temperature, 1900-2000 
 
Source: Huber, M., and R. Knutti, 2012: Anthropogenic and natural warming inferred from changes in Earth's energy 
balance. Nature Geoscience, 5, 31-36, doi:10.1038/ngeo1327 
 
While the NCA issued by the NCADAC focuses on climate change in the United States and the 
IPCC Assessment has a global focus, the messages from the IPCC and the NCA are mutually 
reinforcing. Thus, it seems clear that any debate about the causes of global warming exists among 
those who are on the fringe of mainstream science and deny what multiple sources of independent 
evidence have confirmed to be the case: the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, emissions from 
agriculture and other human activities have increased the concentration of carbon dioxide in the 
                                                 
a smaller group of countries, elected by member governments, provides guidance and advice to the overall Panel on 




atmosphere by over 40 percent since the industrial revolution (Figure 6.3) (U. S. G. C. R. Program, 
2014).   
Figure 6.3.  Global temperature and carbon dioxide concentration (ppm), 1880-2000 
 
Source: Karl, T. R., J. T. Melillo, and T. C. Peterson, 2009: Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States. T.R. Karl, J.T. 
Melillo, and T.C. Peterson, Eds. Cambridge University Press, 189 pp.  
 
  The implications of climate change both in the United States and in other countries are too 
numerous to name, but illustrative effects involve an increase in extreme weather events, projected 
decreases in agricultural yields, substantial adverse effects on marine ecosystems, and most germane 
to this study, threats to human health and well-being.  
  The key ways that climate change affects human health are through extreme weather events 
and wildfire, decreased air quality, and diseases transmitted by insects, food, and water (Alexander, 
Carzolio, Goodin, & Vance, 2013; Patz, Frumkin, Holloway, Vimont, & Haines, 2014). Extreme 
weather events such as Hurricane Sandy can be associated with mental health disorders such as 
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, but also with adverse effects on a household’s 
healthcare seeking behavior if finances are re-allocated to deal with other pressing concerns, such as 




For example, smoke from forest fires in Quebec in 2002 resulted in a 30-fold increase in airborne 
fine particle concentrations in Baltimore, Maryland, which is located over 1,000 miles downwind of 
(Luber, 2014). The length of the pollen season has increased in parts of the United States from 11 to 
27 days between 1995 and 2011, which has effects on respiratory health, including allergies and 
asthma. Vector-borne and water-borne diseases such as malaria and gastrointestinal illnesses can be 
seasonal but have been shown to increase in incidence following changes in temperature and rainfall 
patterns (Alexander et al., 2013).  
V. The NCADAC 
   On December 27, 2010, the FR announced that the NCADAC was being established by the 
DOC, which oversees NOAA. The notice indicated that the committee would consist of 
approximately 50 members total, 35 of whom would be scientists, educators, and other experts with 
expertise in “the full range” of scientific issues pertaining to climate change. In addition, there would 
be 15 individuals representing each of the government agencies in the U.S. Global Change Research 
Program. The notice also indicated that the NCADAC would be holding its first meeting on 
February 3-4, 2011, to discuss initial plans for the NCA.  
A. NCADAC Charter 
  The first NCADAC charter was signed on January 11, 2011 and was renewed twice before 
the NCADAC issued its final report in May 2014. Interestingly, the first charter renewal was only for 
a six month period: it was renewed on January 11, 2013 with a termination date of July 11, 2013, 
even though at the time, the NCA was not scheduled to be released until mid-2014. It is unclear why 
the first charter renewal had a termination date six months from its renewal date given that all 
concerned stakeholders were aware that the NCA would not be delivered until nearly a year after the 




expire 90 days after the Third NCA was released to the public or on June 24, 2015, whichever came 
first.  
  As outlined in the charter, the NCADAC has three objectives: to synthesize and summarize 
the science on the impacts of climate change in the United States; to make recommendations for a 
sustainable national assessment of the impacts of climate change globally, and for adaptation and 
mitigation efforts in the United States; and to develop a National Climate Assessment. More 
specifically, the charter indicates that the NCA should be a report that: 
1. “Integrates, evaluates, and interprets the findings of the U.S. Global Change Research 
Program (USGCRP) and discusses the scientific uncertainties with such findings; 
2. Analyzes the effects of current and projected climate change upon ecosystems and 
biological diversity, agriculture, energy production and use, land and water resources, 
transportation, human health and welfare, and social systems, including in a regional 
context; 
3. Analyzes current trends in global change, both human-induced and natural, and projects 
major trends for the subsequent 25 to 100 years; 
4. Is a continuing, inclusive National process that synthesizes relevant science and 
information about changes in the Earth system as they affect the Nation’s climate, and 
about how such changes relate to and interact with changes in social, economic, 
ecological, and technological systems; and, 
5. Supports climate-related decisions by providing an information base in multiple formats, 
including Web-based and hard copy formats.” 
Ultimately, the major focus of the NCADAC was to develop the NCA. The other objectives, while 
important, were essentially components of the larger NCA effort.  
  The Charter indicates that the NCADAC shall comply with FACA, FACA implementing 
regulations, the Information Quality Act, and other applicable DOC regulations as it developed the 
NCA. The NCADAC reported to the NOAA Administrator, and per FACA rules, served in a purely 
advisory capacity.  
  The non-federal members served at the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce and were 




longer than the usual two-year appointment under FACA, but this was done to ensure continuity in 
NCADAC membership as the NCA was being developed.  
  The NCADAC organizational structure was outlined in the Charter, which states that the 
Under-Secretary of Commerce or her designee would appoint a Chair, two Vice-Chairs, and an 
Executive Secretariat, all of whom would then be responsible for managing the work of the 
committee. In addition, the Charter specifies that subcommittees can be created from among the 
NCADAC members as well as non-members, should specific subject-matter expertise be required. 
This structure is discussed in more depth below. 
  The Charter allows for the frequency of NCADAC meetings to occur as needed, as 
determined by the Under Secretary, Chair, and Vice Chairs. Over the course of its tenure, the 
NCADAC met in-person at least once a year, usually in Washington, DC, and held a number of 
conference calls in between the in-person meetings. Both types of meetings were open to the public. 
This investigator attended nearly all of the NCADAC in-person meetings and conference calls 
during the study period. Some members of the NCADAC attended the conference calls in person, 
which were organized by the USGCRP coordinating office, which is based in Washington, DC.  
  As stipulated by the Charter, NCADAC members served without compensation, although 
travel expenses and per diem were covered by the DOC upon request and subject to the availability 
of funds. As discussed below, there was a substantial staff supporting the NCADAC, which was 
paid for by NOAA’s National Climatic Data Center. The Charter estimated that the annual 
operating cost for the committee was $1 million, and that 2.5 years of staff support19 would be 
needed on an annual basis. However, the Charter also notes that additional funds may be available 
                                                 
19 While the Charter does not specifically refer to full-time equivalent (FTE) units, the request for 2.5 years of staff 
support on an annual basis refers to 2.5 FTEs. This translates into two people working full time and a third person 
working half-time to support the NCADAC or some other combination of work by a number of individuals that adds to 




through NOAA by contract or other means. 
B. NCADAC Membership 
  A request for nominations for NCADAC committee members was announced in the FR on 
March 2, 2011. The announcement indicated that nominations would be evaluated and accepted if 
they benefited the overall composition of the committee. A lengthy list of criteria for the 
characteristics of nominees was included. In addition to specific areas of expertise, the FR notice 
indicated that the DOC was seeking members from a wide range of employers (e.g., private industry, 
government) and geographic regions within the United States, as well as members from a diverse 
array of backgrounds. Nominees were requested to submit a two-page resume as well as a statement 
about how they would assist the committee in meeting the goals outlined in its charter.  
  The March 2, 2011 FR notice also included a list of 49 individuals who had already been 
nominated to serve on the NCADAC, 33 of whom were non-federal members and 16 of whom 
were ex-officio members.20 Thus, the request for nominations in addition to the already-named 
members was a departure from the December 27, 2010 FR notice which suggested there would be 
50 members total. As discussed in more depth below, the member selection process was highly 
political: interview findings revealed that an initial list of members was compiled by OSTP and the 
Administrator of NOAA, with input from USGCRP, and subsequently submitted to the Secretary of 
Commerce who then requested that the nomination process be opened up through the FR. The 
initial list most likely consisted of approximately 50 individuals total, which is the number referenced 
in the December 2010 FR notice, while the March 2011 FR notice was most likely placed in 
response to the request from the Secretary of Commerce. 
  Of the 49 individuals named in the March 2011 notice, all but one of the 33 non-federal 
                                                 
20 In general, FACA permits employees of federal government agencies to serve on advisory committees as ex-officio 
members to represent their agencies’ interests. Whether these ex-officio members have voting rights is determined by 




members served on the NCADAC, although it is unclear how or why this individual was excluded. 
Of the 16 nominees for ex-officio members, 10 did not serve on the committee, although another 
individual from their agency served in their place. Thus, all of the original 16 government agencies 
that were listed in the March 2, 2011 FR notice did have representatives on the NCADAC. The final 
NCADAC committee was comprised of a total of 60 representatives, which indicates that the 
nominations of an additional 12 non-federal members were accepted after the March 2, 2011 FR 
notice. Table 6.1 provides summary data on the organizational affiliations of the NCADAC 
members. 
Table 6.1.  Summary of NCADAC Members’ Organizational Affiliation 
Organizational Affiliation Number of NCADAC Members 
of which (not US based) 
University  22 
US Federal Government Agency 16 ex-officio 
Private Sector Company 7 
Consulting Firm 6 
State Government (e.g., public utilities) 5 





All but one of the NCADAC members is based in the United States, although many serve on the 
IPCC.  
VI. Interview Findings 
  This section discusses the results of the in-depth interviews conducted between March 2013 
and September 2014 with NCADAC members, USGCRP staff, and managers or staff employed by 
advocacy groups active in the climate change community. In addition, materials from all NCADAC 
meetings between April 2011 and May 2014 were reviewed as part of the preparation for the 




included below.  
  The results are presented in relation to the aims and research questions described in Chapter 
4. The results are presented in this way to ensure that there is a parallel structure between this case 
study and the PEPFAR case study and to facilitate the analysis across the two cases, which is 
presented in Chapter 7. In addition, presenting the results by aim, rather than by category of 
respondent, helps to maintain the confidentiality and anonymity of the interviewees. 
A. Aim 1: The Role of the NCADAC in the Policy Process 
  The NCADAC is a different model of a federal advisory committee relative to the PEPFAR 
SAB and other FACs that were initially reviewed for inclusion in this research because its primary 
objective is to develop and deliver the national climate assessment to the President and Congress, 
rather than to provide general scientific advice and guidance to a government agency. One 
interviewee described the NCADAC in the following manner: 
This is a co-production model. It’s not a model where the advisory board tells the 
agency a bunch of stuff and then goes home. Rather, the agencies are part of it, the 
committee is part of it, the public is part of it, the experts are part of it, and they all 
have a role and essentially the advisory committee has been in the driver’s seat in 
terms of actually putting the report together. 
Procedurally, this means that once the NCADAC delivered the final version of the NCA in May, 
2014, it became a government document. Although representatives from 16 different government 
agencies served as ex-officio members on the NCADAC and were responsible for vetting drafts of 
the NCA with their respective agencies, and there was a 90-day period during which comments on 
the draft NCA were accepted anonymously from anyone, including government agency staff. Once 
the NCA was delivered, it was possible that the document could be changed without conferring with 
NCADAC members, USGCRP, or chapter authors. Thus, the potential for the NCADAC itself, as a 




specifically, the potential for the NCADAC to influence policy depends substantially on whether the 
government accepts the NCA as delivered and then whether it decides to take action based on the 
findings and recommendations contained therein. 
1. RESEARCH QUESTION 1: WHAT ARE THE MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES BY WHICH SABS  
  FUNCTION, INCLUDING HOW THEY ARE STRUCTURED, IMPLEMENTED, CONVENED, AND  
  OPERATE?  
i. Implementing the NCADAC 
  The first meeting of the NCADAC was held in April 2011 but the strategic planning process 
for the 2014 NCA began in 2010. In January 2010, a draft outline of the NCA was circulated and 
served as the basis for four different meetings held across the country that year. Feedback from 
those meetings was incorporated into the draft outline before the first of three FR notices was 
published, which also solicited feedback on the topics to be addressed by the assessment. 
Throughout 2010, there were a series of meetings, workshops, scoping sessions, and other efforts 
which generated robust feedback that served as inputs for the NCADAC to use as the 2014 NCA 
was drafted. 
a) NCADAC Adherence to FACA and Other Rules 
  At its first meeting in April, 2011, the NCADAC was presented with a number of 
background and briefing materials focused on the rules and regulations related to serving as a 
member of a FACA committee. The first substantive session of the meeting was a briefing provided 
by the Chair of the Subcommittee on Global Change Research on previous national climate 
assessments (USGCRP, 2011b). While there was no explicit mention of the legal challenges in years 
past, the briefing concluded by noting that the key issue for the NCA was adherence to the 
Information Quality Act (i.e., the FDQA), which meant that there were new demands for the use of 




review process that was itself transparent (Karl, 2011). Subsequent sessions were led by attorneys 
from the DOC’s Office of General Counsel on FACA and the NCADAC Charter, ethics rules for 
NCADAC members, and the bylaws for the NCADAC (USGCRP, 2011b). Undoubtedly, the 
emphasis on the importance of adhering to FACA and other rules so early into the NCADAC’s 
lifespan was related to the experiences of previous committees and their related assessments. 
  At times, adherence to FACA has created procedural challenges and additional work for 
both NCADAC members and USGCRP staff.  
I think FACA itself is severely flawed. One of the pieces of evidence is you know 
what we had to do in order to get the advisory board to a place where they were 
willing to vote to release the document. Essentially it has to be a public document 
for them to vote to release the document. And we would have had to make it public 
for them to approve it before they had approved it. That’s crazy. And so they had to 
all individually sign in to webinars – a series of webinars – where they never all met 
together and talk about their issues individually. And then we had to sort of 
synthesize and respond to them over…we did it I think nine times. Nine times four 
or five because we did it four or five times for each [draft] between July and 
December to try to get them to a place where we could release the document for 
public review because we couldn’t let it out as a public document before they had 
approved it. I mean that’s crazy and ridiculous. So, there’s some pretty serious 
problems with it. BUT, you know, the spirit of it is a useful thing. 
The NCADAC bylaws are of particular interest because neither FACA nor the GCRA requires that 
bylaws be developed for its committees. The bylaws contain five articles: Oversight, Administrative 
Provisions, Membership, Committees, and Meetings. Article 1 draws verbatim from the NCADAC 
charter, as does part of Article 2. However, there is additional information contained in Article 2 
which is not mentioned elsewhere, including that the DFO at NOAA be copied on all email 
communication between NCADAC members. In addition, Article 2 specifies how records and 
documents are to be maintained, noting that NOAA is responsible for keeping official copies of a 




NCADAC. Article 2 also specifies how NCADAC members are to respond to press inquiries. 
Article 3, which addresses Membership, and Article 4, which addresses Committees, are discussed 
below. Article 5 discussed Meetings, including that they were to be called by the DFO and 
announced in the FR, which is required by FACA. However, the bylaws again departed from 
existing law by noting that a quorum was necessary for a NCADAC meeting to be held, and that 
decisions would be made by consensus (USGCRP, 2011a). Meeting materials were to be provided by 
USGCRP and NOAA staff to NCADAC members far enough in advance of meetings to allow 
members time to review any relevant documents. The bylaws suggested that USGCRP be permitted 
to develop processes for sharing materials with the committee. The outcome of this suggestion was 
a secure web-based system with access restricted to committee members and relevant government 
staff. Members of the public were not permitted to access this system, although the system was 
displayed on a projector during meetings.   
  Ultimately, the bylaws reiterated the information in the NCADAC charter and expanded on 
some of the key elements of the FACA law. In addition, they served as a reference for NCADAC 
members for how some of the operational and procedural elements of the committee should run so 
that transparency was maintained.   
b) NCADAC Member Selection  
  As mentioned above, a FACA committee has been established for all previous national 
climate assessments. Respondents indicated that the rationale for establishing a FACA committee 
for the 2014 NCA stemmed not only from repeating what had been done in years past but also from 
recognition that the federal government did not have all of the expertise needed to develop a robust 
assessment. One interviewee described the rationale for using a FACA committee for each 




I think there was a conclusion from the beginning which was essentially the Clinton 
Administration that the federal government didn’t actually have all of the knowledge 
to do this properly. And also to properly assess the impacts on sectors we couldn’t 
just have a government perspective. That there needed to be external sources of 
information and as soon as you sort of need to have ongoing input from an external 
bunch of people you essentially are in violation of FACA [if you have not already 
established a FAC]. So, I think it was essentially just…I don’t know that it would 
have been done this way in the absence of FACA but in the presence of it there 
didn’t seem to be any options.  
Further, a respondent indicated that the credibility of the assessment would be enhanced by using a 
committee of external advisors: 
In addition, because climate change can be a controversial topic, they felt that it 
might be better to have an external body putting together the information and 
drafting the report so that it was felt to be less biased and more…independent 
essentially of any government opinion. So that was the reason for establishing a 
federal advisory committee for the initial drafting. 
As mentioned above, the process for selecting the NCADAC members was highly political. One 
respondent described the following: 
But this was the first kind of effort at a ‘what are the implications of the global 
warming program for the United States’. Having people who could represent [IPCC 
Working Group 1] but then moving on to the impacts and implicitly to the 
adaptation issues. Specifically at first not dealing with mitigation because it got into 
energy policy and it got so close to political controversy that the USGCRP was told 
to stay on the science side of the fence and let the policy people deal with mitigation 
issues. So at first it was a small group. It was a mixed bag of people…each one 
brought a different kind of expertise that seemed to well represent that area, that 
expertise, whether it was wetlands or climate modeling or observing systems. The 
NCADAC, now they wanted to also deal with issues of decision support. They 
wanted to deal with issues of mitigation. They wanted to start discussing adaptation 
policy implications a little bit more directly. They wanted to create a more substantial 
communications outreach. They wanted to create a sustained assessment process so 
how to deal with stakeholders is an expertise area; it’s practically an academic 
specialization, a think tank specialization. They wanted private sector input. You 




agencies ex officio. 
NCADAC member selection was also a lengthy process. One interviewee provided the following 
information about the timeframe and process for selecting the committee members: 
It took 18 months and it was ridiculous. I mean part of it was it was fairly early in the 
Administration and I don’t think everybody understood how to do these 
things…and then it took a long time to get agreement on how to do the nominations 
and then after the nominations, the selection and then the back and forth about who 
and why and what the criteria were and all that kind of stuff. And I would say there 
were negotiations over the names for six months before we got to a point where 
there was even a list. Obviously [the members] had to be asked whether they would 
actually do it or not and if they said no, then there had to be back ups and blah blah 
blah. So it was pretty complicated. And then there was the second round where 
people were added. 
One respondent described the process that occurred after the FR notice (the “second round” 
mentioned above) in the following manner: 
Once all the applications came in, there was a small committee made up of staff 
from the Commerce Department, OSTP because they’re very interested in this and 
they have a role in the US Global Change Research Program, NOAA, and I think 
that’s it. Those were the three main players. So there was a small committee that then 
went through all of the applications and looked at all of them and determined what 
the right mix was of people…and people with expertise, people with experience in 
serving on committees or people who might have served on the committees who did 
the previous national climate assessments. So that’s how it was done for the 
NCADAC. And then they came up with recommendations and the Secretary of 
Commerce and the NOAA Administrator took that list and reviewed it and made 
their decision about who should be included on the committee. 
Approximately 150 applications were submitted following the FR notice. Although interview 
respondents provided some mixed information about exactly which government entities were 
involved with decisions about member selection at which stage of the process, it is clear that the 




government, specifically the White House OSTP, the DOC, and NOAA.  
  In terms of selecting a Chair for the NCADAC, respondents indicated that a number of 
qualities are important for the person in that position to possess. One respondent noted that: 
I think you generally want somebody who’s going to work well with the staff; you 
want somebody who’s going to work well with the other members…it’s everything 
you could imagine for somebody who’s a committee Chair. You want somebody 
who’s good at building consensus but if the committee is struggling to reach 
consensus can sort of break it down into okay here’s essentially where we need to go 
and can sort of push the committee when the committee needs to be pushed and 
knows when to step back when the committee needs a little more breathing room. I 
think you want somebody who’s not too autocratic, who’s willing to…somebody 
who also works well with the NOAA Administrator, but you know, so there’s always 
this sort of dance because the Agency is not allowed to exert undue influence on an 
advisory committee but at the same time, the Agency wants to let the committee 
know what it’s interests are and the committee wants to know what the Agency’s 
interests are so you have to…you want to have somebody who can handle that sort 
of delicate balance. 
c) NCADAC Membership Balance and Bias 
  Under FACA, the establishing agency is required to submit a balance plan to GSA when the 
request for approval for the advisory committee is accepted. The agency has some discretion about 
what criteria are included in the balance plan and the relative importance of those criteria. However, 
GSA reviews this plan and ultimately approves it. In the case of the NCADAC, a respondent 
indicated that the following criteria were important for balance: 
From what I recall from the NCADAC…I think the first criteria (sic) was expertise, 
scientific expertise in the area of climate and the specific areas of climate that the 
Assessment is looking at. Whether or not they had served on committees before, 
whether they had that experience was part of it, and there’s also some consideration 
given to diversity which involves things like gender, ethnicity, other aspects of 
diversity, so that was sort of a final consideration that was given is there also a mix of 
people with diverse backgrounds who can bring diverse opinions in that respect… 
geographic representation was also important for the NCADAC in particular 




committee who would be able to look at California or the west and be able to serve 
as the experts on climate assessment in the Western United States or the northeast. 
   As discussed above, the NCADAC was initially conceived as a committee that would be 
comprised of approximately 50 members total, but ended up having 60 members. This increase was 
due to the request for nominations announced in the FR in December 2010, which in turn, was 
related to the apparent perception that the initial list of members was not optimally balanced with 
respect to the perspectives of committee members.  
There were internal discussions and concern that it wasn’t as balanced as it could be 
or should be and at that point suggestions were made to add to the membership and 
those suggestions came both to the Federal Register notice and called for 
nominations or self-nominations and from particularly the lead agency NOAA and 
maybe others in the inner circle of politics…but it was the White House and top 
levels of NOAA who came up with additional names. Those nominations were then 
added to or considered and then there was an executive decision made by the co-
chairs and by the top levels of NOAA because it’s a NOAA federal advisory 
committee in terms of who should be on it. So it gets decided at that very, very high 
level but a lot of the leg work of pulling together the best of the best gets done at the 
staff level of the NCA. 
 By the time the bylaws were presented to the NCADAC at its first meeting in April 2011, the 
number of non-federal members had been revised to approximately 40, which is in line with the 
actual number who served on the committee (44). The bylaws make specific mention of the balance 
issue, stating that “to assure a balanced representation of views among preeminent scientists, 
educators, and other experts reflecting the full scope of issues addressed in the National Climate 
Assessment, the committee shall have approximately 40 non-federal members” (USGCRP, 2011a). 
The inclusion of 13 individuals from private sector companies or consulting firms suggests that 
special attention was paid to ensuring that there was both real and perceived balance of views 




First of all there are NGOs represented on the advisory committee and so is 
Monsanto and a bunch of other people. So, I think there was a pretty deliberate and 
pretty successful attempt to have a balance of perspectives in the NCADAC and in 
the Executive Committee.   
Ex officio members would be representatives from the 13 USGCRP agencies as well as the NSTC 
Subcommittee on Global Change Research, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the 
Department of Homeland Security. Ostensibly the participation of individuals from all of these 
agencies was part of an effort to ensure or at least facilitate buy-in to the NCA process by USGCRP 
partners. However, some respondents were concerned about this participation by representatives of 
federal government agencies: 
The ex officio feds are supposed to be independent of the advisory committee. It’s 
not an arm of the government. It’s advice to the government. The feds who are on 
the National Assessment Synthesis team for the first assessment were technical 
experts. But they weren’t there to represent the government. They weren’t there to 
represent their agencies’ interest. But on the NCADAC it may have just been naively 
you know “we want to have the federal government as a stakeholder for this 
assessment”. You know, “we want to have all the stakeholders’ input”. But they 
basically have some of the USGCRP principals, you know the agency representatives 
to the USGCRP – all people in similar positions being put on the NCADAC. These 
people have a tendency to be turf conscious. Their career is engaged not necessarily 
with intellectual honesty, it’s with protecting their agency. 
Ultimately, the concern about ex officio representation related to conflict of interest. According to 
one respondent, “now the NCADAC has members on it whose agencies are funding this study and 
to whom the National Climate Assessment is being delivered. It’s too incestuous. I don’t like it.” 
   The issue of bias among non-federal NCADAC members was not raised by interviewees as a 
concern, at least with respect to members expressing views or pushing for certain agendas because 
of the potential for financial gain. The distal relationship between the NCADAC members’ activities 




established the NCADAC, the committee was interacting most closely with the USGCRP, which 
coordinates the research arms of various federal agencies but does not have a readily apparent direct 
funding mechanism for individual climate scientists (USGCRP, 2014). Further, throughout the 
committee’s existence, it was unclear whether and to what extent the recommendations contained in 
the NCA would be adopted by the government and thus whether any member could stand to 
benefit from additional or new funding for research, for example. 
  However, there is an interesting dynamic with the NCADAC membership given that the 
2014 NCA is the third (or fourth, depending on whether the 2008 assessment is counted as 
complying with the GCRA) climate assessment. Many individuals who served on the NCADAC had 
participated in the previous assessments, either as members of the committees that drafted them or 
as government officials at OSTP or the USGCRP. Interviewees noted that many of the members 
had been involved with climate assessments previously, but the broaching of this subject was not 
attached to concerns that members were biased in any way. In fact, it was just the opposite. 
Participation in previous assessments was viewed as an asset: 
But the same core group has been involved in all of those. And I think as with 
Academy committees they are brought in in part because they have a track record for 
how these things get done. The scientific assessment is a genre of activity. It’s an 
important intellectual creation in the science policy arena over the last several 
decades. It’s not just a state of the science summary. It’s a state of the science in 
terms of the implications for whom the assessment’s being written. It’s a large, 
cumbersome process that involves many inputs, many kinds of interaction. And in 
order to give these things shape they tend to draw on a similar cast of characters. 
Given the timing of when the previous assessments were released – namely under two different 
Democratic administrations (Clinton and Obama), which have a proven track record of putting 
more stock in the science behind climate change assessments and acting on their recommendations 




introduces bias simply because the same perspectives are represented time and again. However, at 
least in the case of the NCADAC, it seems there was a concerted effort to introduce new thinking 
into the committee, as described in the section on Member Selection.   
ii. Managing the NCADAC 
a) NCADAC Staff Support 
  The National Coordinating Office (NCO) of USGCRP had a staff of 12 people dedicated to 
assisting the NCADAC develop the National Climate Assessment. There was additional staff at the 
National Climatic Data Center in Asheville, North Carolina. The volume of work with which this 
staff provided assistance was described as the following: 
It is a very complicated thing that involves lots of different people. We have an 
expert staff, we have about six people here, about 14 people in Asheville and what 
we’ve been doing is helping [the NCADAC] do what they need to do…help them 
with the writing, help them with the workshops…we’ve held 70 workshops in two 
years. We’ve written 14 methodology reports to help people use consistent 
methodologies, we’ve built an information system, we have an online resource for all 
the authors to engage. We’ve facilitated the nomination process for the authors – 
who are not the actual NCADAC authors – the 240 others. So, [there was] all kinds 
of administrative and technical support. 
Funding for the NCA staff was contributed by the USGCRP agencies and the EPA and included 
detailees from NOAA, National Atmospheric and Space Association (NASA), Department of 
Energy (DOE), Department of the Interior (DOI), NSF and USDA. These funds were used for 
ongoing Advisory Committee support, publications, workshops, web support, data architecture, and 
training, among other activities. In addition, each agency provided extra funding to support 
Assessment staff, travel, the review of the NCA by the National Research Council (NRC), and 
contracts for writing/editing, data management and peer review. This commitment to funding the 




funding from the USGCRP agencies was necessary to ensure that the NCA was completed. 
However, the program is not without challenges due to its design. One respondent offered the 
following:  
The USGCRP is a very disaggregated entity. It’s the agencies…there’s no hammer, 
there’s no CEO, there’s no unified budget. It’s a synthesized budget out of the 
budgets of different agencies with different leadership and missions made to look 
like a program. It’s really a composite of many things. The best people in it try to 
make sure that the key things get covered the best they can… 
  Given the sheer volume of work involved with developing the NCA, including the strategic 
planning process which started in 2010, as well as the size of the NCADAC, it seems that a large 
staff was a critical element that facilitated the day-to-day operations of the NCADAC as well as the 
production of the NCA. In the words of one respondent, the staff “ha[s] literally forced all the 
square pegs through the round holes to get everything done.” It remains to be seen whether future 
assessments will require such a large staff given the focus through the NCA 2014 on developing a 
sustained assessment process, precisely to try to avoid having to reinvent the wheel every four years.  
b) NCADAC Organizational Structure: Chair, Vice Chairs, and Executive Secretariat 
  Article 3 of the bylaws specifies that the NCADAC will be governed by one Chair, two Vice-
Chairs, and Article 4 discusses an Executive Secretariat. One respondent noted that the impetus to 
use this structure was the large size of the board: 
And then because that became so big that’s when the decision was made to have the 
smaller executive secretariat. It’s representative. It has academia and so on and so 
forth. It’s obviously much less diverse but by necessity. It needs to function. 
The Chair was appointed by the NOAA Administrator and served as the chief executive officer of 
the NCADAC. His role included general supervision of the NCADAC, including presiding over 




 Liaison - Serving as a liaison with the DFO and staff assigned from NOAA and 
USGCRP;  
 Communication - Maintaining communication with the NCADAC members;  
 Key Issues - Framing questions for deliberation and articulating the scientific dimensions 
of key issues;  
 Tracking Actions - Moderating and chairing deliberations of the NCADAC and tracking 
the actions;  
 Tasks - Assigning tasks to subcommittees within the NCADAC;  
 Results - Summarizing the results of deliberations to produce recommendations and 
articulating the "sense of the group" relative to reaching broad based concurrence; and  
 Presentations - Responding to/ planning for potential presentations at select venues.  
The role of the Vice-Chairs was to serve in the Chair’s stead, should he be unable to act. In fact, the 
Vice-Chairs of the NCADAC played substantial roles in assisting with decision-making, contributing 
to the development of content to be discussed and decided upon at NCADAC meetings, and to the 
drafting of the NCA itself. The Executive Secretariat was to consist of between five and 15 
members to be named by the NOAA Administrator. In fact, there were 10 members of the 
Executive Secretariat. Interestingly, the bylaws note that any meetings of the Executive Secretariat 
would be subject to the same FACA rules that govern the full NCADAC. However, it is not clear 
that this was carried out in practice, because there were no FR announcements of Executive 
Secretariat meetings, nor were minutes of these meetings made available to the public.  
  Aside from the specified duties of the individuals holding these leadership positions, 
respondents noted that the personal character and style of working are critical factors for ensuring 
assessments are completed: 
So there’s kind of a screening process for how people get onto Academy committees 
and these assessment things. And it tends to weed out people who are highly 
idiosyncratic and bring kind of agendas that they’re trying to cram down everyone’s 
throat. People can see in their world of collegiality where the collaborative, collegial 
expertise is. And those kinds of people tend to end up on these. The Academy 
committees might be full of a little bit more academic raw edge, idiosyncrasy types 




staff in choosing these committees. It’s a not well understood, under-appreciated 
role that they play because their job depends on getting these studies done. And so 
they bring in the kind of people who will not gum up the work or run the thing off 
the rails because of personal intellectual style. So I mean that’s one of the guiding 
principles for how these things get set up and operate. Because the process is too 
complicated to accommodate people who aren’t team players.  
c) NCADAC Working Groups 
  Article 4 of the bylaws addressed NCADAC committees, including sub-committees, which 
were considered formal standing bodies under the full NCADAC and thus subject to FACA rules, 
and ad hoc committees, which were temporary but still had to bring their work before the full 
NCADAC. Importantly, ad hoc committees were not subject to FACA rules. The working groups 
created by the NCADAC were considered ad hoc committees. From an operational perspective, this 
meant that any conference calls, meetings, or draft reports or chapters written by the working group 
members did not have to be provided to the public. However, members of the public were 
permitted to request such information under FOIA.  
  At the April 2011 meeting, NCADAC members were asked to complete a form indicating 
the topics to which they would be interested in contributing, and in what capacity. Even at that early 
stage it was clear to members that the topics were really working groups: the form asked members to 
note how they would like to contribute, listing options such as being a leader of a working group or 
a chapter author, among others.  
  Given the size of the NCADAC, and to ensure that the committee delivered the NCA in a 
timely fashion, 15 working groups were formed (Table 6.2) according to the topics that had been 
outlined during the 2010 strategic planning efforts. Each group had one or two leaders, drawn from 
the non-ex-officio members of the NCADAC. There was also “staff support” for each working 




members. Then, in addition, there were “other members” who were not NCADAC committee 
members but staff of government agencies or USGCRP.  
Table 6.2.  NCADAC Working Groups 









and Other Institutions 
Represented by 
Additional Staff 
WG 1 Outline, NCA Strategy, and Federal 
Agency Activities 
2 20 0 N/A 
WG 2 Engagement strategy and requests for 
information 
1 13 0 N/A 
WG 3 Scenarios and regional summaries 1 21 14 DOE, NOAA, NCAR, 
UCSD, NASA, USACE, 
Census, UofA, NPS 
WG 4 Peer review and data 
management/portal 
1 8 1  
WG 5 Request for Information 2 7 0 N/A 
WG 6 Information Quality Assurance 2 8 6 USGCRP, OMB, NOAA 
WG 7 Engagement, Communication, and 
Evaluation 
2 12 1 USGCRP 
WG 8 Regional Coordination 2 15 0 N/A 
WG 9 Sectoral Coordination 2 17 18 USGS, USACE, DOE, 
DOT, USDA, USFS, 
NIH, NOAA, NASA 
WG 10 Science of Climate Change  2 2 14 NOAA, U of SC, LLNL, 
NCAR, LBNL, Texas 
Tech U., Purdue 
WG 11 Agenda for Climate Change Science 2 3 0 N/A 
WG 12 Adaptation and Mitigation 3 16 5 University of Michigan, 
PNNL, DOE, Chevron, 
ORNL 
WG 13 Indicators development and evaluation 3 7 12 Information unavailable 
WG 14 International 1 14 2 USGCRP, DOS 
WG 15 Sustained Process 2 5 0 Information unavailable 
 
  As the NCA was developed, USGCRP staff kept careful track of the progress made by each 
working group. At nearly every meeting, a status update was provided to the NCADAC which 
included whether each working group had its work approved, proposed, or terminated. Each 




approval process involved three steps: approval by the Chairs, then approval by the Executive 
Secretariat, and then approval by the entire NCADAC. The date of each phase of approval was 
recorded. Once the work had been approved by the entire NCADAC, the working group was 
considered “terminated”. The careful tracking of the working groups’ existence was important for 
the NCADAC because the working groups were ad hoc committees not subject to FACA: it was 
critical to document that the groups existed only on a temporary basis to justify and demonstrate in 
a transparent manner adherence to FACA rules and the bylaws.  
iii. Convening the NCADAC 
  The NCADAC met 16 times between April 2011 and May 2014. Seven of these meetings 
were in person meetings and the others were held by conference call. All of the in-person meetings 
were held in the Washington, DC area except for one, which was held in Boulder, Colorado. The 
committee met four times in 2011, five times in 2012, six times in 2013, and twice in 2014. 
 Attendance at the meetings – both those held in person and by conference call – was high because 
there had to be a quorum of members present for the meeting to be held. Initially, the proposal for a 
quorum meant that at least 33 of the 44 voting-eligible21 NCADAC members had to be in 
attendance for the meeting to actually happen, although it was decided that a quorum would be 
reached if 50 percent plus one voting NCADAC member were in attendance (i.e., 23 of the 44 
voting-eligible members). Participation by phone was permitted for inclusion in the quorum but 
email or proxy participation was not permitted. 
a) Setting NCADAC Meeting Agendas 
  Ultimately, the topics discussed at each meeting were determined by the Chair, Vice Chairs, 
and the Executive Secretariat. However, there did not seem to be a lot of latitude in terms of what 
                                                 




issues were discussed given that the committee was held to a very tight schedule for drafting the 
NCA. Thus, at the conclusion of a meeting, it was clear that the issues that would be discussed at the 
next meeting would be those requiring follow-up from the previous meeting. Further, given that 
there was a sub-group of members serving as the committee’s leaders, discussion of issues by other 
members during meetings was rather limited. Agenda items were presented as either “informational” 
or “decisional”. Time was allotted for discussion with both types of agenda items, but at the 
meetings this investigator attended as an observer, there was very little discussion among the 
committee members. 
b) Managing NCADAC Meeting Discussions 
  It took over a year for the NCADAC to make a final decision about how meeting 
discussions would be managed. As noted above, the bylaws presented at the first NCADAC meeting 
held in April 2011 included a section noting that decisions would be made by consensus. This issue 
was raised again at the June 2012 NCADAC meeting, during which a proposal was made to have all 
committee decisions made by consensus and if for some reason it was not possible to reach 
consensus, a vote would be taken of the NCADAC members present, assuming a quorum was 
reached. At the next NCADAC meeting, held in August 2012, the proposal for NCADAC decision-
making had changed: voting was no longer included because it was considered inconsistent with the 
pursuit of consensus, although the proposal to decide issues by consensus remained.  
  Respondents indicated that opting for a consensus-based decision making process is not 
typical for federal advisory committees, and had not been used in previous national climate 
assessments. One respondent noted there are advantages and disadvantages to moving forward with 
any approach: 




might be able to move much more quickly on certain issues. But if that’s the case 
then the question becomes so is it a dictatorial sort of thing? The chair determines 
what you do. Then in that case with 60 members, the NCADAC or a federal 
advisory committee is essentially a show. It’s just a farce. You don’t need that. If you 
do something that is majority based, sort of democratic if you will, and you just go 
with what the majority wants, you may end up with a somewhat less efficient but 
moving forward kind of process but you may lose a lot of people’s trust in the 
process or belief in the outcome if you just sort of drag them along and whatever. So 
potentially there’s quite a fall off of participation or of people feeling like well ‘I 
wasn’t heard’. 
Respondents also indicated that making decisions by consensus was not always easy:  
This is a hierarchical organization. The decision making is all the way to the top. It’s 
not, we are consensus-based officially. I think we’re learning how to do that. I think 
it’s not something we have grown in people’s blood how to do that. It’s not an easy 
process. And so what decisions ultimately get made at the very top and things are 
very heavily influenced by [the Chair]. 
If there had been discussion, debate, or disagreement about issues, those seemed to have occurred in 
advance of the meeting itself. Moreover, the timeframe for both informational and decisional items 
was often very brief: meeting agendas were quite full and there was not much time for discussion. 
One interviewee noted that: 
I felt like the dialogue, the conversation was somewhat…I felt like sometimes it was 
a little bit stiff. But the formal dialogue process – you need to be recognized, and you 
know it maybe that’s a good thing but I sometimes worry that it or you had very 
strict limits. You’re only allowed to talk about this for 15 minutes. I wonder to what 
extent that having a kind of very formal process changes the dynamic and the types 
of results that come out of it. 
It is possible that discussion was limited because committee members were content with the top-
down nature of decision-making or perhaps members did not feel it was worth their time to raise 
issues if they had concerns, given that they knew the Executive Secretariat had such influence over 




consensus-based process delayed the release of draft versions of the report and was tedious for all 
involved. In one instance, one individual was concerned about a draft being released that was not of 
adequate quality. The requirement that decisions be made by consensus meant that USGCRP staff 
had to engage to assist in resolving the dispute about the draft. One respondent described the 
process in the following way: 
It just took a long time and I think to the credit largely of the staff who worked with 
this person and then being the go-between to the relevant authors who were affected 
or the comments were directed…whose text it was directed towards, that was just a 
tedious process and it took a lot of individual meetings. It took a lot of email 
exchanges, it took a lot of working it out. And in my view actually the most 
constructive process in this regard was to come up with alternative wording so that 
the reviewer could say, ‘yes I can live with that, no I can’t’. So it wasn’t just ‘no this 
doesn’t work’ but it was to come up with alternatives so we could move forward. 
And it ultimately ended up delaying the report by a few months but I think like I said 
ultimately probably to a better end. 
 The second instance of the consensus-based process causing delays happened when the NCADAC 
was deciding whether to keep comments received during the 90 day public comment period 
anonymous.  
People who are particularly experienced in IPCC where you see the name of the 
commenter, they basically felt it helps them a lot in helping to get a better feeling for 
where is this person coming from, and that helps them give a response, you know, 
and make the appropriate or not appropriate adjustment. And some other ones of us 
felt that’s precisely the problem. Knowing who someone is should not color how 
you respond. You should take the thing at the face value and take it seriously and 
professionally, and politely respond no matter who it is who said it, whether it comes 
from a kindergartner or a climate skeptic or your grandmother or your dearest 
colleague in your field. It shouldn’t matter. And so in the end that is what we agreed 
upon: that the reviewer identity will only be made available along with the comment 
and our responses at the very end. 
  Overall, it seemed respondents – even those who initially preferred to handle comments in 




and legitimacy of the peer review process.  
2. RESEARCH QUESTION 2: TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE THEORETICAL DISCONNECT  
  BETWEEN THE LITERATURE ON THE HEALTH POLICY PROCESS AND THE LITERATURE ON  
  EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY HAVE EMPIRICAL SUPPORT? 
  As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the traditional model of the policy process assumes that 
policymaking is inherently linear, with policymakers engaged at each stage as rational actors. The 
push for policy to be more evidence-based or even evidence-informed relies heavily on these 
assumptions. Critics suggest these assumptions are flawed and argue that any call for policy to be 
evidence-based ignores the reality of the policy process, including that it is inherently irrational and 
political. This case study provides an opportunity to assess whether this disconnect has any bearing 
in practice. Overall, the evidence suggests that at times, the disconnect does bear out in practice, but 
at other times, it does not. There is support for a number of the different theories of the policy 
process as well as different models of the research-policy relationship.  
  The inherent assumption of the step-wise or cyclical models of the policy process is that 
policymaking occurs in a series of stages and that policymakers are capable of making rational 
decisions at each stage. With respect to the use of research findings or evidence, an implication of 
these models is that a problem is defined, and research is conducted which then informs the policy 
solution to that problem. Findings from the in-depth interviews suggest that there is support for 
these assertions, although in an attenuated fashion. Research was not commissioned by USGCRP 
expressly for the NCADAC to use as an input into the NCA, so in that sense, the ability to attribute 
policy change to research findings is difficult.  
  In terms of models of the research-policy relationship, the example of the NCADAC and 
the NCA provides support for some models and not for others. There is moderate support for the 




applying empirical evidence directly to a specific policy issue, which is then resolved because the gap 
in knowledge is filled (Weiss, 1979). To date, the numerous policy issues in the climate change arena 
have not been resolved even though two major assessments – the 2014 NCA and the 5th IPCC 
report – were released close together and have similar findings. However, the intention of these 
reports was to fill a gap in knowledge about the state of climate change in both the US and globally. 
Presumably, if the recommendations contained in the reports were acted upon by policymakers, 
then we would observe improvements in the problems caused by global warming, albeit over a 
lengthy period of time.  
  In contrast, there is strong support for the linkage and exchange model, which suggests that 
when the interface among researchers, policymakers, research funders and knowledge purveyors – 
all of whom are stakeholders involved with the NCADAC – is strong, research will be used (Lomas, 
2000). However, in the case of the NCADAC and the 2014 NCA, respondents generally agreed that 
the interface among relevant stakeholders was not as strong as it could be, but that with a stronger 
interaction, national climate assessments could be far more useful for policymakers.  
In other words it’s interactive. It has to be interactive. The report is almost an artifact 
of the interaction. It’s in the interaction that people will get smart and have their 
thinking shaped. Then it’ll be ‘oohhh’. You know. ‘We need to do this here in 
Seattle’. You know? People in the mayor’s office, a light bulb will go off if we spend 
enough time talking with people at the University of Washington who know about 
this stuff. So, it’s that, I think. It’s not the report. But I’m not sure that a FACA is 
really set up to quite engage in that kind of sustained dialogue. It has to come to 
grips with management. Not keep management at arms-length. If you’re going to do 
decision support you have to think like management and management has to think a 
little bit more like scientists. 
One way this interface occurs is when policymakers ask researchers for advice on pressing policy 
problems and researchers aim to provide solutions. Given that a national climate assessment is 




request advice on particular issues related to climate change. Although, the strategic planning 
process that began in 2010 sought the input of officials around the country at various levels of 
government and the 2014 NCA content was developed from these inputs. Thus, perhaps with 
continued engagement through the sustained assessment process emphasized by the NCADAC, this 
interface could be strengthened. One respondent provided support for this by stating the following: 
You need somehow an ongoing process in which the relevant scientific, engineering, 
technical, and economic expertise is brought together in an ongoing interaction with 
people who have management responsibilities in various areas, whether it’s 
transportation infrastructure, water infrastructure, local government, or coastal zone 
management. And they need to learn how to talk to each other. So that the decision 
makers can get – they don’t have to become scientists but they have to learn enough 
to figure out what they can potentially get from the experts and the experts have to 
be able to put themselves in the shoes of management...But it needs to be interactive. 
It can’t just be delivering a report. The production of the reports periodically, if done 
properly, should be done in the context of establishing that interaction…The report 
itself can’t do that but the process that can be initiated in the production of…specific 
papers, specific workshops, specific consultative relationships.  
 The general utilization theory model posits that there must be a change in social context which 
leads to a change in policy issues for policymakers and researchers to interact (Nutley, 2007). It 
could be argued that the change in the Administration and its new approach to using data to inform 
policy was a change in social context that allowed certain policy issues to be brought to the fore, 
which were then discussed by the NCADAC and included in the NCA. Further, the NCADAC 
“adapted, recreated, [and] transformed” the science behind climate change into information that was 
more easily digestible for policymakers (Nutley, 2007, p.100). However, as discussed in the next 
section, some respondents were skeptical of the extent to which the Obama Administration is truly 
comfortable with climate change science. 
  The two communities’ model, which is based on the premise that policymakers rarely use 




has strong support. Perhaps because of the variety of levels of government (i.e., federal, state, local) 
involved in policies related to climate change, and more specifically, that could take action as a result 
of the findings of the NCA, there are more opportunities for policymakers to use research – or not 
– relative to a policy issue that was focused on only one level of government (e.g., the state level). 
Respondents recognized that challenges in using research exist on both the “supply” (i.e., 
scientist/researcher) side and the “demand” side (i.e., policymaker/manager): 
The problem is not just that the advice is irrelevant because it doesn’t go far enough, 
it’s that the receiving end doesn’t know what to with the good advice they get 
sometimes. It’s a double-edged problem. 
Further, respondents discussed the need for researchers to provide policymakers with information 
that could be used to support their decision-making efforts. Until assessments like the NCA re-
orient their approach toward this concept decision support, respondents felt there would be minimal 
utility of such massive efforts: 
It was intellectually fascinating but it’s not decision support. There’s something 
missing. It’s written by academics. They don’t understand the world of federal 
management budget and program. They don’t understand the world of infrastructure 
engineers. They don’t understand the world of mayor’s offices. It’s not decision 
support. 
In contrast, there is little support for the enlightenment model, which suggests that policy is not 
changed due to the findings of a specific study but rather because general ideas rooted in research 
almost unconsciously enter the policy sphere, and the knowledge-driven model, which suggests that 
basic research provides an opportunity for applied research to assess whether the initial findings are 
relevant for practical application (Weiss, 1979). 
  Findings from this case study support the assumption proposed in Chapter 2: the linkage 




a strong interface between policymakers and researchers is needed for research use to occur, and 
that this interface can be strengthened through a sustained assessment process and a re-framing of 
how the NCA is presented.  
3. RESEARCH QUESTION 3: HOW DO FACS FACILITATE AND IMPEDE THE USE OF EVIDENCE  
  BY POLICYMAKERS? 
  Respondents indicated that the NCADAC facilitates the use of evidence in part because the 
members help to distill the data and science behind climate change for policymakers and other 
decision-makers. One respondent focused specifically on how advisory committees benefit the 
agencies which establish them: 
I think because they’re experts in a particular field what they do for the Agency is go 
through the publications – not data specifically – but more…because they’re 
scientists they’re familiar with the data, they’re familiar with the publications, they’re 
maybe familiar with the implications of those publications and that information 
might have, and they try and look at it holistically, they try and filter it sort of 
through the whole…any controversies that might exist and try to arrive at some 
recommendations. 
Others recognized the unique composition of the NCADAC, in terms of having representatives 
from a variety of sectors, as being helpful: 
[The NCADAC] help[s] bring the best science as well as the types of questions that 
might be asked especially when you have an advisory board that includes people 
from industry and the private sector. People who might be making decisions from 
utilities or whatever it might be, they can help say what those questions are. And 
really help to explain what science might be needed to answer those questions. And 
so the advisory committee can help set the space that a scientific report might 
inform. 
Another respondent noted that NCADAC members can be “ambassadors of the work of their 
committee and the work of the program and the federal agencies…back to their communities.” 




stakeholder engagement strategy it used throughout the development of the 2014 NCA. One 
respondent noted that: 
By having this much broader network, this grass roots component to the assessment, 
is the thing that will generate insight into what is going on really in each of the 
regions and sectors by having by design and by intention two-step communication 
between say us and say the planning association or the American Society for Civil 
Engineers or the…public health folks. Their constituencies will hear it from their 
mother organization. They already believe. So it’s not then coming from us directly, 
like who the hell are we, but a bunch of planners around the country, but it’ll come 
from the APA. So, by design we’re trying to build a process and a network of 
partners who can take this much further. So it has a chance to be influential both 
symbolically, to create political pressure, but also in concrete ways with all of the 
information that has gone into the assessment to actually help shape policy 
documents at lower levels of government or in the private sector or whatever. 
Another respondent noted that from a process perspective, “you have multiple instances of review 
and transparency…so that there [are] multiple opportunities to bring the attention of the advisory 
committee when the authors meet, whatever, that there is other information out there.” 
  In terms of impeding the use of evidence, respondents noted that the selection of members 
can have a substantial effect on the quality and utility of the advice provided.  “I mean often people 
just go for the big names not the people who have on the ground experience or really understand 
decision making.” Similarly, another respondent noted that “there are a lot of standing scientific 
advisory boards where I don’t think the advisors know very much about what they’re advising on. 
They’re smart, they’re experts, but they actually don’t know how the agencies functions. And so their 
advice isn’t very useful.” Finally, respondents noted the role of the agency in how useful the advisory 
committee is, indicating that “resources are not always fully used because agencies control what they 






B. Aim 2: Contribution of Contextual Factors to Adoption of 2014 NCA 
Recommendations 
  Participants identified three different contexts that were considered important contributors 
to whether the recommendations contained in the 2014 NCA would be adopted. Within the 
government, respondents identified the White House, and more specifically, President Obama, as 
key influencers on the lifespan of the 2014 NCA recommendations. One respondent acknowledged 
that part of the success is “the right people being in leadership, alignment with the objectives of the 
Administration, you know there are a lot of things that play into this. The timing of the release of 
the document22 relative to the President’s election wasn’t really able to be anticipated.” Another 
respondent saw the timing of the release of the draft NCA for public comment as more calculated:  
They decided to release [the draft NCA for public comment] after the election which 
in my view is just as much a political decision as putting it out before. The difference 
is that the one is more likely to catalyze a discussion about climate change at a critical 
point in our political process and the other one was intended to make sure that that 
didn’t happen. And that’s exactly what happened. Nobody talked about climate 
change. It’s partly because these guys chose, I believe for political reasons, to defer 
the report until after the election.  
It is unclear exactly why the decision was made to release the draft report after the election. In the 
context of discussing the role of the political climate on the potential uptake of the 2014 NCA, other 
respondents mentioned the President’s level of comfort with discussing climate change, institutional 
barriers, and the need to control the message coming out of the assessment to ensure it aligns with 
the Administration’s position.  
  One respondent indicated that although “Obama is clearly totally uncomfortable talking 
about climate change… at least [he’s] not suppressing it.” In addition, respondents indicated that: 
The people on the policy side have agendas running... they don’t want an assessment 
                                                 




to say things that are fundamentally cross-wise with Administration policy. They’re 
hoping for something from the committee that will give a boost, to what they’re 
trying to do, essentially. Not just intellectual help but [a] programmatic, political 
boost of some kind. 
The need for this “boost” may come from the fact that, as one respondent indicated, “the 
government doesn’t seem to be able to do what everybody would intellectually acknowledge what 
the government should be doing. Because institutionally it’s just too hard.” The institutional 
environment in this case also refers to Congress, which is technically the recipient of any national 
climate assessments under the GCRA. However, respondents were not optimistic that the 2014 
NCA would be well-received:  
If you consider [who] is our primary audience and who we are supposed to advise, 
we are advising a federal government, or I should say a Congress who could not care 
less about climate change. Or some portions could care less. And it is incredibly 
difficult to imagine, for me anyway, that we will see climate legislation coming out of 
that particular report or following our release of the report anytime soon. 
Several respondents discussed the importance of climate change for the average American citizen. 
While the American public is not formally a recipient of the 2014 NCA, nearly all respondents 
indicated their interest in contributing to the NCA so that it would not only reach but also be 
meaningful for citizens living in urban and rural areas alike across the United States.  
There’s a real demand now all around the country for what the hell is going on with the climate. 
“What does it mean for me, how am I going to run my business if power is going to get interrupted 
every six months or every year or if the railroad gets washed out by a flood” or whatever.  
  These findings suggest that the two contextual factors that have the most influence over 
whether the recommendations contained in the 2014 NCA are adopted are the political 
environments in the executive and legislative branches and demand by average American citizens for 




C. Aim 3: Stakeholder Engagement with the NCADAC 
  When this study was initially conceived, the third aim was developed based on the 
investigator’s assumption that there was a vibrant civil society community actively lobbying and 
advocating for certain policies in the climate change arena and that these groups would be actively 
engaging in efforts to influence the proceedings and outcomes of the NCADAC. In addition, in the 
absence of knowledge about how the advisory committees functioned and the dynamics between 
the committees and their establishing agencies, it was assumed that advisory committee members 
themselves served almost as lobbyists, in addition to science advisors, in their capacity as committee 
members.  
  However, after conducting the first few interviews for this case study and attending 
NCADAC meetings as an observer, it became clear that there was little civil society engagement 
with the NCADAC through formal channels mandated under FACA legislation, that civil society 
engagement with the NCADAC was highly structured and organized, that the committee members 
took their role as science advisors quite seriously, and largely set personal agendas aside. Thus, the 
research questions originally defined for the third aim quickly seemed less relevant than originally 
anticipated. Instead, it became clear that there was a far more nuanced dynamic occurring between 
civil society and the NCADAC involving primarily informal mechanisms of communication. 
Further, the informal communication that was occurring was influenced heavily by already-existing 
and long-standing personal relationships. Finally, it was apparent that the mechanism built into 
FACA for engagement with the public – the mandatory public comment period held at FACA 
committee meetings – was ineffective. Chapter 7 will address these issues across the two case 
studies. 
  With support from USGCRP staff, the NCADAC developed and implemented a 




Importantly, this engagement strategy was not required by FACA but rather was an initiative initially 
proposed by USGCRP. The rationale for this effort was based on the view that the NCA was more 
than just a report, but rather was a process that was laying the groundwork to sustain the NCA 
effort over time so that future assessments could be conducted more easily and without such a 
massive investment in human and financial resources. In the words of one respondent: 
There has been a design to this engagement strategy from the beginning and part of 
it has been trying to pull in from the whole country the on-the-ground knowledge to 
be synthesized with the central scientific findings of the US Government. And it’s 
just a different vision from I think how…everybody’s always thought stakeholders 
are important. Stakeholders should help frame the question. We need to know what 
stakeholders want to know. We need to know what’s important to them, we need to 
know what’s relevant. Most scientists say that. And they think the way you do that is 
to have a meeting with them, and they tell you what they want, and you go off and 
do whatever the hell you were going to do anyway. And that’s stakeholder 
engagement. 
  The stakeholder engagement effort was referred to as NCAnet (National Climate 
Assessment Network). The concept behind the effort was to have a “network of networks” by 
engaging partner organizations which would assist USGCRP and the NCADAC in disseminating the 
2014 NCA and ultimately, stay involved to sustain the assessment process. A FR notice announced 
the creation of NCAnet and invited organizations to submit expressions of interest. Organizations 
could participate at four different levels of engagement and level of effort. In decreasing order of 
engagement, these levels were sustained process partners, contributing partners, communication 
partners, and federal partners.  
  Respondents described several benefits to the NCAnet, including that it was helpful because 
it allowed people who were not NCADAC members to engage with the process in an official way. 
In addition, respondents perceived that participating in NCAnet provided access to information that 




…that’s part of what’s driving people to NCAnet.” Finally, others indicated that there is a mutually 
beneficial effect of interactions between the NCADAC members and non-scientists in that it 
“causes you know the dissemination of knowledge to be much broader.” 
  Other respondents had different views. One respondent noted that the communications 
process with stakeholders was so controlled that it inhibited civil society and NCAnet members 
from being as helpful as they could otherwise be: 
So I tried to get people from very early on engaged in the NCADAC process which 
turned out to be very, very difficult, more difficult than I thought, because they were 
really not into that…for all the lip service that they give to public engagement and so 
on, they really don’t, they want it to be on their terms. Just like with this report, you 
know, they want it to come out when they want it to be out and they don’t want it to 
be out before then if they’re legally required to have it out before then.  
Others felt that the communications process through NCAnet was disorganized and as above, 
lacking in information: 
But what’s plagued us with the NCAnet was a lack of information, like we don’t 
know what’s going on and they don’t know what’s going on either because the 
process is so kind of disjointed. So we’ve constantly felt like we were being 
blindsided, you know, this report comes out all of a sudden. 
  Aside from the unique effort to engage stakeholders through NCAnet, there were the 
required FR notices and public comment periods at NCADAC meetings. The key finding from this 
research related to stakeholder engagement with the NCADAC through these formal channels 
mandated by FACA is the lack thereof. Respondents in all categories of interviewees expressed 
surprise at how little interaction there was between civil society – especially NGOs and advocacy 
groups working on climate change – and the NCADAC. This seems to be due in part to the fact 
that the NCADAC meetings were not widely publicized. While FACA requires that the meetings are 




awareness about the occurrence of an SAB meeting, respondents indicated that they felt that 
attending the meetings were not worth their time. The only opportunity to comment on NCADAC 
proceedings is during the FACA-mandated public comment period that is only 10 minutes long and 
scheduled at the end of each day. However, neither of these opportunities for engagement was 
viewed as being very useful or productive. One respondent indicated that: 
Very few people read Federal Register notices. So, the affected parties almost never 
know about these actual meetings. Secondly, the public comment part of it in my 
experience has mostly not been useful and I don’t think it’s taken very seriously. I 
think it does provide access to information for people who have lobbyists and more, 
you know, are sort of in the know and happen to live in Washington but there are 
lots of affected parties who could engage more usefully. 
VII. Findings from Document Review: Issues and Recommendations in the 2014 
NCA 
A. NCA 2014 Development Process 
  As described above, the GCRA mandates that every four years, a National Climate 
Assessment be issued to the President and Congress that: 
integrates, evaluates, and interprets the findings of the USGCRP; analyzes the effects 
of global change on the natural environment, agriculture, energy production and use, 
land and water resources, transportation, human health and welfare, human social 
systems, and biological diversity; and analyzes current trends in global change, both 
human-induced and natural, and projects major trends for the subsequent 25 to 100 
years (U. S. G. C. R. Program, 2014). 
The overarching goal of the NCA process was to enhance the ability of the United States to 
anticipate, mitigate, and adapt to changes in the global environment, with the recognition that these 
changes are increasingly due to human activity.  
  This case study focuses on the NCADAC and its role in the policy process as well as in 




working groups, and organizational structure have been discussed at length above. An additional 
role of the NCADAC in drafting the NCA was to select two to three convening lead authors, 
approximately six lead authors for each chapter, as well as contributing authors based on criteria that 
included expertise, experience, geography, and ensuring a variety of perspectives. Authors 
represented the public and private sectors, non-governmental organizations, and universities and 
served on a volunteer basis. To be clear, NCADAC members served as chapter authors in a variety 
of capacities, but the majority of the 240 NCA authors were not NCADAC members. 
  In collaboration with the NCADAC, there were several other critical entities which played a 
role in the process of developing the 2014 NCA (Figure 6.4). The organizational structure of 
USGCRP is explained by Figure 6.1. Thus, the following discussion focuses on the portion of Figure 
6.4 which is below the USGCRP box. The Interagency NCA Working Group (INCA), comprised of 
representatives of 13 government agencies, plus additional agencies that supported the NCA 
activities, coordinated, developed, and implemented interagency activities for the NCA. The NCA 
Coordination Office was a part of the USGCRP National Coordination Office in Washington, D.C. 
With support and funding from an interagency agreement with the University Corporation for 
Atmospheric Research (UCAR), a team of UCAR staff and federal detailees with expertise in 
planning, writing, and coordinating collaborative climate and environmental science and policy 
activities provided support for the development of the NCA report and sustained assessment. The 
NOAA-funded NCA Technical Support Unit (TSU) provided climate science research, data 
management, web design, graphic design, technical and scientific writing and editing, publication 
production, and meeting support. NCAnet, discussed above, consisted of more than 100 partner 
organizations that worked with the NCA Coordination Office, NCADAC, report authors, and 






Figure 6.4. Organization of NCA Components 
 
   
  The engagement strategy developed by the NCADAC and the NCA Coordination Office 
outlined several processes for participation, outreach, communication, and education to help make 
the NCA process and products accessible and useful to a wide variety of audiences (Figure 6.5). As 
part of the assessment process, a series of 14 process workshops were held across the country to 
provide updates on the NCA process, solicit broad input from subject matter experts, and collect 
feedback on the approach, topics, and methodologies under consideration. These workshops were 
separate from those conducted during the strategic planning period in 2010.  
  In addition, in July 2011, NOAA issued a FR notice requesting “expressions of interest from 
the public in providing technical inputs and/or offering assessment capacity on topics related to 




This request resulted in the submission of more than 500 technical input documents authored by 
more than 800 individuals from academia, industry, and government, including 25 technical inputs 
sponsored by USGCRP agencies. Further, the TSU climate science team developed nine peer-
reviewed regional climate scenario documents (one for each of the eight regions and one for the 
contiguous United States), which provided a scientific consensus view of historical climate trends 
and projections.  
  Beginning in December 2011, the chapter author teams met multiple times by phone, web, 
and in person to produce and refine drafts of their chapters. These meetings were not subject to 
FACA and thus were not announced in the FR and were not open to the public. The NCADAC 
reviewed the draft NCA and then released it in draft form on January 13, 2013 for public comment. 
Concurrently, the NCA underwent an independent expert review by the NRC. The public review 
period closed on April 12, 2013 at which point 4,161 comments from 644 government, non-profit, 
and commercial sector employees, educators, students, and the general public had been received. 
Chapter author teams and the NCADAC revised the draft NCA and prepared written responses to 
each comment received. External reviewers evaluated the adequacy of the responses to the 
comments on each chapter.  






As the result of a NCADAC consensus decision, the entire review process was “blind”: NCADAC 
members and authors did not know the identity of commenters when responding to each comment. 
The NRC provided a second review of the report which was considered in developing a final draft 
for submission to federal agencies in Fall 2013. Any adjustments to the NCADAC’s Fall 2013 draft 
as a result of the government review process were made with the chapter authors’ approval, and the 
NCADAC approved the Third NCA Report in Spring 2014.  
1. NCA 2014 AND HUMAN HEALTH 
  The chapter of the NCA 2014 that addressed human health was drafted by a total of 16 
authors. The two convening lead authors were affiliated with the CDC and the National Resources 
Defense Council and the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University (one of the 
authors had a joint appointment at the latter two institutions). The remaining authors were affiliated 
with institutions ranging from other government agencies (e.g., USDA) to universities to private 
companies (Luber, 2014).  
  The chapter has four key messages, which can be summarized broadly by the following 
(Luber, 2014): 
1. Climate change affects human health and well-being in a variety of ways.  
2. The risk for health effects are not uniform across the US population: some groups, such as 
the elderly, children, the sick, the poor, and some communities of color are more 
vulnerable. 
3. Public health preparedness and prevention efforts can be effective to protect people from 
the impacts of climate change. 
4. The response to climate change must be multi-sectoral. This type of response has societal 
benefits beyond improving human health. 
At first glance, these messages seem comprehensive. But upon a deeper reading, there are some 




particularly with respect to the first message. The chapter focuses on several key causes of human 
health problems related to climate change, namely decreased air quality due to air pollution, 
allergens, and wildfires, (warm) temperature extremes, precipitation extremes leading to heavy 
rainfall, flooding, and drought, and diseases that are vector-, food-, and water-borne. The chapter 
also notes that climate change can compromise food security and mental health.  
  What the chapter fails to note is the mediating role of the economic or financial impact of 
climate events and human health. As was observed with Hurricane Katrina, extreme weather events 
(especially wildfires, drought, and flooding), can destroy not only the houses that lie in the path of 
the storm but also crops, farms, and other sources of income for households and communities. 
Depending on the income level and assets of those who have been affected, such destruction can 
force households to make a choice between using scarce resources to re-build the physical 
infrastructure that was destroyed or to pay for needed healthcare, among other things.  
  In the development economics and global health financing literature, there is evidence that 
suggests health “shocks”, such as a sudden illness, push households without full medical insurance 
coverage into poverty or deeper into poverty because of the large medical expenditures incurred and 
that the borrowing and/or selling assets is a common way for households to “cope” with such 
events (Amponsah, 2015). An economic shock such as home loss or crop loss due to an extreme 
weather event among uninsured or under-insured Americans could have a similar effect on their 
medical expenditures: the large out-of-pocket expenses incurred to repair or rebuild could leave 
households with little, if any, disposable income to pay for medical care. Importantly, the lack of 
insurance for Americans could refer to both a lack of homeowner’s or renter’s insurance as well as a 
lack of medical insurance.  
  While the chapter acknowledges that the poor are at higher risk for health problems 




defined as problematic because of the combined effect of limited resources and a large number of 
pre-existing health conditions. Although the effect of floods, wildfires, or hurricanes on human 
health via constrained resources may be attenuated, the human health chapter of the NCA 2014 
could have acknowledged the possibility that such a pattern could occur, at a minimum. 
  The chapter stops short of making explicit recommendations for actions that can be taken to 
prevent and prepare for climate change as a way to protect human health in its discussion of the 
third message, but it does provide the example of the numerous beneficial health effects of reducing 
carbon pollution. Immediate effects, such as improved air quality, and long-term effects, such as a 
reduction in obesity rates (noted as resulting from increased used of more active transport methods 
such as biking and walking), are mentioned as benefits to reducing carbon pollution. Interestingly, 
one of the two primary components of President Obama’s Climate Action plan is the EPA’s Clean 
Power Plan, which proposes new pollution standards for power plants which will “protect the health 
of our children”, according to the White House (The White House, 2014). Although this plan was 
announced just weeks after the release of the 2014 NCA, there is no indication from publicly-
available information that the plan was formed in response to the NCA. Indeed, the Clean Power 
Plan was an initiative that had been in progress long before the NCA was released (EPA, 2014). It is 
possible that the NCA, as it was being drafted, informed the Clean Power Plan, but it is not possible 
to attribute the Plan to the messages contained in the NCA. 
VIII. Conclusion 
  The political context of how previous NCAs were treated under the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations – namely the legal challenges which alleged that one or more of the laws governing 
how federal advisory committees are supposed to operate and/or how committee reports are to be 




background of the NCADAC and the PEPFAR SAB. This history seems to have had an impact on 
nearly every aspect of the NCADAC’s operations as an advisory committee, including how the 
committee was structured, how meetings were convened and managed, how decisions were made 
about managing the writing, editing, and revisions of the NCA, and how stakeholders were engaged. 
Essentially, the NCADAC and USGCRP staff were committed to ensuring that all decisions and 
actions taken were transparent and well-documented to mitigate the likelihood of a possible legal 
challenge once the NCA was released.  
  Although the motivating factor for taking these measures to ensure transparency ultimately 
was fear of another lawsuit, the default byproducts were beneficial for any individual interested in 
tracking the operational and substantive decisions taken by the NCADAC regarding how it would 
function and also how the NCA would be developed. More specifically, there is a user-friendly and 
comprehensive record available online of all NCADAC meetings, including agendas, meeting 
minutes, and copies of the documents that were discussed by the committee. In addition, the 
emphasis on maintaining transparency through the public comment period of the NCA resulted in a 
record of what comments were received and how they were addressed, as noted above. Similarly, the 
online version of the final 2014 NCA has hyperlinks to all of the original sources of data used for 
charts, figures, and data presented in the text, referred to as “traceable accounts”.  
  The NCADAC and the NCA 2014 benefited from an investment in the strategic planning 
efforts undertaken in 2010 as well as in substantial staff support throughout the NCADAC’s 
existence, both of which seem to have been critical inputs to the NCADAC’s successful delivery of 
the 2014 NCA. The strategic planning process conducted during 2010 allowed USGCRP to present 
the NCADAC at their first meeting in April 2011 with a draft outline of the NCA as well as a draft 
plan for the working groups needed to divide the writing and communications tasks among 




able to start substantive operations immediately by reacting to the draft outline rather than spending 
months coming to consensus about what content the NCA should include. The staff support 
provided to the NCADAC facilitated the smooth implementation, management, and administration 
of NCADAC processes and meetings.  
  NCADAC together with USGCRP developed an extensive strategy to engage with 
concerned stakeholders by creating NCAnet, but challenges remained for meaningful interaction and 
exchange with the NCADAC itself. The public comment period was under-utilized and the 
stipulations of FACA law regarding when reports should be made public proved frustrating to 
government and NGO staff alike.  
  While the NCADAC was created for the primary purpose of drafting the NCA, which is an 
objective that is quite different than the PEPFAR SAB, there are a number of similarities between 





 CHAPTER 7 : CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
I. Introduction 
  Chapters 5 and 6 provided a detailed analysis of the themes within each case study. This 
chapter presents an analysis of the major themes across the two case studies. This approach is typical 
for research with a multiple-case study design (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). As noted in Chapter 4, the 
goal for multiple case study design research is literal replication (producing similar results across case 
studies) and theoretical replication (producing different results but for predictable reasons) (Yin, 
2009). 
  The risk in aggregating results across multiple cases is oversimplification and 
misinterpretation of the findings and loss of the uniqueness and complexity of each individual case 
(Khan & VanWynsberghe, 2008a; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In addition, there is the potential that 
the contextual richness of each individual case will be lost, although the literature acknowledges that 
some loss of contextual detail in a cross-case comparison is permissible and consistent with the goals 
of a cross-case analysis, namely to identify themes across cases (Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003). 
Cross case analyses have been referred to as “essentially a ‘decontextualization and 
recontextualization’ of cases” (Tesch, 1990). Thus, the approach to analyzing data across the 
PEPFAR and NCADAC case studies deserves careful consideration.   
  The literature suggests there are two approaches to a cross-case analysis (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). A variable-oriented approach focuses on the variables across cases rather than on the case 
itself. For example, a variable-oriented approach is akin to reading a table of quantitative data 
vertically, by column, so that the relationship between one independent variable is assessed relative 
to the outcome of interest. In contrast, a case-oriented approach would read a table of quantitative 




subject (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In addition, the number of cases for comparison in a variable-
oriented approach is high, and the cases should be similar to each other to foster generalizations. 
Case-oriented approaches allow for fewer cases for comparison and permit the comparison of cases 
that are seemingly very different (Khan & VanWynsberghe, 2008b). This chapter employs a case-
oriented approach and more specifically, uses replication logic as noted in Chapter 4, which is 
consistent with Yin. 
II. Cross-Case Findings 
  Just as Chapters 5 and 6 followed a similar organizational structure to facilitate comparison 
in this chapter, the cross-case findings presented here are organized according to the same general 
structure. First, background characteristics that are critical to the two cases are compared and 
contrasted, including the difference between the two cases in the amount of experience government 
agency staff had with implementing a FACA committee, the politically-charged nature of both 
climate change and HIV/AIDS science and the perspective of those issues in the Bush and Obama 
Administrations, and finally, key features of the charters and member selection for each committee. 
Following the comparison of major background characteristics, findings across the two case studies 
are presented by aim and research question. Conclusions and a discussion of the transferability of 
the cross-case findings to other FACs are provided at the end of the chapter.  
A. Comparison of Key Background Characteristics of the PEPFAR SAB and the 
NCADAC 
1. INFLUENCE OF PRIOR EXPERIENCE IMPLEMENTING FACA COMMITTEES 
  One major difference between the PEPFAR SAB and the NCADAC was that the PEPFAR 
SAB was the first FACA committee established by OGAC. In contrast, while the NCADAC as 




(or four, depending on how they are counted) previous FACA committees charged with developing 
a national climate assessment. Moreover, many of the individuals involved with the NCADAC had 
been involved in some capacity with each NCA since the GCRA was passed, although some 
switched employers (e.g., moving from government to a research institution or government to civil 
society). The experiences these individuals had provided a wealth of institutional memory about the 
potential challenges the NCADAC and the 2014 NCA could face.  
  The awareness of and concern for legal challenges once the NCA was released seemed to 
permeate nearly every element of the NCADAC’s operational decisions. Transparency of committee 
proceedings and compliance with FACA were considered to be of utmost importance. In and of 
themselves, emphasizing transparency and ensuring the committee was compliant with the law are 
important and should be a part of every FACA committee’s priorities. The critical point with the 
NCADAC is that it took special measures to mitigate the possibility of a future legal challenge. 
  For OGAC, establishing a FACA committee was a novel endeavor for all involved. Once 
Ambassador Goosby decided he wanted a group of science advisors external to the government, 
OGAC staff had to rely on several different Bureaus at the State Department to guide them through 
the process of implementing the SAB. This should not be considered unusual: it is reasonable to 
expect that any agency that establishes a FACA committee for the first time would need a 
substantial amount of assistance throughout the process. However, the lack of experience of OGAC 
staff and PEPFAR SAB members with FACA committees had several interesting implications for 
how the SAB was implemented, managed, and convened. These issues are discussed in depth below 
in Section i.a under the first research question. Thus, the operational elements of the PEPFAR SAB 
like the NCADAC, were heavily influenced by the lack of and wealth of prior experience, 
respectively, that its stakeholders had with establishing a FACA committee. 




memory of NCADAC stakeholders, on the one hand, and the relative lack thereof among the 
PEPFAR SAB stakeholders, on the other, is remarkable not only because of how divergent the two 
case studies are in this area, but also because in spite of this difference, there are a number of 
important similarities across the two cases.  
2. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF HIV/AIDS AND CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE  
  Each case study briefly discussed some of the key issues and questions in the scientific arena 
for HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment and climate change, respectively. While the subject 
matter addressed by each advisory committee could not be more different, there are some 
interesting commonalities between how the science addressed by the NCADAC and the PEPFAR 
SAB have been politically charged issues.  
  Both global warming and HIV/AIDS, along with many other science-based issues, were met 
with substantial skepticism during the Bush Administration. While the complexity of the Bush 
Administration’s treatment of science falls outside the scope of this research, the overarching 
political context of how the issues under the purview of the PEPFAR SAB and the NCADAC 
provides relevant background information for both case studies, as previously discussed in Chapters 
5 and 6. There were – and still are – factions that question the causes of global warming. This 
skepticism was at the root of the legal challenges to previous national climate assessments. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the primary aim of the legal challenges was to discredit the assessments by 
questioning the validity of the science on which they were based. The measures taken by the 
NCADAC to ensure transparency during the process of drafting the NCA and incorporating 
comments from the public review period were implemented to provide legitimacy and credibility to 
the NCA. While the cause of HIV/AIDS was not questioned by policymakers in the Bush 




aligned with scientific consensus, as discussed in Chapter 5.  
  The transition to the Obama Administration signaled a new perspective on the role of 
science in public policy on many issues, HIV/AIDS and climate change included. Respondents in 
both case studies noted the importance of the broad policy context and the value placed on 
evidence-based policy during the Obama Administration for providing a window of opportunity for 
the NCADAC to develop a national climate assessment that would likely be met with a much more 
favorable reaction from the White House than in years past and for the PEPFAR SAB to be 
established.   
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEPFAR SAB AND NCADAC CHARTERS AND MEMBERSHIP  
  There are no major discrepancies in the categories of information included in the PEPFAR 
SAB and NCADAC’s charters: the type of information required in each document is set by FACA 
law. The major differences between the two documents are manifest in the objectives and duties of 
each committee. As discussed in Chapter 5, the objective of the PEPFAR SAB was to provide 
advice “concerning scientific, implementation, and policy issues related to the global response to 
HIV/AIDS”. This objective is broad and while some additional information is provided about what 
scientific, implementation, or policy issues OGAC wanted advice on, even that is rather vague. For 
example, the charter indicates that the SAB is to “advise on global evaluation and research issues”, 
but does not specify which issues.  
  The NCADAC charter is much more specific about what the committee’s objectives and 
duties were. As discussed in Chapter 6, the objective of the NCADAC was three-fold: to synthesize 
and summarize the science on climate change in the United States; provide recommendations for 
how NOAA and partner agencies could sustain the national assessment process so that developing 




major endeavor every four years; and finally, develop the NCA. The charter includes five different 
and specific points about the scope of the NCA.  
  While a reader can glean much more information about the objectives and duties of the 
NCADAC by reading its charter relative to the charter for the PEPFAR SAB, this departure is a 
natural function of the fact that the NCADAC was established essentially to comply with the 
GCRA, whereas the PEPFAR SAB was the first of its kind and was established because 
Ambassador Goosby wanted broad scientific and implementation advice from experts external to 
the government. More specifically, it was clear from the nascent stages of each advisory committee 
what the overall purpose of the committee would be, and the NCADAC simply had a much more 
specific purpose because it was required to by law and was informed by previous committees’ 
efforts, whereas OGAC most likely wanted to keep the scope of the SAB broad to maximize 
flexibility.  
  An additional point of divergence between the charters is the estimated annual operating 
cost and staff support for each committee. The NCADAC charter provides an annual operating cost 
that is greater than the PEPFAR SAB by a factor of 10: the NCADAC indicates it will require $1 
million annually to operate, whereas the PEPFAR SAB estimates it will require $100,000 annually. In 
terms of staff support, the NCADAC charter requests 2.5 years FTE on an annual basis; the 
PEPFAR SAB charter requests 0.5 years FTE annually. Given the scope of the NCADAC’s 
mandate, namely to draft the NCA, this discrepancy is understandable.  
  The outcome of the member selection process was quite similar across the two committees. 
Both committees were large, and were larger than originally envisioned. The plurality of members on 
each committee was affiliated with universities. The NCADAC had more than twice the ex officio 
members that the PEPFAR SAB had, but this is due to the fact that the USGCRP is a program that 




affiliations that are important to have representation from for the NCADAC but not the PEPFAR 
SAB, such as state-level government. Similarly, it was important for the PEPFAR SAB to have 
representation from the UN and global health partnerships, for example, although this would not 
have been a logical choice for the NCADAC.  
Table 7.1.  Summary of PEPFAR SAB and NCADAC Members’ Organizational Affiliation 
Organizational Affiliation Number of PEPFAR 
SAB Members 
of which 
(not US based) 
Number of NCADAC 
Members 
of which 
(not US based) 
University  17 (4) 22 
US Government (ex officio) 5 16 
Private Sector Company 1 7 
Consulting Firm 0 6 
State-Level Government (e.g., public utilities) 0 5 
Research Institution (not affiliated with a university)  15 (6) 2 (1) 
Foundation 3 1 
UN Organization/Global Health Partnership  4 (3) 0 
NGO 3 1 
Think Tank 2 0 
TOTAL 50 60 
 
Perhaps most importantly, and if ex officio members are excluded, what is clear from Table 6.3 is 
that researchers based at either a university or other research institution (e.g., the NIH) constitute 
the majority of members on both committees. 
III. Comparison of Findings Related to Study Aims and Research Questions 
A. Aim 1: The Role of Federal Advisory Committees in the Policy Process 
1. RESEARCH QUESTION 1: WHAT ARE THE MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES BY WHICH SABS  
  FUNCTION, INCLUDING HOW THEY ARE STRUCTURED, IMPLEMENTED, CONVENED, AND  
  OPERATE? 
i. Implementing a FACA Committee 




  Understanding and interpreting FACA rules proved a difficult task for both USGCRP and 
NOAA staff, who had considerable experience with FACA committees, as well as State Department 
staff, who had little experience with such committees. 
  Although the NCADAC stakeholders had a wealth of experience implementing other FACA 
committees and producing previous NCAs, the task of establishing the NCADAC stymied even 
those with that institutional memory. One respondent noted that: 
I mean part of it was it was fairly early in the Administration and I don’t think 
everybody understood how to do these things. I pretty much had to figure it out 
myself. I spent a lot of time talking to GAO about this…we talked to them a lot 
trying to get input about how these things are done.  
In spite of this initial confusion, USGCRP appeared to have a very solid understanding of the rules 
and regulations stipulated by FACA and related laws by the time of the NCADAC’s first meeting in 
April 2011. Again, this likely stems from the experience of USGCRP staff and leadership with 
previous FACA committees and national assessments and more specifically, a concern about future 
legal challenges. As discussed in Chapter 6, the importance of complying with FACA and other rules 
was emphasized at the April 2011 NCADAC meeting, during which there were three sessions 
devoted to briefing NCADAC members on previous assessments, FACA law and the NCADAC 
charter, and ethics rules for special government employees.  
  As described in Chapter 5, OGAC staff also had difficulty navigating the complexities of 
establishing a FACA committee. This task was made even more difficult because the trainings on 
FACA committees were not required. Respondents indicated that while there was a lot of 
information provided about FACA committees (independent of the training) “sift[ing] through the 
legal language to figure out how it applies to our situation is sometimes challenging.” In addition, the 




day-to-day management was not a direct hire and thus was not permitted to attend the training. 
Further, only one staff member attended a training session two years after the first SAB meeting.  
  Even with all of the guidance OGAC staff received when establishing the PEPFAR SAB, it 
was not until early 2013 that staff realized (after attending a FACA training) that conference calls 
held with the entire SAB – meetings that were interim to the annual, in-person meetings – were 
required by FACA to be open to the public. If all-committee calls were held after this realization, 
which occurred in early 2013, they were not announced in the FR or on PEPFAR’s website and 
were not open to the public.  
  The original intent of the FACA legislation was to ensure that there was greater transparency 
in how government agencies were using advisory committees. Subsequent case law has helped to 
clarify the original legislation. In spite of the spirit of the law and efforts to provide greater 
assistance to agencies by clearing up some of the ambiguous language in the legislation, findings 
from both case studies indicate that there remain substantial hurdles to smooth implementation of a 
FACA committee. Politics aside, navigating a government agency’s various departments or bureaus 
to obtain consistent and accurate information about the FACA committee implementation process 
seems difficult at best. Further, the courts have ruled that agencies are to be left to interpret the 
FACA law how they see fit, so additional clarification to the legislation itself or through case law 
does not appear to be an option. At a minimum, it may behoove agencies to open trainings on 
FACA committees more widely.  
b) FAC Member Selection 
  It was clear from both case studies that the processes of developing an initial pool of 
potential advisory committee members and then selecting a final list of individuals to appoint to the 




HIV/AIDS, and given the history of the national climate assessments and the fact that the PEPFAR 
SAB was the first of its kind for OGAC, it is not surprising that politics played a substantial role in 
the member selection process.  
  However, the member selection process for both committees was also highly personal. The 
relationships between government agency staff and advisory committee Chair(s)/ members had a 
substantial influence over not only which individuals were included in the initial pool from which 
potential committee members were drawn but also, which individual(s) were ultimately appointed as 
Chair or Co-Chairs and to the committee as members. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, one 
negative implication of government agency staff’s ability to exercise their personal preferences for 
who sat on the committee – both based on area of research expertise and personality – was that the 
committee could have been perceived to be or actually been biased and/or unbalanced which, in 
turn, could result in a reluctance of committee members to challenge government agency views or 
positions and/or provide advice and recommendations which are not truly independent.  
  If the exertion of personal preferences for member selection on FACA committees is 
problematic, it was not readily apparent from the two cases included in this research. More broadly, 
and as noted in Chapter 5, some level of bias may be inevitable given the relatively small number of 
individuals with niche expertise in the scientific or implementation matters under the purview of 
FACs. The importance of selecting members who are trusted by the establishing agency and can 
collaborate effectively as a committee to carry out the work outlined in their charter can further 
narrow the pool of potential committee members.  
  Ultimately, the role of pre-existing relationships and the power of their influence over 
myriad advisory committee characteristics points to the potential value of analyzing the social 
network among the three categories of respondents. While it is apparent from these two case studies 




not clear at the initiation of the research that this was the case. Without researching these 
connections in more depth, it is not clear ex ante how connected the stakeholders are both within 
each stakeholder group and across groups, how long-standing the connections are, and what is the 
origin of the connection as well as to what extent and how the connections have changed over time. 
For example, it could be the case that a connection between two individuals (A and B) was initiated 
because they were colleagues at the same organization, but then individual A left to work for the 
agency that funded the organization, and individual B is now serving as a member of the advisory 
committee to the agency that employs individual A. Without a social network analysis, the dynamics 
and intricacies of how FAC stakeholders are connected are not readily apparent. 
c) FAC Membership Bias and Balance 
  The NCADAC and the PEPFAR SAB both struggled with concerns about potential bias of 
committee members and lack of balance of perspectives, but for different reasons. As discussed in 
depth in Chapter 6 and again briefly above, the member selection process for the NCADAC was 
highly politicized. The White House and NOAA leadership rejected the initial composition of the 
committee because it felt the NCADAC was not as balanced as it could be; this concern was the 
impetus for releasing the FR notice to request additional nominations. The effort to ensure that the 
NCADAC membership was balanced in its perspectives and not biased was likely motivated by the 
importance of the NCADAC being perceived as legitimate by a variety of stakeholders and to stave 
off concerns about future legal challenges.  
  Concerns about bias on the PEPFAR SAB were related to the primary function of PEPFAR, 
namely as a funder of HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment programs. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, respondents noted that many of the PEPFAR SAB members received large amounts of 




that these individuals were not as candid as they would otherwise be if they were not receiving 
PEPFAR funds. However, views about the independence of the committee members were mixed, 
with other respondents noting that those who received a lot of funding “just say what they want”. 
Ultimately, this issue of appointing advisory committee members who are also recipients of funding 
from the agency to which they are providing advice boils down to concerns about conflict of 
interest. All nominees to FACA committees go through an extensive clearance and vetting process. 
Key elements of the vetting process include in-depth financial disclosure through the Office of 
Government Ethics Form 450 which is a standard financial disclosure form for the Executive 
Branch. Nominees provide information on assets and income sources, liabilities, positions held 
outside the government, agreements or arrangements (e.g., for continued participation in a previous 
employer’s retirement plan), and gifts and travel reimbursements. With the exception of the outside 
positions and gifts/travel reimbursement categories, the FAC nominees must report all information 
for himself, his spouse, as well as any dependent children.  
  The tension between appointing advisory committee members who are both experts in a 
specific content area (e.g., ocean acidification, HIV infection among people who inject drugs) and 
have an understanding of the policy, politics, and implementation of government programs but do 
not have conflicts of interest may be impossible to resolve. A committee consisting of only content 
experts may not be useful to a government agency if its members do not understand how the agency 
functions and implements its policies. Similarly, a committee consisting only of policy and 
implementation experts may not provide the agency with advice informed by a deep understanding 
of the science underlying the issues the committee was established to address. Ultimately, the 
optimal level of conflict of interest may not be zero. However, it is critical to remember that the 
primary function of any FACA committee is to provide guidance and advice to the federal 




whether the advice of the committee is taken into account. The establishing agency can disregard the 
advice of the committee if the agency feels the committee is too conflicted.  
ii. Managing a FACA Committee 
a) FAC Staff Support 
  The discrepancy between the support provided by USGCRP staff and OGAC staff to the 
NCADAC and PEPFAR SAB, respectively, could not be more stark. The National Climate 
Assessment – and by extension, the NCADAC – had twelve USGCRP staff supporting it. While 
three of these individuals were student assistants, the other staff members were either doctoral-level 
climate scientists or had established expertise in climate science. This staff supported nearly every 
function of the NCA, including coordinating all of the chapter authors (of which there were 240), 
ensuring consistency across the NCA report itself, and coordinating the implementation of the 
stakeholder engagement strategy, among other things. With an endeavor as massive as the 2014 
NCA, it is difficult to imagine how the assessment would have been completed without the level of 
staff support provided to the NCADAC. 
  In contrast, the PEPFAR SAB was supported on a day-to-day basis by one individual at .5 
FTE who was not a direct hire. Other, more senior OGAC staff also had some responsibility for the 
substantive and administrative components of the SAB, although it is not clear what percentage of 
their time was devoted to the SAB (although it was certainly less than 50 percent). It seemed that the 
lack of staff support from OGAC had negative implications for the SAB. As an example, 
respondents indicated that it was often the case that SAB meeting agendas were distributed to the 
committee within only a few days of the meeting itself, which left the committee members little time 
to prepare. OGAC struggled with the lack of staff support as well: “The first year was a huge 




more people who could devote more time to it.” 
  Although the question of whether the NCADAC and the PEPFAR SAB were a “success” 
falls outside the scope of this research, it does seem that a committee’s operating efficiency is 
improved when it receives adequate staff support. Further, from the agency’s perspective, staffing a 
committee appropriately may actually enable the committee to be more useful to the agency. 
b) FAC Organizational Structure 
   The concept of an organizational structure applies primarily to the NCADAC, which had a 
Chair, two Vice-Chairs, and an Executive Secretariat. As noted in Chapter 6, these positions were 
identified in the NCADAC bylaws. The PEPFAR SAB had a Chair identified in the FACA database, 
but many respondents were unclear who the Chair was. Their surprise at hearing who was 
“officially” Chair suggests that the sample of respondents included in this study were somehow 
unaware of whom the Chair was or that several individuals from OGAC were the “face” of the 
agency during SAB meetings and it was unclear who was actually chairing. This researcher’s 
observations of several PEPFAR SAB meetings support the latter conclusion.  
  Findings from the two case studies suggest that the leadership and management style of the 
Chair can be an important factor in how efficiently committee meetings are run. In addition, 
whether the committee Chair is affiliated with the establishing agency on a contractual basis may 
affect perceptions of the independence of the committee’s recommendations. 
c) FAC Ad-Hoc Working Groups 
  As a result of both the number of members and the scope of the objectives of the 
NCADAC and the PEPFAR SAB, ad hoc working groups were established so that each committee 
could actually accomplish the objectives set out in their charters. Respondents from both cases 




committees the working groups were focused on substantive (not administrative) issues, although 
the NCADAC did have two working groups devoted to process issues 
(communications/stakeholder engagement and the peer review process for the draft NCA).   
  Participation on the working groups was voluntary, although some respondents in the 
PEPFAR SAB case study indicated that Ambassador Goosby may have suggested some individuals 
participate on certain working groups, depending on the topic.  
  One interesting departure between the two committees is that the NCADAC members were 
asked to select the working group(s) on which they wanted to participate at the first meeting. Prior 
to that meeting, USGCRP had already developed a draft outline for the 2014 NCA, and the working 
group list matched that outline. The draft outline was informed by the year-long planning efforts 
and events held during 2010. While the proposed outline was subject to change pending discussion 
and approval by the NCADAC, in fact, the draft version bore substantial similarity to the version 
approved by the NCADAC. In contrast, the PEPFAR SAB created its working groups in a much 
more ad hoc manner. Further, they were created in response to Ambassador Goosby’s request as 
well as the committee’s own requests.  
iii. Convening a FACA Committee 
a) Setting FAC Meeting Agendas 
  The NCADAC’s specific objective to draft the NCA meant that there was very little latitude 
in terms of what topics were included on meeting agendas: from meeting to meeting, agendas 
included progress updates on the NCA. Naturally, the scope of these updates changed as the NCA 
was being written. At the initial meetings, the NCADAC moved quickly to approve the outline for 
the NCA and set the working groups that would actually carry out the tasks. As the assessment was 




delivering the assessment was discussed as needed. From attending the meetings as an observer, it 
appeared that the Executive Secretariat did a substantial amount of work outside of the full 
committee meetings: issues were usually presented to the committee for information or for decision, 
but there was very little discussion that followed and meetings often ended early.  
  In contrast, the agendas for the PEPFAR SAB meetings were not governed by the need to 
deliver a major assessment of the scientific issues under the SAB’s purview. As discussed in Chapter 
5, the agenda items were set both by SAB members as well as by Ambassador Goosby. Frequently, 
there was insufficient time for discussion due to there being too many agenda items for the time 
allotted, members of the SAB were actively engaged in discussion and debate, and the Chair often 
did not curb discussion to adhere to the agenda. As a result, the agenda had to be re-arranged, and 
respondents felt that the advisory board was not being used as effectively as it could otherwise be. 
  Findings from both case studies suggest that the pre-existing relationships between 
government agency staff and civil society were influential on the issues discussed by the advisory 
committee. A similar pattern was observed of those relationships between the advisory committee 
Chairs/members and civil society. While some of the influence exerted by civil society came through 
formal channels, such as the public comment period held at the end of each advisory committee 
meeting, much of it seemed to occur informally, namely by email, phone, or conversations between 
specific members of civil society and government staff or committee members. Findings suggest 
that this pattern of communication was primarily initiated by the members of civil society. The 
ability of these individuals to reach out directly to government staff and/or committee 
Chair(s)/members was predicated on long-standing mutual trust and respect built through 





2. RESEARCH QUESTION 2: TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE THEORETICAL DISCONNECT  
  BETWEEN THE LITERATURE ON THE HEALTH POLICY PROCESS AND THE LITERATURE ON  
  EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY HAVE EMPIRICAL SUPPORT? 
  As described in depth in Chapter 2, traditional models of the policymaking process – 
independent of whether research is involved – describe the policy process as a sequence of steps or 
a cycle including agenda setting, formulation, implementation, and evaluation (Buse et al., 2005). 
Underlying these traditional models is the assumption that policymaking is a linear process and by 
extension, that policymakers make rational decisions at each stage. In turn, this assumption implies 
that there would be a direct relationship between evidence and policy decisions at each stage and 
moreover, that “research precedes the policy solution to a pre-defined problem” (Buse et al., 2005, 
p.160). Critics argue that the traditional model of policymaking ignores its reality: that policymaking 
is inherently complex.  
  Other models of the policy process attempted to address some of the shortcomings of the 
traditional model. Lindblom argued that small, incremental changes in policy are not only all that is 
feasible, but also are advantageous over major shifts because incrementalism reduces the complexity 
of the process as well as the number of policy options that need to be considered. Cohen’s garbage 
can model suggests that it may not be possible to make decisions pro-actively, since problems and 
solutions emerge from the garbage can when new opportunities arise (Nutley, 2007). Kingdon’s 
multiple streams model focuses primarily on agenda setting and suggests that issues will rise to the 
policy agenda when problems with feasible solutions come to the attention of policymakers during a 
time of a favorable political environment. Both the garbage can and multiple streams model “suggest 
that research…may enter policy through diverse and indirect routes and from a variety of different 
sources” (Nutley, 2007, p.97). 




policymaking, in spite of its flaws. Not only does “the rational, linear model of the relation between 
research and policy still tends to inform the day-to-day working assumptions of many researchers 
and policymakers”(Buse et al., 2005, p.160), research can still play a role at each stage of the process. 
At the agenda setting stage, research can “help clarify the nature of issues of concern, and to push 
such issues onto the policy agenda”(Nutley, 2007, p.93). During the implementation phase, research 
can help define policy alternatives and can help address implementation problems, through process 
evaluations, for example. During the evaluation stage, research can make a “substantial 
contribution,”(Nutley, 2007, p.93) since evaluation involves research by definition (Buse et al., 2005, 
p.160).  
  Separate from models describing the policy process are models describing the relationship 
between research and policymaking. These models are discussed in depth in Chapter 2 and applied 
to the findings of each case study in Chapters 5 and 6. They are reviewed again briefly here as part 
of the synthesis across the two case studies. Caplan’s two communities model suggests that 
researchers and policymakers exist in two completely separate cultures and that policymakers rarely 
use research (Caplan, 1979b). This model is not refuted by this research but it is not entirely 
supported by the findings either. Support for the two communities model is found in the fact that 
establishing an advisory committee is an explicit acknowledgement that a government agency needs 
and/or wants assistance using research. Respondents in the PEPFAR SAB case noted that this was a 
motivation for establishing the SAB and that while the government had some expertise, there was a 
need for additional experts outside of government. The NCA could not have been drafted without a 
diverse committee of experts. As noted in Chapter 6, one of the respondents indicated that because 
the government did not have staff with the appropriate scientific knowledge there was really no 
other option than establishing a FACA committee to ensure that the NCA was drafted, given that 




  The evidence that does not entirely refute the model is the informal communication that 
occurred in both case studies. However, this communication occurred between respondents in the 
NGO community and government agency staff, not between researchers and agency staff.  
  The issue of selecting members to sit on the advisory committee is particularly relevant to 
the two communities model: if a committee is comprised of individuals who do not understand the 
policymaking process or the realities of agency-level implementation, the concept of researchers and 
policymakers existing in two separate cultures is only amplified. Thus, while there could be concerns 
about conflict of interest, selecting committee members who are both content experts and are well-
versed in policy and program implementation is critical.  
  Perhaps, then, the isolation between the researcher and policymaker communities is driven 
by the policymakers: many of the SAB members who were researchers, at least in the PEPFAR case, 
had a blend of research and implementation expertise, whereas the government agency staff had 
expertise in the implementation arena. The blend of expertise held by many PEPFAR SAB members 
may be more of an exception than a rule among FACs given that PEPFAR is a program which 
provides funding for the implementation of HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment programs 
which are often evaluated by the implementers who often are trained as researchers. Other 
government agencies may also provide funding to the organizations with which their FAC members 
are affiliated, but the funding may be for research in less applied settings.   
  Wingens’ general utilization theory model suggests that research use occurs when there is 
interaction between the systems in which policymakers and researchers exist. This interaction 
happens when a change in social context occurs that in turn prompts a change in policy issues. 
However, for research to be used, it must be “adapted, recreated, and transformed”(Nutley, 2007, 
p.100). The background for each case study highlighted the treatment of both the scientific 




Administration and how there was a marked change in the perspective on these issues as well as in 
the role for research in public policy when President Obama took office (Haskins, 2011; Orszag, 
2009). This change in social context seemed to prompt a change in which policy issues were 
considered feasible to address and each advisory committee adapted and transformed (but did not 
re-create) the relevant science in the process of delivering the NCA and the recommendations from 
the PEPFAR SAB. It is unclear what exactly is meant by “use” in this context, and as such, it is 
difficult to ascertain the extent to which the general utilization theory model is supported by this 
research aside from OGAC’s adoption of the SAB’s recommendations about treatment as 
prevention. 
  Lomas’ linkage and exchange model conceptualizes research and policy as processes, not 
products, which suggest that there are numerous opportunities for there to be mutual influence 
between research and policy (Lomas, 2000). The political and institutional contexts are critical to the 
linkage and exchange model, which argues that decisions are more likely to be shaped by these 
contexts than they are to be rational and determined by research. Findings from both case studies 
suggest that the political and institutional contexts were, in fact, important influences on which 
issues were considered by the NCADAC and the PEPFAR SAB for discussion. OGAC’s adoption 
of the SAB’s recommendations on treatment as prevention provides an example of a decision being 
based on research, but it is unlikely that the political and institutional environment within OGAC and 
the US government more broadly played no role. 
  Weiss’s enlightenment model views the influence of research on policy as a phenomenon 
that occurs gradually as the concepts and perspectives generated by a body of research diffuse 
through various subtle and indirect pathways (Weiss, 1979). The relevance of the enlightenment 
model to this research is somewhat suspect; establishing a FACA committee is not subtle nor is it 




climate change and research on HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment to the members of the 
PEPFAR SAB and the NCADAC, respectively, as well as to the government agency staff managing 
the committees, then the enlightenment model seems more applicable. 
  Weiss also proposed the knowledge-driven model which assumes that knowledge will be 
used by policymakers simply because it exists. However, she argues that this model is more relevant 
for basic research and if scientific findings “affect government decisions…it is not likely to be 
through the sequence of events posited in this model” (Weiss, 1979, p.427). Indeed, as indicated by 
the findings from both case studies, it was clear that policymakers were not using the knowledge 
generated by research, or at least were not using it to the extent that they could have, which was one 
of the motivating factors for establishing the PEPFAR SAB and to some extent, the NCADAC 
(although establishing the NCADAC may have been driven more by a need for a group of experts 
to draft the NCA).  
  Finally, the problem solving model, also put forward by Weiss, suggests that policymakers 
search for already-existing research once they are faced with a decision or commission specific 
research when a knowledge gap is identified (Weiss, 1979). In either pathway to research use, 
empirical evidence is applied directly to a specific policy issue, which is then resolved because the 
gap in knowledge is filled. There is some support for this model within the PEPFAR SAB case 
study. Respondents indicated that part of the reason why the SAB was established was to legitimize 
increasing the investment in ART because at the time, skeptics across the U.S. government were 
questioning the cost-effectiveness of anti-retroviral therapy and arguing that funding should be 
directed away from treatment and towards prevention. The results of the HPTN 052 trial had not 
been released, but a number of observational studies had already indicated that ART can be effective 
in reducing the risk of transmission of HIV among sero-discordant couples (Bunnell et al., 2006; Del 




between stakeholders within USG about how funding should be allocated. It may have been the case 
that Ambassador Goosby had a policy goal in mind, namely to increase PEPFAR’s allocation to 
ART, and created the SAB to have his goal validated by a group of independent experts external to 
the government. 
  Overall, it seems that the findings from each case study suggest that there is not a conclusive 
answer to the question of whether there is empirical support for the disconnect in the policy process 
and evidence-based policy literature. Examples exist in each case study that support some models 
but not others, or support one element of a model but refute its other characteristics. This is not 
surprising given this study’s scope: with only two case studies it is certainly not possible to 
extrapolate to all FACs about the extent to which their processes and interactions with policymakers 
support or refute various models and theories proposed in the literature. The primary objective of 
each FAC as outlined in the charter, and especially whether it is to provide broad advice, like the 
PEPFAR SAB, or is to deliver a specific product, like the NCADAC, may influence the extent to 
which it is even feasible to observe if and how policymakers react to and integrate the advice and 
recommendations from FACs into policy. More specific to this study, the fact that the 2014 NCA 
was delivered to the President and Congress obfuscates efforts to attribute or even trace policy 
action back to the NCA’s findings. In contrast, the PEPFAR SAB provided very specific 
recommendations in response to a very specific request from Ambassador Goosby regarding what 
PEPFAR guidance should be in light of the findings from HPTN 052. It may be the case that for 
this second research question, the differences between the two selected cases are just too substantial 
to synthesize findings into a meaningful conclusion.  
3. RESEARCH QUESTION 3: HOW DO FACS FACILITATE AND IMPEDE THE USE OF EVIDENCE  
  BY POLICYMAKERS? 




committees could facilitate the use of evidence by policymakers. Respondents indicated that 
committee members can serve as translators of scientific information who understand the 
implications of that information for policy and can then make recommendations which may help to 
resolve controversies or ideological debates. The perceived legitimacy of the advisory committee was 
also noted as an important factor in facilitating the use of evidence. More specifically, respondents 
noted that having respected academics from an array of disciplines as committee members is critical. 
For the NCADAC in particular, the NCANet was noted as an important component that would 
help the NCA recommendations translate to lower levels of government or into the private sector. 
  The concept of a committee impeding the use of evidence was more easily grasped by 
respondents from the NCADAC case than the PEPFAR case. Many respondents in the PEPFAR 
case study took it as a given that any policy on HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment would be 
based on the best science available. Those who did offer suggestions for how an advisory committee 
could impede the use of evidence had responses similar to respondents from the NCADAC case 
study: flawed member selection, namely appointing “big names” who do not have content expertise 
or a good understanding of how the government implements its programs, was viewed as a major 
way for advisory committees to impede the use of evidence. In addition, respondents across both 
cases indicated that the establishing agency has a responsibility or a duty to the committee to be 
clear about its expectations and share information in a candid way so that the committee could be as 
effective as possible. 
B. Aim 2: Contribution of Contextual Factors to Adoption of Committee 
Recommendations 
  With the caveat that the only observed adoption of advisory committee recommendations 
during the study period was OGAC’s adoption of the SAB’s recommendations on treatment as 




White House on evidence-based policy in terms of potentially adopting any advisory committee’s 
recommendations. Respondents indicated that having “the right people in leadership” is critical and 
that “it starts with the President”.  
  There is a fundamental difference, however, between the two case studies in terms of what 
government entity receives each committee’s recommendations. The NCADAC delivered the 2014 
NCA to Congress, as required by the GCRA. The PEPFAR SAB delivered its recommendations to 
OGAC under Ambassador Goosby. Thus, even though there was a favorable political climate 
emanating from the White House, NCADAC stakeholders were not optimistic that Congress would 
act on the recommendations put forward in the NCA. Indeed, much of the action taken on climate 
change during the Obama Administration has been through Executive Orders.  
  The issue of what entity receives an advisory committee’s recommendations seems to play an 
important role in the potential feasibility of adopting those recommendations. Relying on a Congress 
with a Republican majority to take legislative action on climate change is not likely to be fruitful. In 
contrast, if a committee delivers its recommendations to the leadership of an agency, it is possible 
that the agency would have more latitude in adopting the committee’s recommendations. 
  In addition, the number of agencies that may be affected by an advisory committee’s 
recommendations may also play a role in how feasible it is to fully adopt and implement committee 
advice. The NCADAC had 16 ex officio members, mainly because the USGCRP serves as a 
coordinating body for 13 agencies involved in climate change. In contrast, there were six ex officio 
members on the PEPFAR SAB. PEPFAR funding is funneled primarily through USAID and CDC, 
whereas the recommendations contained in the 2014 NCA affect 13 agencies at a minimum. 
C. Aim 3: Stakeholder Engagement with FACA Committees 




engagement with the PEPFAR SAB and the NCADAC is that there was little civil society 
engagement with either committee, that civil society engagement with the NCADAC was highly 
structured and organized via the NCAnet, and that there was a far more nuanced dynamic occurring 
between NGOs and the advisory committee members and government agency staff involving 
informal “offline” (i.e., not using the official public comment period) mechanisms of 
communication. Further, the informal communication that was occurring was influenced heavily by 
already-existing and long-standing personal relationships. Finally, it was apparent that the 
mechanism built into FACA for engagement with the public – the mandatory public comment 
period held at FACA committee meetings – was ineffective. 
  Across both case studies, respondents in all categories of interviewees expressed surprise at 
how little interaction there was between civil society – especially NGOs and advocacy groups 
working on global HIV/AIDS or climate change – and the PEPFAR SAB or NCADAC, 
respectively. Respondents indicated that because the committee meetings were not widely publicized 
there was little knowledge in the climate change and HIV/AIDS advocacy communities that 
meetings were occurring. While FACA requires that the meetings are announced in the FR, 
respondents indicated that no one ever checks the FR. Further, while meeting announcements were 
added to the PEPFAR SAB website they were not announced on the main PEPFAR website nor 
were they sent out via listservs to the HIV/AIDS NGO community in Washington, DC. Thus, it 
was often the case that individuals were unaware that SAB meetings were occurring. The NCADAC 
had its own website as well and meeting announcements were placed there, along with meeting 
agendas and any documents that could be made publicly available. But, like the PEPFAR SAB, an 
individual interested in attending a NCADAC meeting would have to take the time to check the 
website periodically to be informed of meetings (assuming they were not checking the FR on a 




  Although both committees took an additional step beyond merely posting meeting notices in 
the FR, as is required by FACA law, by creating websites for the committees, it seems clear that 
taking additional measures to release information about committee meetings would help to inform 
civil society when meetings were occurring, at a minimum. This could be done by announcing 
committee meetings on major listservs that are used for communication among civil society groups. 
To the extent that meeting agendas were available in advance of the meetings, it would be helpful to 
include such documents in meeting announcements so that members of the public could determine 
whether it was worth their while to attend the meeting and/or prepare public comment. 
IV. Conclusions 
  Although the findings from case studies cannot be generalized in a probabilistic sense, they 
may still be relevant to other contexts. The findings from the PEPFAR SAB and NCADAC case 
studies, as well as from this cross-case analysis, may be comparable to other studies of FACs. 
Comparability in this context refers “the degree to which the parts of a study are sufficiently well 
described and defined that other researchers can use the results of the study as a basis for 
comparison” (Khan & VanWynsberghe, 2008b). Related concepts of “naturalistic generalizability” 
or “transferability” refer to the extent to which “working hypotheses” generated from case study 
research are appropriate for understanding other cases, which in turn is a function of how similar 
the potential cases are to the original case (Gomm, Hammersley, & Foster, 2000). Yin rejects 
defining generalizability as analogous to probabilistic generalizability and as described in Chapter 4, 
refers to analytic generalizability. He notes that analytic generalizability is not automatic, but can be 
achieved through replicating findings in multiple cases (replication logic). Yin notes that conducting 





  The literature suggests that the extent to which a case may be generalizable to other contexts 
may depend on the heterogeneity of the “population” of potential cases. If the assumption can be 
made that the population is comprised of nearly identical units, then the likelihood that a single case 
or a small number of cases could be broadly transferable or generalizable to other contexts is high. 
However, if there is a great degree of diversity across the pool of potential cases in areas that are 
consequential for the research, then transferability is more limited. Selecting cases strategically, based 
on the information – even if limited – that is known about the population of cases, can improve 
transferability (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gomm et al., 2000).  
  The findings from the NCADAC and PEPFAR SAB cases could be transferable or 
generalizable to other FACs within limited parameters, namely FACs established by agencies with a 
common function. However, the difference between the two committees’ primary objectives should 
be taken into consideration when generalizing the findings of this research. More specifically, the 
findings from the NCADAC case study are likely to be more generalizable to other FACs with very 
focused objectives which include drafting a major assessment synthesizing the state of the science in 
a particular area. Similarly, the findings from the PEPFAR SAB case study are likely to be more 
generalizable to FACs established to provide broad advice and guidance to an agency on a range of 
issues that fall under the purview of that agency.  
  While additional segregation of the pool or population of potential cases (i.e., other FACs) 
by primary objective may enhance the analytic generalizability of this study’s research, there are 
conclusions which are applicable to FACs with any objective. These conclusions and 




CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION 
I. Policy Implications and Recommendations 
  Based on the findings of the two individual case studies and the cross-case analysis, there are 
9 preliminary implications and recommendations for policy. The following suggestions are offered 
with the hope that government agencies, advisory committee members, and civil society will take 
them into consideration when future committees are established. 
A. Implications and Recommendations for Government Agencies 
 Government agency leadership and staff should consider and define ex ante a detailed scope of work for 
the FAC and clearly communicate expectations for the committee about successfully meeting the agency’s 
expectations. 
  This recommendation is offered with the understanding that issues may arise ad hoc which 
the establishing agency may need the committee to address. However, apart from unexpected 
matters requiring the committee’s attention, the host agency has a responsibility to be clear and 
transparent with the advisory committee Chair(s) and members regarding the specific issues on 
which it would like the committee to provide advice; what, if any, products (i.e., reports) are 
expected from the committee; and under what timeframe the agency expects the committee to 
deliver. If any of these expectations change during the committee’s tenure, the establishing agency 
has a duty to inform the committee. Whether the charter needs to be amended to reflect these 
changes would be left to the discretion of the agency in consultation with the DFO, CMO, and legal 
advisors. This type of iterative process of updating and managing expectations would help to ensure 
that the establishing agency obtains from the committee what it expects, that the committee delivers 
on said expectations, and ideally, would mitigate the likelihood that the establishing agency would 
perceive that the FAC had ‘failed’ because it did not deliver. 




additional guidance on what issues or scientific questions the agency expects the committee to 
provide advice that are developed well in advance of the first committee meeting and then 
distributed with sufficient time for committee members to review the guidance and formulate 
responses. The committee should be permitted to discuss and debate the guidance provided as well 
as to suggest that additional issues be added to the overall scope of the committee’s agenda and/or 
that some of the original issues proposed by the agency be eliminated.  
 Government agency leadership should ensure that adequate staff time and resources are dedicated to 
effectively implement, manage, and administer its advisory committees.  
  As noted in Chapter 7, a major difference between the PEPFAR SAB and the NCADAC 
was the staff support provided to each committee. As noted in Chapter 5, respondents in the 
PEPFAR case thought that the SAB could have been more useful to OGAC if more staff or more 
staff time had been dedicated to overseeing the SAB’s operations and that the SAB could have been 
more efficient in completing its tasks with additional OGAC staff support. Although government 
agencies are nearly always operating in a resource-constrained environment, it is clear that without 
sufficient staff resources, establishing an advisory board can become an unfunded mandate, which 
compromises the potential effectiveness of the board.  
  Serious consideration should be given to re-balancing employees’ responsibilities when an 
advisory committee is in the nascent phases of implementation to maximize the committee’s 
effectiveness. A staff dedicated to managing the advisory committee not only can provide 
administrative support to the committee (e.g., setting up and effectively managing committee 
meetings and conference calls, receiving and responding to committee members’ questions, assisting 
with the production and distribution of documents for committee meetings) thereby helping the 
committee itself to conduct its work in a more efficient manner, but can also help to ensure that 




wants the committee to provide advice and recommendations. The need for substantial staff support 
seems to be particularly acute with large advisory committees. 
  Based on the findings from this research, the specific amount of staff time or the ratio of 
staff to committee members that would be optimal for a committee’s effectiveness likely varies 
considerably by the expected outcomes of the committee. FACs like the NCADAC, which are 
tasked with delivering a major report or assessment of the state of the science on a certain issue, are 
likely to need a substantial amount of staff support at a variety of levels, from administrative to 
highly technical. FACs providing advice on recommendations on broad issues primarily in response 
to the requests of agency leadership may need less staff support on a standing basis, but should have 
access to additional support as needed. For example, when a FAC working group is tasked with 
delivering its report to the full committee, it may need both administrative and technical assistance. 
Thus, the model for a FAC like the PEPFAR SAB may involve not only having more staff/more 
staff time devoted to the committee on a standing basis, since 0.5 FTE on an annual basis was not 
sufficient, but also the flexibility to pull staff into FAC support on an ad hoc basis.   
 Training of FACA committees should be open to staff directly involved with the administration of agency 
committees, including non-direct hires.  
  Given the restrictions on government agency hiring, it is often the case that individuals are 
hired through contractors, rather than directly by the agency itself. However, as discussed in Chapter 
5, non-direct hires are prohibited from attending trainings on FACA committees. To the extent that 
this is a government-wide rule, and not just a rule of the State Department, consideration should be 
given to opening the FACA trainings to all agency employees hired under any mechanism who are 
spending at least 50 percent of their time administering a FACA committee. While agencies may 
perceive direct hires to be an investment in the future of the agency, and thus the more appropriate 




hired through contracting mechanisms. Prohibiting them from enrolling in trainings that are directly 
relevant – if not critical – to their job duties compromises the effectiveness of the staff with respect 
to their duties related to supporting the FAC and potentially, the effectiveness of the FAC. 
 To ensure that advisory committees are perceived and actually do provide independent advice, the Chair(s) 
of the committee should be an individual who is not an employee or consultant of the establishing agency.  
  In addition to difference in staff support received by the PEPFAR SAB and the NCADAC, 
another major departure point between the two committees was the affiliation of the chair. The 
chair of the PEPFAR SAB was technically a consultant to OGAC as well as a professor at UC 
Berkeley. In contrast, the chair of the NCADAC had no contractual affiliation with the DOC, 
NOAA, or USGCRP at the time he served as chair. If a primary goal of implementing a committee 
under FACA is to obtain advice and guidance from individuals who are independent of the 
establishing agency, then committee chairs should not be employees in any form of the establishing 
agency. This is not to say that the independence of the advice from committees with government 
employees or consultants who serve as chairs is always compromised. Rather, this recommendation 
is provided with the acknowledgement that even the perception that a committee’s advice is not 
fully independent can compromise the legitimacy of the committee.  
  When selecting a chair, the agency should consider an individual’s prior experience chairing 
FACA or other similar advisory committees, leadership style, ability to manage robust debates and 
discussions, and ability to keep the committee on task while maintaining a good rapport with 
committee members. These management skills should be considered in balance with scientific 
expertise: a chair with no experience in the scientific matters under the purview of the FAC but with 
a wealth of FAC management expertise would not be a logical choice. In reality, the option is not 
likely to be dichotomous, but an agency may have to weigh one skill set over another in selecting a 




as well as their personalities, the desired outcomes of the FAC, and the perceived or proven ability 
of the proposed chair to navigate agency politics in a facile manner.  
 Agencies should create and manage websites for their advisory committees that serve as “electronic homes” 
where all committee meeting announcements, agendas, presentations, reports, and minutes, are housed.  
  Taking measures to ensure that all committee materials are posted in a timely manner on a 
website devoted specifically to the FAC helps to ensure that the activities and proceedings of FACA 
committees are fully transparent. In addition, maintaining up-to-date websites could strengthen 
engagement with civil society: with meeting materials posted online, the public has the opportunity 
to review the content and provide feedback through formal or informal channels. In addition, 
agencies should consider posting meeting announcements through listservs which are actively read 
by civil society groups, especially listservs maintained by NGOs on certain issues relevant to the 
topics addressed by the advisory committee. As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, respondents indicated 
that public attendance at committee meetings may have been low because meeting announcements 
were publicized in the FR, which few people read. By going a step beyond what FACA law requires 
and publicizing the meeting announcements more widely, agencies could engage more productively 
and frequently with civil society.  
B. Implications and Recommendations for Advisory Committee Members 
 If not directed by the establishing agency, committee members should determine a process for decision-
making.  
  A primary impetus for drafting the FACA legislation in the early 1970s was to ensure that 
advisory committee proceedings and decisions were more transparent so that the American public 
and Congress could hold agencies accountable for their actions. Although meeting minutes are 
required by law, the extent to which the FAC or establishing agency complies with this is unclear. 




of the four meetings held during the committee’s tenure have “executive summary” documents that 
are apparently intended to serve as meeting minutes, but neither of these documents reflect the 
tenor of the discussions held during the meetings. 
  Further, findings from the PEPFAR case study indicate that it was not always clear how the 
SAB arrived at its recommendations. In contrast to the NCADAC, which implemented and 
documented a comprehensive process to guide how the committee would make decisions (i.e., by 
consensus), the PEPFAR SAB did not have such measures. While debate among PEPFAR SAB 
members about a variety of topics was robust, in the absence of a specific set of procedures 
outlining how the board made final decisions about what recommendations and advice to present to 
OGAC, there seems to be room for additional transparency. Further, if a committee chooses not to 
make decisions by consensus and there are dissenting opinions from the majority, having a pre-
determined decision-making process in place would permit these dissenting opinions to be noted in 
the meeting minutes.  
C. Implications and Recommendations for Civil Society 
 Civil society should encourage government agencies to increase efforts to raise awareness about committee 
meetings. 
  A common theme in both case studies was the lack of awareness among civil society groups 
about committee meetings. Surprisingly, both the PEPFAR SAB and the NCADAC had websites 
which announced the date, time, and location of upcoming meetings. While maintaining such 
websites provides an opportunity for the public to stay informed of committee proceedings, it 
requires proactive effort by civil society to visit the website (or check the FR). In the spirit of FACA, 
it seems appropriate for the agency to make an additional effort to provide notice of committee 
meetings to key NGOs or other organizations so that such information can be released via blogs, 




agencies, given that these organizations manage the listservs through which FACA committee 
information would be announced.  
  Aside from the potential to glean useful perspectives from members of civil society, more 
productive engagement could facilitate civil society buy-in to FAC decisions and processes. 
However, more frequent engagement by civil society – at least through the formal public comment 
period mandated by FACA – is not guaranteed to provide useful inputs to the FAC. Given how 
short the public comment period is (usually 10-15 minutes) and that the DFO can request that any 
attendees from the general public submit their comments in advance of the meeting, concerns about 
civil society groups being disruptive or otherwise distracting seem unlikely to be realized. 
 Civil society groups should engage more actively in committee proceedings.  
  A surprising finding in both case studies was the low level of attendance and engagement by 
civil society at committee meetings. Respondents indicated that there were myriad factors which 
contributed to this, including that the meetings were not well-publicized, were not a good use of 
time, did not permit any engagement with committee members, and that there were other channels 
(e.g., conferences) through which civil society could access committee members. While all of this 
may be true, it seems possible that there is a negative feedback loop that could be at the root of the 
lack of engagement: irregular attendance at committee meetings and/or a poor experience with the 
public comment period could discourage civil society groups from attending future meetings. 
However, civil society groups could be helpful to the establishing agency and the advisory 
committee, by disseminating information about the committee’s proceedings via blog posts, for 
example, and by reaching out to non-Washington, DC-based audiences that may have a vested 
interest in a committee’s discussions but may not otherwise be able to attend the meetings in person. 




HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment services to individuals in other countries. Essentially, 
more regular and active engagement on the part of civil society may in turn make such engagement 
more fruitful. 
D. Implications and Recommendations for Revisions to the FACA Legislation 
 FACA committee working groups should continue to not be subject to the rules and regulations of the 
FACA legislation.  
  More specifically, should revisions to the FACA legislation be proposed, any meetings, 
discussions, or conference calls among working group members should not be required to be open 
to the public. Although arguments have been made that FACA committees are lacking in 
transparency because of the allowance for working groups to conduct their business away from the 
“sunshine” of the public, the results from the two cases included in this research suggest that there 
is limited interest among the public in the overall advisory committee’s operations, let alone what is 
occurring at the working group level. Further, the logistical challenges of ensuring that all working 
group activities are open to the public and the delays in delivering on tasks that would likely ensue 
should the requirements be changed outweighs calls to open all committee operations to the public. 
Finally, there are measures to prevent working groups from having undue influence on the advice 
and recommendations received by the agencies: FACA requires that all working group reports, 
advice, and recommendations have to be approved by the advisory committee as a whole, and then 
presented by the committee (not the working group) to the host agency. 
II. Strengths and Limitations 
  This study is the first empirical assessment of advisory committees focused on health issues 
established by government agencies at the federal level in the United States. The existing literature 




that U.S. government agencies which include public health in their purview consistently and 
systematically establish federal advisory committees to provide recommendations regarding how 
research and evidence can be integrated into policy, gaining a better understanding of how FACA 
committees operate makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of how research and 
evidence are integrated into the health policy process.   
  The case studies included in this research allowed for a novel and ‘real-time’ examination of 
two high-profile advisory boards addressing issues that are high priorities in the public policy arena. 
PEPFAR is the largest program to combat a single disease by any nation. Climate change is a major 
policy priority for the Obama Administration. In the context of ever-increasing healthcare costs in 
the United States and concerns that funds allocated to international development could be better 
spent on domestic issues, ensuring that health policy is based on sound evidence is increasingly 
important. This may be especially true for policies determining what programs receive government 
funding and the volume of funding allocated. This research makes a novel contribution to the 
understanding of how advisory committees, which provide one mechanism for evidence to be 
integrated into public policies – function in the policy process.    
  Despite these strengths, there are limitations to the study. The policy implications and 
recommendations outlined above are based on findings from only two case studies. However, the 
concern about limited theoretical generalizability is mitigated to some extent because replication 
logic was used in the Stage 1 screening process: “if two or more cases are shown to support the 
same theory, replication may be claimed” (Yin, 2009, p.38). The transferability of the findings to 
other advisory committees should ultimately be tested through additional research, but the 
similarities in the findings across the two cases suggest there is relevancy for other FACA 
committees. 




selected into the study: not all invited participants responded and some declined. Thus, the data 
obtained from the in-depth interviews may not be representative of the respondents’ interview 
category (i.e., committee members, NGO/advocacy staff, and government officials). In particular, 
committee members who were relatively uninvolved in meeting discussions or did not attend 
committee meetings were not included in the pool of respondents because they were not 
recommended through the snowball sampling process. Those who did participate recommended the 
investigator avoid such individuals because it was assumed they would not have provided rich data. 
Further, there may have been a missed opportunity to obtain additional and rich data because a few 
of the participants who did not respond to multiple requests for an interview or declined to 
participate were recommended by a large number of other participants. 
  Finally, the gap between data collection and analysis is a departure from the grounded theory 
method and may have compromised theoretical sampling. Recall bias may have affected which 
topics were ultimately raised because the investigator was relying on her memory of topics raised in 
previous interviews and her interview notes – rather than coded interview data – to guide which 
topics were raised during interviews. However, all interviews were transcribed by the investigator 
which enabled her to remain close to the data. 
III. Future Research 
  There are several areas for future research which are suggested by the two case studies. First, 
additional advisory committees established by agencies should be studied to assess whether the 
findings of the two case studies included herein are supported in different contexts. While the two 
advisory committees included in this study were intentionally selected to have many common 
characteristics, they differed on one key parameter, namely their objective to their host agency. Thus, 




established for the purpose of providing broad scientific guidance and advice, as the PEPFAR SAB 
did, as well as committees that are established for the purpose of producing a report assessing the 
state of the science in a particular area, as the NCADAC did. Research that included a larger number 
of case studies would also provide more data about how agency-established FACs function and play 
a role in the policy process.  
  Further, advisory committees established by other authority – statutory authority/Congress, 
authorized by law, and Presidential – should be studied and compared to those established by 
agencies to better understand how institutional factors affect an advisory committee’s role in the 
policy process. In addition, including FACs established by other types of authority would allow for a 
more robust comparison of how effective FACs are as a mechanism to facilitate the use of research 
and evidence by federal policymakers.  
  Related to future research that would study additional advisory committees by applying the 
same selection criteria used in this study as well as slightly varied criteria is research that expands the 
timeframe or boundary for each of the case studies. Extending the timeframe of the case studies so 
that the research is more longitudinal in nature would facilitate an assessment of the impact of the 
committees’ recommendations on policy or program. While the PEPFAR SAB’s recommendations 
on treatment as prevention were adopted almost immediately by OGAC, it may be the case that this 
is the exception to the rule. While attributing policy or program change to a committee’s 
recommendations would likely be difficult given the number of other sources of advice which an 
agency is receiving, conducting a follow-up study several months or even years following the release 
of a committee’s recommendations or report could be useful. Such a study could provide 
information about any lasting effects of a committee, including whether a committee’s 
recommendations were adopted and why or why not. 




understand the overall landscape of FACs for health so that individual case studies could be placed 
within a larger context. Such research could draw on some of the findings from this study and utilize 
the FACA database to extract and analyze various basic characteristics of committees, such as the 
organizational affiliation of the committee chair (i.e., government staff or external organization) as 
well as the committee members, the number of committee members, the estimated budget and FTE 
requested, among other variables. This approach would involve substantial time and effort because 
the data on each variable exist on individual webpages within a specific FAC’s record in the 
database, so the data on each page would have to be downloaded and then compiled with the rest of 
the data on that committee, which in turn then would have to be compiled with the other 
committees of interest.  
  In addition, committee charters could be analyzed to assess the scope of the committee 
objectives to better understand whether committees such as the NCADAC which had a primary 
purpose of developing the NCA are rare. While the response rate may be low, a survey could be 
developed and sent to the DFO and chairs for each health FAC that addressed questions which 
could not be answered from the data available in the FACA database but may not need to be 
answered through an in-depth interview, which is time consuming for both the respondent and the 
researcher. Alternatively, the survey could be administered as a part of the in-depth interview. This 
would potentially increase the response rate. The survey could address issues such as how the 
committee arrives at decisions (i.e., by consensus or other method) and whether there are working 
groups and if so, how many, since a current issue for FACA is whether the law should be amended 
to require FAC working groups to be subject to the same rules as the overall FAC. To facilitate 
responses, the survey questions would likely need to be multiple choice and include few, if any, 
questions with open-ended responses. 




committee stakeholders. Findings from both case studies indicate that the pre-existing professional 
relationships among the three categories of respondents can have a substantial influence on a variety 
of advisory committee characteristics, including the composition of the committee and what issues 
the committee discusses. There are three combinations of relationships that are of particular interest 
among the triad of respondent categories: government agency staff-advisory committee 
Chair(s)/members; government agency staff-civil society; and advisory committee 
Chair(s)/members-civil society.  
  While it might be understandable and even desirable for government agency staff to select 
committee members who are ‘known entities’ and thus already linked in some capacity to the agency 
and/or to each other, it is not clear ex ante just how connected these stakeholders are. A social 
network analysis would facilitate understanding of questions related to how dense (i.e., connected) 
the different stakeholders are to each other within and across stakeholder groups, as well as the 
power dynamics of individuals within the network (i.e., how central certain individuals are within the 
network). To the extent that the density of a social network analysis – or at least the density of the 
government agency staff and advisory committee members’ portion of the network – serves as an 
indicator of how like-minded a group is in their thinking, such an analysis could also provide data on 
the homogeneity or diversity of a committee’s perspectives.  
IV.  Conclusions 
  There are numerous mechanisms and opportunities, both formal and informal, for research 
and evidence to play a role in the policy process at all of its stages. This research sought to describe 
how one of the more formal mechanisms – advisory committees under the purview of FACA – are 
implemented, function, and managed. To date, there is a gap in the literature on even this most basic 




this study also sought to understand what and how contextual factors in the policy environment at 
the agency level and in the overall US government influenced the uptake of recommendations 
provided by FACs. Similarly, the role of key stakeholders – especially NGOs – was assessed to 
better understand whether and how these groups attempt to influence FAC proceedings and/or 
outcomes.  
   The two case studies conducted for this research provide a number of novel insights into 
the questions outlined above. While it is neither possible nor appropriate to claim that the findings 
from this research are applicable to all FACs, the findings do suggest that in spite of the 
heterogeneity that exists across FACs, there are important common elements that point to 
opportunities for future research as well as policy action, as outlined above. Although FACA has 
been clarified through additional legislation and case law since it was passed in 1972, these efforts 
are clearly not sufficient. Without definitive guidance on FACA rules, agencies have a wide berth 
with which the law can be interpreted. In turn, this affects how FACs are implemented, including 
who is appointed as chair, how transparent meeting proceedings are, and the information made 
available to the public. The member selection process is highly political and inevitably results in a 
FAC that is not without conflicts of interest. However, a FAC with no conflicts of interest may be a 
FAC with little utility to the establishing agency, as FACs need members with both implementation 
and scientific expertise. The political context – namely the perspective of the President and 
Congress about the role of evidence in policy – influences not only whether the recommendations 
from a FAC are used but more fundamentally, whether a FAC would be established at all.  
  Although the implementation and administration of FACs is challenging, and while the 
agencies which establish them are not bound to act on the recommendations they provide, federal 
advisory committees under FACA can provide a valuable opportunity for the US government to 




for the executive branch to obtain advice from a group of external experts through a mechanism 
other than a FACA committee, the benefits of establishing a FAC may outweigh the costs. FACA 
committees can provide credibility and legitimacy to an agency’s decisions and can help to resolve 
inter-agency or inter-governmental disputes about the appropriate (i.e., evidence-informed) path for 
policy action. Further, the original intention behind drafting FACA has carried through over the past 
40 years: the influence of external advisors on the executive branch is kept in check, the process of 
providing advice to the government is relatively transparent except in rare cases when national 
security might be compromised by having meetings open to the public, and the individuals who 
comprise FACs are ostensibly balanced in their perspectives, among other factors. While there is 
potential for a FAC to serve merely as a rubber stamp for an agency’s decisions, this research 
suggests that agencies and FAC members alike take the role of the FAC very seriously and view 
FACA committees as a valuable mechanism which can facilitate policy and programs being 
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Appendix E. FACA Committee Categories and Topics 
 
Category Topic (* included as public health) 
1. Agriculture   1. Agriculture   
2. Forestry  
3. Plant Biology   
4. Rural Development   
2. Animals   5. Animal Sciences and Husbandry   
6. Fish and Wildlife   
7. Veterinary Medicine   
3. Applied Science   8. Applied Sciences   
9. Engineering   
10. Mathematics   
11. Statistics   
4. Arts   12. Arts and Humanities   
5. Aviation   13. Air Traffic   
14. Airline Sciences   
15. Aviation   
6. Basic Science   16. Basic Sciences   
17. Biology   
18. Chemistry   
19. Materials Research   
20. Microbiology   
21. Physics   
7. Business   22. Business and Domestic Commerce   
23. Business and Domestic Commerce   
24. Industry   
25. Management Science   
26. Manufacturing   
27. Patents and Trademarks   
28. Small Business   
8. Civil Rights   29. Children   
30. Civil Rights   
31. Disabled   
32. Equal Opportunity   
33. Minorities   
34. Native Americans   
 35. Women   
9. Communications   36. Broadcasting and Communications   
37. Radio   
10. Computer Technology   38. Applications   
39. Computers   
40. Information Technology   
41. Internet   
42. Semiconductors   
43. Systems Engineering   
44. Technology   
11. Data   45. Data Integrity   
46. Data Quality   
47. Privacy   




Category Topic (* included as public health) 
49. Schools and Academic Institutions   
50. Sports   
51. Training   
13. Eligibility   52. Eligibility Programs   
53. Social Services  
54. Welfare   
14. Emergency   55. Disaster Assistance   
56. Earthquake, Flood, and Fire Hazards and 
Administration   
57. Emergency Preparedness and Management   
15. Energy   58. Energy   
59. Fuel   
60. Fuel Transportation   
61. Mining and Minerals   
62. Natural Resources   
63. Nuclear Power   
64. Pipelines   
16. Environment   65. Earth Sciences   
66. Environmental Issues   
67. Oceans and Atmospheric Sciences   
68. Waste Disposal   
17. Federal Employment   69. Compensation   
70. Federal Employees and Personnel   
71. Public Services   
18. Finance   72. Banking   
73. Credit   
74. Finance   
75. Investment   
76. Securities   
77. Tax   
19. Food and Drugs   78. Biotechnology   
79. Food and Drugs (*)   
80. Medical Devices   
20. Government   81. Federal Government   
82. Internal Federal Government   
83. State Government   
84. Tribal Government   
21. Health   85. Aging (*)   
86. Biodefense (*)  
87. Health Care (*) 
88. Hospitals (*)   
89. Medical Education (*) 
90. Medical Practitioners (*) 
91. Nutrition (*)  
92. Nutrition for Women, Infants and Children (*)   
93. Physical Fitness (*)  
94. Public Health (*)  
95. Radiation Protection (*)   
96. Safety (*)   




Category Topic (* included as public health) 
98. Treatment (*)  
22. Honorary Award   99. Honorary Award   
23. Housing and Urban   100. Housing and Urban Development   
101. International Programs, Studies, and Diplomacy   
24. International   102. International Economic Policy   
103. International Law   
 104. International Organizations   
25. Justice   105. Criminology   
106. Drug Abuse Policy and Enforcement   
107. Justice   
108. Juvenile Justice   
109. Law Enforcement   
110. Prevention   
111. Research and Statistics   
26. Labor   112. Employment   
113. Job Training   
114. Labor   
115. Occupational Safety and Health (*)   
116. Wages   
117. Workforce and Occupations   
27. Land   118. Conservation and Preservation   
119. Grazing Areas   
120.  Land Management and Use   
121. National Parks, Sites, Trails, Recreational Areas 
Monuments   
28. Legislation   122. Administrative Procedure   
123. Jurisprudence   
124. Legislation   
125. Regulations   
126. Regulatory Negotiation   
127. Rulemaking   
29. Medicine   128. Diseases (*)   
129. Health and Health Research (*)   
130. Illnesses (*)   
131. Medicine and Dentistry (*)   
132. Radioactive Materials   
30. National Defense   133. National Security and Defense   
134. Overseas Security Issues   
31. Rehabilitation   135. Rehabilitation and Disability   
32. Research   136. Basic Research   
137. Research and Development   
 138. Research and Statistics   
33. Retirement   139. Employee Welfare   
140. Pensions   
141. Retirement   
142. Social Security   
34. Science and Technology   143. Innovation   
144. Science and Technology   
35. Social Sciences   145. History   




Category Topic (* included as public health) 
147. Social Sciences   
36. Space   148. Space and Aeronautics   
37. Tax   149. E-payments   
150. Information Reporting  
151. Administration   
152. Compliance   
153. E-file   
154. Electronic Services   
38. Trade   155. Competitiveness   
156. Exports and Imports   
157. International Commerce and Investment   
158. Trade and Trade Policy   
39. Transportation   159. Boating and Navigation   
160. Highways   
161. Mass Transit   
162. Railroads   
163. Surface and Vehicular Transportation   
40. Veterans   164. Benchmark and Clinical Trials Research Studies   
165. Veterans and Veterans' Medical Care   
41. Water   166. Harbors   
167. Rivers   
168. Water Use   






Appendix F. Results from Phase 1 Screening (ordered chronologically by fiscal year) 
 
FY Agency Committee Name Topic Function 
1993 EPA Clean Air Act Advisory Committee env National Policy Issue Advisory Board 
1993 USDA National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods safety Scientific Technical Program Advisory Board 
1993 HHS Board of Scientific Counselors  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health safety Scientific Technical Program Advisory Board 
1993 DOE Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Advisory Committee env National Policy Issue Advisory Board 
1996 EPA Pesticide Program Dialogue Committee env National Policy Issue Advisory Board 
2003 HHS CDC/HRSA Advisory Committee on HIV and STD Prevention and Treatment   Other 
2003 USDA Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 21st Century Agriculture env Other 
2004 HHS National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity safety Scientific Technical Program Advisory Board 
2005 DOD Veterans' Advisory Board on Dose Reconstruction hc Scientific Technical Program Advisory Board 
2006 DOT National Emergency Medical Services Advisory Council osh Other 
2008 HHS Board of Scientific Counselors  National Center for Injury Prevention and Control safety Other 
2008 HHS Board of Scientific Counselors  Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response ph Scientific Technical Program Advisory Board 
2011 DOS The President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief ph Other 





Appendix G. List of SABs Excluded under Phase 2 Screening with Rationale for Exclusion 
 
FY Agency Committee Name Topic Function Exclude/ 
Include 
Rationale 
1993 EPA Clean Air Act Advisory Committee env National Policy Issue 
Advisory Board 
exclude - Advises on the implementation and enforcement 
of a specific piece of legislation (compromises 
literal replication) 
- Potential time boundary problems because the 
committee has existed for 22 years  
1993 HHS Board of Scientific Counselors  
National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health 
safety Scientific Technical Program 
Advisory Board 
exclude - Focuses entirely on research – extent to which 
committee recommendations affect broader 
public health policy is unclear 
1993 DOE Environmental Restoration and Waste 
Management Advisory Committee 
env National Policy Issue 
Advisory Board 
exclude - Focuses on nuclear waste cleanup. Active 
projects in 14 states in the U.S. 
1996 EPA Pesticide Program Dialogue Committee env National Policy Issue 
Advisory Board 
exclude - Reports to the EPA Administrator through the 
Office of Pesticide Programs, Office of Chemical 
Safety and Pollution Prevention;  
- Provides guidance specifically to the pesticide 
program (i.e., not the entire EPA) 
2003 HHS CDC/HRSA Advisory Committee on 
HIV and STD Prevention and 
Treatment 
  Other exclude - Topic areas addressed by this SAB have overlap 
with PEPFAR SAB. Since theoretical replication is 
a key component of Phase 2 case study selection, 
it is important to have variation across the case 
studies, including in the substantive topics 




FY Agency Committee Name Topic Function Exclude/ 
Include 
Rationale 
2003 USDA Advisory Committee on Biotechnology 
and 21st Century Agriculture 
env Other exclude - Current focus of SAB (to develop practical 
recommendations for strengthening coexistence 
among different agricultural production methods) 
is tangentially related to public health. 
2004 HHS National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity 
safety Scientific Technical Program 
Advisory Board 
exclude - Focus of SAB is very narrow 
- Unclear whether SAB would be a viable case 
study given secret/classified nature of SAB topic 
and frequency of closed meetings 
2005 DOD Veterans' Advisory Board on Dose 
Reconstruction 
hc Scientific Technical Program 
Advisory Board 
exclude - Topical focus of SAB is very narrow (i.e., 
provide "review and oversight of the Radiation 
Dose Reconstruction program and make such 
recommendations on modifications in the 
mission, procedures and administration of the 
Radiation Dose Reconstruction Program.") 
- Focus on veterans as a population is also narrow. 
2008 HHS Board of Scientific Counselors  
National Center for Injury Prevention 
and Control 
safety Other exclude - Spoke with David Grossman as key informant 
re: scope and objectives of SAB.  
- He clarified that the major activity of the BSC is 
to serve NIH as a secondary advisory council and 
to make recommendations for grant funding.  
2008 HHS Board of Scientific Counselors  
Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency 
Response 
ph Scientific Technical Program 
Advisory Board 
exclude - Provides advice about operations and 
administration of programs rather than technical 
guidance on implementation of public health  





Appendix H. Final Interview Protocol 
 
Introduction 
1. Can you please describe for me what have been your interactions with science advisory 
boards under FACA?  
 
2. What has been your experience to date with the PEPFAR [NCADAC] advisory board 
[committee]? 
 
Role of SABs in Evidence-Based Policy 
I would like to ask you some questions about how science advisory boards function and their role in 
the policy process. 
1. What was the rationale for establishing the PEPFAR SAB? 
 
 PROBE: What is your sense of why the PEPFAR SAB was established when it was? 
 [NOTE: This question is only relevant to the PEPFAR case because the NCADAC has 
 existed in various forms for several years.] 
 
2. Could you describe the process involved with your appointment to the SAB? 
 
3. What is your sense of how the decision-making process went for appointing the Chair? 
 
4. What is your sense of how the PEPFAR SAB [NCADAC] is balanced in terms of the areas of 
expertise, organizational affiliation, etc. of the other board [committee] members? 
 
5. To what extent do you think the size of the SAB [NCADAC] had an effect on its proceedings, 
efficiency, etc.? 
 
6. How do you think science advisory boards facilitate the use of evidence by policymakers? 
 
7. How do you think science advisory boards impede the use of evidence by policymakers? 
Factors Contributing to Adoption of SAB Recommendations 
I would like to ask you some questions about the impact of science advisory boards. 
1. Could you please describe your sense of the role of the agency in the board’s [committee’s] 
work? 
 
2. How would you characterize a successful science advisory board? 




3. How would you characterize a failed science advisory board? 
 PROBE: If an advisory board is considered a ‘failure’, what does that mean? 
4. What factors do you think contribute to policymaker’s use of the recommendations from 
science advisory boards? 
 
5. If policymakers do not use the recommendations from a science advisory board, what factors 
do you think contribute to this? 
Stakeholder Strategies 
I would like to ask you some questions about the strategies different stakeholders use to help to 
facilitate the uptake of recommendations put forth by science advisory boards. 
1. To what extent do you think the public comment period is effective? 
 
2. What are other mechanisms for external stakeholders – especially advocacy groups, civil society, 
or NGOs – to engage with the SAB [NCADAC]? 
 
3. How do you think advocacy groups/government officials/SAB members could be more 
effective in ensuring that SAB recommendations are used by policymakers? [Note: adjust per 
type of respondent.] 
 PROBE: What other strategies could advocacy groups/government officials/SAB members 
 use to facilitate the uptake of SAB recommendations? 
4. Who else would you recommend I speak with about this issue? 
 









Appendix I. Curriculum Vita 
 
L I S A  K .  F L E I S H E R                          





Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD 
PhD Candidate, Health Policy and Management (expected 2015) 
Dissertation: The Role of Science Advisory Boards in U.S. Federal Health Policy  
 
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD 
MPH, 2005 
 
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 
BA, Human Biology, 2001 
Minor: Spanish 
 
Universidad de Salamanca, Spain 
Visiting Student, Spring 2000   
 
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE  
The World Bank, Washington, DC         August 2012–present  
Short-Term Consultant, Health, Nutrition and Population Unit (HNP), Human Development Network 
 Co-author of a case study on verification of results-based financing for health in Afghanistan.  
 Co-author of a cross-case analysis of six country cases (Afghanistan, Argentina, Burundi, Panama, 
Rwanda, United Kingdom) of verification of results-based financing for health programs. 
 Drafted and edited content of nine e-learning modules for results-based financing in health online 
course. Assisted with course design and implementation.  
 Co-managed the Health and the Economy work program. Co-authored two HNP Discussion papers 
on trends in health financing and the political economy of government health spending. 
          May–September 2012 
Short-Term Consultant, East Asia and Pacific Health, Nutrition and Population Unit  
 Analyzed health outcome, macro-economic, and health financing data for assessment of macro-fiscal 
implications of attaining universal health coverage in Vietnam. 
 Drafted policy note assessing macro-fiscal context of universal coverage in Vietnam. 
 
The United States Agency for International Development, Washington, DC                     2011–2012 
Technical Advisor, Global Health Initiative  
 Provided technical guidance on the development and implementation of two Evidence Summits on 
‘Community and Formal Health Systems Support for Enhanced Community Health Worker 
Performance’ and ‘Increasing Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives’. 
 Designed and administered survey on USAID Mission support for performance-based incentives 
(PBI). Analyzed survey results and briefed Global Health Bureau and front office staff on key 
findings. 
 Drafted workplan for PBI Interest Group and Executive Summary of existing USAID guidance 





The World Bank, Washington, DC         Summer 2010 
Short-Term Consultant, Health, Nutrition, and Population Unit, Human Development Network 
 Wrote working paper on aid effectiveness and achievement of the health MDGs. Worked with the 
Health Results Innovation Trust Fund, International Health Partnership and Related Initiatives, and 
Health Systems Funding Platform teams to consider possible impacts of improved aid effectiveness 
on health outcomes. 
 
ONE, Washington, DC                       2009 
Senior Policy Associate, Global Policy Team 
 Managed health portfolio for policy team. Developed ONE’s position on major events such as the G8 
Summit (health component), launch of President Obama’s Global Health Initiative, GFATM 
Replenishment meeting, and U.S. budget proposals for global health.  
 Advised senior leadership on strategic directions for health advocacy efforts, especially innovative 
financing mechanisms and replenishment of global health funds. Served as ONE’s focal point for 
collaboration with the global health advocacy community.  
 Drafted ONE’s positions on developments in HIV/AIDS, malaria, vaccines, health systems, maternal 
and child health, and innovative financing.  
 Advised U.S. Government Relations team on health-related lobbying activities. Reviewed and edited 
draft legislation. 
 Wrote health and aid effectiveness sections of ONE’s 2009 DATA Report, tracking progress of G8 
donor commitments for development in Africa. Drafted briefs for ONE principals, health and aid 
effectiveness content for website, and blog postings on key health issues. 
 Supervised research assistant and intern. Served as liaison to ONE’s field team staff and volunteers. 
 
Abt Associates, Bethesda, MD                2007–2008 
Senior Analyst, Health Systems 20/20 Project 
 Co-managed technical assistance to Kenya Ministry of Health for National Health Accounts (NHA) 
estimation. Analyzed financial flow data; advised on use of findings for policy; and co-led data 
analysis and report writing workshops. Briefed USAID/Kenya mission staff on project progress and 
findings.  
 Co-managed design and implementation of health system assessment in Nigeria. Served as technical 
lead for health financing module. Led focus group discussions with state government officials to 
collect state-level data; analyzed data; and co-authored report on findings.   
 Developed case study for facilitating use of reproductive health NHA data to inform resource 
allocation decisions by Rwanda’s Ministry of Health. Advised on revision of Liberia NHA survey 
instrument. 
 Assisted with design and implementation of PEPFAR-funded evaluation of transition program for 
men released from drug rehabilitation facilities in Vietnam. 
 Contributed to successful bids for $300 million DFID-funded Partnership for Transforming Health 
Systems (PATHS2) project in Nigeria and $10 million Health Policy Initiative (HPI) project in 
Vietnam. 
 
The World Bank, Washington, DC                2005–2007 
Junior Professional Associate, Health, Nutrition, and Population (HNP) Unit 
 Assisted with management and priority setting of Health Systems and Financing Policy team. Edited 
Health Financing Revisited: A Practitioner’s Guide and co-authored other publications on global 
health aid architecture. Analyzed health financing and morbidity and mortality data to perform cross-




 Core member of team which developed the World Bank Strategy on Health, Nutrition, and Population 
Results. Wrote introduction on impact of investment in health on economic growth and annex on 
trends in global aid architecture. Coordinated inputs from regional staff on Strategy implementation 
plans.  
 Assisted with development of Sub-Saharan Africa-focused World Bank/WHO initiative to coordinate 
agendas of global health donors; wrote and edited briefs and presentations for HNP Unit and World 
Bank senior management; assisted the Acting Director of HNP with special assignments. 
 
The Center for Law and the Public’s Health, Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, 
Baltimore, MD                2004–2005 
Research Assistant 
 Assisted with CDC-funded project to develop voluntary and legal interventions for health 
departments to use to reduce transmission of STIs and HIV among individuals who patronize 
commercial sex venues. 
 
FHI360, Arlington, VA                          2003–2004 
Associate Program Officer, YOUTHNET Program 
 Coordinated among USAID/Washington, YouthNet staff, and country-level colleagues to design, 
implement, monitor, and evaluate reproductive health and HIV/AIDS projects for youth in Sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America. 
 
AcademyHealth, Washington, DC              2001–2003 
Research Assistant, Changes in Health Care Financing and Organization (HCFO) Initiative  






 Ajay Tandon, Lisa Fleisher, Rong Li, Wei Aun Yap. 2014. “Reprioritizing government spending on 
health: pushing an elephant up the stairs?” World Health Organization South-East Asia Journal of 
Public Health Special Issue on Universal Health Coverage 3 (3-4): 206-213. 
 Trujillo, Antonio, Amanda Glassman, Lisa K. Fleisher, Divya Nair, and Denizhan Duran. 2014. 
"Applying Behavioral Economics to Health Systems of Low- and Middle-Income Countries: What 
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Hypertension in Latin America”, Journal of Aging and Health Volume 25 Issue 8.  
 Schieber, George, Pablo Gottret, Lisa Fleisher, and Adam Leive. 2007. “Financing Global Health: 
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Additional Publications 
 Tandon, Ajay, Lisa Fleisher, Rong Li, and Wei-Yun Yap. January 2014. Reprioritizing Government 
Spending on Health: Pushing an Elephant Up the Stairs? HNP Discussion Paper: The World Bank, 
Washington, DC.  
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